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would like to thank Hal Cole, Guillermo Ordóñez and participants at the Macro Workshops
at the University of Pennsylvania. I also thank the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
for the Dissertation Fellowship during the Summer 2017, which allowed me to significantly
improve my job market paper.
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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Dirk Krueger

This dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first two chapters, I study the
welfare and distributional consequences of government policies in economies with credit
constraints and heterogeneous agents. Given the complexity to compute such models, the
third chapter reviews the basics of parallel computing in macroeconomics.
In the first chapter, I quantitatively assess the welfare maximizing policy during
the Great Recession, when the government had access to two policy instruments: a)
offer bailouts to banks, and b) subsidize the mortgage refinancing of households. The
implementation of these instruments involves a trade-off, shaped by a dead-weight loss
caused by foreclosures and an information friction on house prices. The main finding is that
a subsidy-only policy would have generated welfare gains of up to 0.4% in consumption
equivalent terms when compared to the HAMP and TARP benchmark. In the second
chapter, I study the general equilibrium effects of government-supplied student loans
in the educational markets of developing countries. Our main finding suggests that
subsidized student loans can lead to a widening gap in the quality of education offered by
top-10 versus top-50 educational institutions. Given the complexity to compute models
with heterogeneous agents, the third chapter describes the basics of parallel computing
in economics, reviews widely-used implementation routines and compares performance
gains using as a test bed a standard life-cycle problem.

vi

Contents

Acknowledgements

v

Abstract

vi

Introduction

1

1

3

Wall Street or Main Street: Who to Bail Out?
1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2

Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

1.3

The Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

1.4

Quantitative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

1.4.1

Household’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

1.4.2

Mortgage Originators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

1.4.3

Production Firms’ Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

1.4.4

Government’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

1.5

Recursive Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

1.6

Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

1.6.1

vii

1.7

1.8

2

The Great Recession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

1.7.1

HAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

1.7.2

The Information Parameter p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

1.7.3

TARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

1.7.4

Results and Counter-factual Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

General Equilibrium Effects of Student Loans on the Provision and Demand
55

for Higher Education
2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

2.2

Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

2.2.1

The Role of Borrowing Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

2.2.2

General Equilibrium Effects and the Bennett Hypothesis . . . . . . .

64

2.2.3

The Education firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

A Model of the Market for Higher Education with Credit Constraints . . .

67

2.3.1

Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

2.3.2

Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

2.3.3

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

2.3.4

Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

The “Revolución Educativa” of Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

2.4.1

Enrollment and inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

2.4.2

Higher Education institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

2.4.3

The ACCES Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

2.3

2.4

viii

Product Differentiation in the Market for Higher Education . . . . .

88

Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

2.5.1

Evolution of Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

2.5.2

Calibration of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

2.5.3

Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

2.5.4

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

2.4.4
2.5

2.6

3

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

A Practical Guide to Parallelization in Economics

105

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

3.2

Why Parallel? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

3.3

What Is Parallel Programming? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

3.4

When Do We Parallelize? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4.1

An application where parallelization works: Value function iteration 118

3.4.2

An application where parallelization struggles: A random walk
Metropolis-Hastings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

3.4.3

The road ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

3.5

A Life-Cycle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

3.6

Different Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

3.7

Parallelization Schemes on CPUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.7.1

Julia - Parallel for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

3.7.2

Julia - MapReduce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

3.7.3

Matlab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

ix

3.8

3.9

3.7.4

R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

3.7.5

Python . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

3.7.6

C++ and OpenMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

3.7.7

Rcpp and OpenMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

3.7.8

MPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Parallelization Schemes on GPUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.8.1

CUDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

3.8.2

OpenACC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Beyond CPUs and GPUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

3.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
184

Appendices
.1

.2

Wall Street or Main Street: Who to Bail Out? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
.1.1

Steady State Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

.1.2

Computation of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

.1.3

Proves of Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

.1.4

Other Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

General Equilibrium Effects of Student Loans on the Provision and Demand
for Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
.2.1

.3

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

A Practical Guide to Parallelization in Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

x

List of Tables

Wall Street or Main Street: Who to Bail Out?

3

Table 1

Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

Table 2

Model and Data Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Table 3

% of defaulters with income and price shocks on the period of default. 38

Table 4

Productivity Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

General Equilibrium Effects of Student Loans on the Provision and Demand for
55

Higher Education
Table 1

Estimates for the quality production function. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table 2

Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Table 3

Equilibria computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

A Practical Guide to Parallelization in Economics
Table 1

98

105

Number of CUDA cores and memory in NVIDIA GPUs. . . . . . . 170

xi

List of Figures

Wall Street or Main Street: Who to Bail Out?
Figure 1

3

Foreclosure Starts (Mortgage Bankers Association) and House Price Index
(Core Logic). Source: Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) . . . . . . . . . .

5

Figure 2

Subsidy vs. Bailout policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Figure 3

Home Equity Cummulative Distribution - Model vs. Data (SCF 2007) . .

36

Figure 4

State space distributions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Figure 5

Home Equity Cummulative Distribution - Model vs. Data (SCF 2007) . .

38

Figure 6

Model average default rate (%) (a) by age, and (b) home equity (%) . . .

39

Figure 7

Mortgage refinancing as a % of home-owners by age and equity . . . . .

41

Figure 8

Mortgage refinancing as a (%) of home-owners by age. Solid line: refinancing to increase mortgage size. Dashed line: refinancing to decrease
mortgage size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Figure 9

Transitional dynamics of (a) house prices and (b) foreclosure rate. . . . .

47

Figure 10

Equity distribution during transitional dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

Figure 11

Welfare gains in consumption equivalent terms (%) under a subsidy-only

Figure 12

policy, by home equity (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

Default rate by age, before and after the Great Recession. . . . . . . . . .

50

xii

General Equilibrium Effects of Student Loans on the Provision and Demand for
55

Higher Education
Figure 1

% of enrollment in private institutions by country. . . . . . . . . . .

59

Figure 2

Representation of the education decisions on the state space. . . . .

71

Figure 3

Number of students that change their study decision when borrowing constraints change from Ā = 0 to Ā, by ability θ. . . . . . . . . .
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Introduction
Recent computational developments have made it possible to study in a greater detail the
design of optimal government policy in economies with heterogeneous agents, to which
distributional concerns are inherent. This dissertation takes advantage of such developments to study the effect of government policies in two seemingly-different contexts: the
mortgage markets in the U.S. during the recent financial crisis, and the market for college
education in developing countries. In both settings, governments have implemented
policies to alleviate credit constraints. In this sense, financial frictions are at the core of
this dissertation.
In the first chapter, I study the welfare consequences of government policies in mortgage
markets during the Great Recession. Mortgage markets lied in the heart of the Great
Recession. After a drop in house prices, foreclosures tripled from their historical average
and generated large losses to financial institutions. When many of the global systemically
important banks faced solvency problems, the U.S. government implemented a bailout
program to mitigate the losses generated by foreclosures, and a mortgage modification
program to avoid further default from households. The first chapter of this dissertation
studies whether the way in which the bailout and subsidy programs were implemented
was welfare-maximizing. The main finding is that the government could have generated
welfare improvements by expanding the subsidy program to households and eliminating
the bailout program to banks.

1

The second chapter studies the design of subsidized student loan policies for college
education in developing countries. The literature in the economics of education has
identified the existence of a large inefficiency when credit markets are imperfect, as many
high-ability households that face credit constraints are left out of the market. During
the last decade, the Colombian government made an effort to alleviate this inefficiency
by providing subsidized student loans to high-ability households. The literature has
identified a positive impact of these programs on college enrolment. However, there
are general equilibrium consequences of this program that have not been studied. In
particular, the evidence from Colombia suggests that, as the government expanded the
supply of subsidized student loans, the gap in the quality of education offered by top-10
versus top-50 institutions widened. We propose a model in which the divergence in the
quality offered is a consequence of the subsidized student loan program offered by the
government.
The last chapter of the dissertation is an effort to advance the use of parallel computing
in macroeconomics. The computation of most models with heterogeneous agents, such
as the two described above, requires great computational power. The use of parallel
computing has improved the performance achieved by serial computing, by exploiting
the multi-core architecture of modern computers. In this paper, we describe the basics of
parallel computing, discuss the methods to implement it across different programming
languages, and provide the reader with multiple example codes for the purpose of
exposition.

2

Chapter 1

Wall Street or Main Street: Who to
Bail Out?
Housing crises are characterized by a sharp increase in foreclosure rates that generates
losses to mortgage investors. To preserve the solvency of these investors, governments have
historically implemented two policies: a) offer them bailouts (Wall Street), and b) subsidize
the mortgage refinancing of households to prevent additional foreclosures (Main Street).
The implementation of these instruments involves a trade-off, shaped by two frictions.
On one hand, houses lose 20% of their value during the foreclosure process because of
larger depreciation due to vacancy and vandalism. If the government offers complete
bailouts to investors rather than subsidies to households, the economy has to bear the
dead-weight loss of the value lost by foreclosed houses. On the other hand, house prices
have an idiosyncratic component, so the government does not have perfect information on
individual households’ decision to default. Households have incentives to engage in strategic default to qualify for benefits. A subsidy policy transfers resources to households that
were not planning to default in the absence of the policy but avoids the dead-weight loss
of foreclosures. I quantitatively assess the welfare-maximizing policy in a heterogeneous
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agents’ economy and find that a subsidy-only policy would have generated welfare gains
of up to 0.4%, measured as the consumption equivalent variation, as compared to the
baseline calibration that matches the TARP and HAMP programs implemented during the
Great Recession. Households on the left tail of the equity distribution, which benefit the
most from a subsidy program, obtain the largest welfare gains. In contrast, a bailout-only
policy would have generated a welfare loss of 0.8%.

1.1 Introduction
In the U.S., mortgages are the main source of funding for house purchases, used by two
out of three homeowners to finance their home acquisition. Mortgages are collateralized
debt contracts in which borrowers pledge their house as collateral. In case of default, the
property is foreclosed upon and is legally transferred to the lender, to cover for the losses of
the loan. With some exceptions, such as the Great Depression and the Great Recession, the
average yearly foreclosure rate has oscillated around 1.5% of total outstanding mortgages.
During the recent financial crisis, after house prices plummeted more than 20%, the
foreclosure rate almost tripled from an average of 1.52% during 1991-2006, to 4.36% in
2007-2010. This sharp increase in foreclosures generated significant losses to financial
institutions, which are the largest investors in the mortgage market (Antoniades, 2015).
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of foreclosure starts since 1992 and the Core Logic housing
price index (HPI).
During mortgage crises, governments have historically implemented two sets of policies
to preserve the solvency of financial institutions: 1. offer bailouts to cover for the losses
of these institutions, and 2. subsidize the mortgage refinancing of households to prevent
additional foreclosures. During the Great Recession, through the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, the Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
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Figure 1: Foreclosure Starts (Mortgage Bankers Association) and House Price Index (Core Logic).
Source: Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015)

implement both types of policies. First, it approved the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP), which allocated up to $700 billion for investments in institutions that were in
financial distress, through the purchase of troubled assets. These investments implicitly
bailed out the recipient institutions; of the $243 billion invested by 2008,1 the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated a risk-adjusted net present value return of −$61 billion, or
0.5% of the 2007 GDP.2 Second, the Treasury committed $75 billion to subsidize mortgage
refinancing through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), in order to
reduce payments-to-income (PTI) ratios and prevent default.
In a frictionless, full-information and representative agent economy, offering bailouts
to mortgage investors or subsidies for the mortgage refinancing of households would
have exactly the same welfare consequences. If the government could observe which
households are planning to default after a house price shock, it could offer them the
1. These investments do not include loans to automobile companies.
2. Under Section 202 of the EESA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) were required to estimate a semiannual risk-adjusted net present value of TARP. The
first of such reports published by the CBO in January 2009 estimated a risk-adjusted net present value of
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) equal to −$61 billion. Although TARP was not specifically directed
to cover the losses generated by mortgage investments, the primary driver of the crisis was the exposure
to the housing sector (Antoniades, 2015). See Calomiris and Khan (2015) for further details.
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exact amount that would make them indifferent between defaulting or not. This would
prevent the foreclosure rate from rising and financial intermediaries from experiencing
losses. Otherwise, the government could allow foreclosures to rise and transfer to banks
an amount exactly equal to their losses. In the absence of any friction, both strategies
would yield the same welfare outcome.
However, at least two frictions make this policy design non-trivial. On one hand, wide
empirical evidence documents the existence of a 20% − 22% price discount on foreclosed
houses. Using hedonic regression methods, Campbell et al. (2011) find that in the State
of Massachusetts houses that have been foreclosed upon are sold at a price 27% lower, as
compared to houses with similar characteristics that are sold by homeowners rather than
banks. Out of this 27%, they estimate that 7 percentage points correspond to the discount
of banks engaging in fire sales,3 while the remaining 20 percentage points correspond to a
loss of value throughout the foreclosure process, mainly because of a larger depreciation
due to vacancy and vandalism.4 Similarly, using a repeat-sales methodology PenningtonCross (2006) follows a panel of houses over time and finds that when a house is sold after
a foreclosure, its price is 22% lower.5 If the government implements a policy that offers
bailouts to mortgage holders and does not prevent foreclosures, this 20 − 22% value lost
on foreclosed houses represents a dead-weight loss to the economy.
On the other hand, the literature has identified an uninsurable idiosyncratic component
in house prices, which is not perfectly observable by the government.6 Given that the
3. Mayer (1995) argues that in markets with search frictions, urgent sales are made at lower prices because
the quality of the match is lower. This supports the fact that houses in foreclosure are sold at discount, as
the real estate market is highly illiquid and banks have incentives to hold the properties for a short time.
4. Part of this price discount can also be explained by lower investments of households prior to default.
Melzer (2017) finds that homeowners with a high risk of mortgage default cut down substantially on
home improvements, consistent with the debt overhang theory. When households cannot appropriate the
returns on their investment at every state of the world, investment falls. In particular, households with
negative home equity spend 30% less per quarter on home investments, compared to households with
positive equity. Similarly, Harding et al. (2000) find evidence that households with high loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios invest less in their properties.
5. See Pennington-Cross (2006) for a review of the literature.
6. See Case and Shiller (1989); Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Piazzesi and Landvoigt (2015). There are at
least two different sources of idiosyncratic house price risk: a) there are idiosyncratic quality shocks that
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default decision strongly depends on house prices, the government cannot perfectly
observe which households plan to default at every point in time. As a consequence, any
policy that subsidizes the mortgage refinancing of households at risk of default generates
a moral hazard problem, as households that are not in financial distress might engage in
“strategic default” to obtain the benefits. Mayer et al. (2014) estimate that strategic default
can be as high as 10% of total default after the announcement of a mortgage modification
program. Therefore, any policy that subsidizes mortgage refinancing will avoid the deadweight loss of foreclosures, but has to cover the costs of subsidizing strategic defaulters,
as pointed out by Foote et al. (2008) and Mayer et al. (2014). If taxation is distortionary,
levying taxes to subsidize strategic defaulters represents a welfare loss to the economy,
through a distortion of the labor decisions of households.
The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively study the welfare-maximizing policy to
preserve the solvency of financial institutions during mortgage crises, when governments
have the two policy instruments described above. In particular, I study the case of the Great
Recession: I assess the welfare costs of the dead-weight loss and strategic default, and
evaluate counter-factual policies that yield higher welfare outcomes, when compared to the
TARP-HAMP baseline. I use a heterogeneous agents’ life-cycle model with housing and
long-term mortgage markets, calibrated in the initial steady state to match the pre-crisis
U.S. economy. The model is disciplined by using micro estimates on the dead-weight loss
of foreclosures, the magnitude of strategic default and the Frisch elasticity of demand
estimated in the macro literature for the calibration. Then, I replicate the financial crisis
after unexpected shocks to labor productivity and a loan-to-value restriction at origination
hit the economy in 2007, assuming the government implements a policy analogous to
TARP and HAMP. This laboratory allows me to perform counter-factual experiments to
assess the welfare gains of different policies.
scale over time, and b) the housing market is illiquid, so there are one-time shocks that are realized at the
time of sale reflecting the quality of the match. Giacoletti (2016) finds that the idiosyncratic component of
house prices represents 80% of house price variance.
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A heterogeneous agents’ economy is the appropriate laboratory in which to study the
design of a welfare-maximizing policy for two reasons. First, in addition to the frictions
already described, offering subsidies to households or bailouts to banks has redistributional
consequences that affect welfare and have to be taken into consideration. The welfare
consequences of either policy are mainly driven by marginal propensities to consume and
insurance motives, which are fully considered in a heterogeneous agents’ environment
(Mian et al., 2013; Kaplan and Violante, 2014). Second, as pointed out by Foote et al.
(2008), the cost of strategic default in a subsidy policy depends on the fraction of eligible
households that plan to default after an aggregate house price shock. If a large fraction of
the eligible households finds it optimal to default after the aggregate house price shock,
the cost of the information friction will not be large, as the fraction of households that
can potentially engage in strategic default is small. In contrast, if only a small fraction of
eligible households find it optimal to default after the shock, the total amount of subsidies
distributed to strategic defaulters is potentially large. In a heterogeneous agents’ economy,
the welfare-maximizing policy will offer subsidies to certain groups of the population,
based on observable characteristics.
The main result of my paper is that a subsidy-only policy dominates the TARP-HAMP
combination implemented through the EESA of 2008. The reason is that the distortion
generated by the taxes levied to finance strategic default, given the macro estimates of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, is smaller than the dead-weight loss of foreclosure.
For this reason, completely replacing a bailout policy such as TARP with a subsidy policy
analogous to HAMP would yield welfare gains equal to 0.25% in consumption equivalent
terms. The welfare gains are concentrated on the lower tail of the equity distribution, as
households with the highest debt levels receive the largest subsidies. However, households
that do not receive benefits also experience welfare gains, as labor taxes are lower under a
subsidy-only policy. If, in addition, the government implements a better eligibility rule
that targets the households that would not default in the absence of the crisis, and adds an
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age component to the subsidy, the welfare gains rise to 0.4%. Finally, eliminating HAMP
and extending TARP would yield a welfare loss of 0.8%.
This paper abstracts from two additional frictions that arise in this environment. First,
by assuming that the crisis happens after a completely unexpected shock, I abstract from
the moral hazard problem that exists when financial institutions and households anticipate
the government’s policy and engage in overly-risky behaviors prior to the crisis. There
is anecdotal evidence that policy-makers at the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury
ignored any moral hazard concerns at the time of the policy design in 2008. As Timothy
Geithner stated, “Trying to mete out punishment to perpetrators during a genuinely systemic
crisis—by letting major forms fail or forcing senior creditors to accept haircuts—can pour gasoline
on the fire. It can signal that more failures and haircuts are coming, encouraging creditors to
take their money and run. Old Testament vengeance appeals to the populist fury of the moment,
but the truly moral thing to do during a raging financial inferno is to put it out.”7 Second, I
ignore the externalities that foreclosures generate on the price of neighboring houses. The
literature has documented this externality, but its effects are very local and do not seem to
be very large (see Campbell et al. (2011)). In any case, including a price externality would
make foreclosures even costlier, which would reinforce the results obtained in this paper.
Including these two frictions is left for future research.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature to which this paper
is related. Section 1.3 illustrates the main mechanism driving the welfare-maximizing
policy, through a simple example. Section 2.3 presents the heterogeneous agents’ model
used throughout the rest of the paper. Section 1.5 states the definition of a recursive general
equilibrium in this environment. Section 2.5.2 describes the calibration of the model to the
pre-crisis U.S. economy and the main results in the initial steady state. Section 1.7 presents
the main results of the paper and Section 2.6 concludes.

7. See The Greenspan Legacy article in The Economist, published January 5, 2017.

9

1.2 Related Literature
This paper models the mortgage market, so it is inherently related to the extensive literature
on housing and mortgage decisions. My model builds upon Gervais (2002), who models
an economy with heterogeneous agents that optimally choose between homeownership
and renting. Jeske et al. (2013) add to the model the presence of short-term mortgages,
where households have the possibility of defaulting on their debt obligations and the
pricing of mortgages is consistent with the probability of default. This paper also models
the mortgage market and allows for the possibility of default. However, I model long-term
mortgage markets, rather than short-term contracts. In this respect, this paper is close to
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015), Corbae and Quintin (2015) and Hedlund (2016), who
study foreclosures, homeownership, consumption and other macroeconomic aggregates
during the recent financial crisis. I depart from all of these works in that I study the welfare
consequences of a subsidy-bailout policy aimed at preserving the solvency of mortgage
investors.
This model is also related to models that study the welfare effects of fiscal policies
within financial crises, where the economy is modeled in the steady state and counterfactual fiscal policy experiments are performed after an unexpected aggregate shock. A
good example of such a paper is Kaplan and Violante (2014).
As in Jeske et al. (2013), this paper assumes that the idiosyncratic component of
house prices is driven by an idiosyncratic depreciation that is partially observable by the
government. This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence found by Case and
Shiller (1989), Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Piazzesi and Landvoigt (2015), who estimate
large idiosyncratic components in the variance of house prices. The partial observability
of these idiosyncratic shocks generates strategic default after the announcement of any
mortgage refinancing subsidy policy (Foote et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2014).
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This paper is also related to the literature that studies bailout policies. In particular, this
paper studies the ex-post costs of bailouts (Acharya et al., 2014), and abstracts from ex-ante
moral hazard concerns arising from different policy combinations. For this, I assume that
the economy is in the steady state and a one-time, completely unexpected shock hits the
economy, so financial institutions and homeowners do not foresee any government policy
in the steady state. Fahri and Tirole (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2013), Chari and Kehoe
(2016) and Faria-e-Castro (2016) do take into consideration moral hazard.
Given that I am assuming a completely unexpected aggregate shock to the economy, my
model is not appropriate to study any amplification effects of the financial sector during
crisis periods. Two such papers that study the effect of household default decisions during
the Great Recession on the cost of the funding of banks through a financial accelerator
channel are Faria-e-Castro (2016) and Greenwald (2016). Other papers that study fiscal
multipliers in New Keynesian settings are Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) and Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012).

1.3 The Mechanism
This section illustrates the underlying trade-off between bailouts and mortgage refinancing
subsidies through a simplified example, emphasizing the role of the dead-weight loss of
foreclosures and the information friction on house prices. To isolate the mechanism behind
the trade-off, this example abstracts from many of the determinants of mortgage default,
which are later considered in the quantitative model in Section 2.3.
Assume there are two households, denoted H1 and H2, and one bank in the economy.
Each household has a house worth $100 and an outstanding mortgage of $100 on the
house. Mortgage contracts are short-term and last only for one period, default implies
losing the collateral and there is no recourse in the economy. That is, households will
default on current mortgages if and only if they are underwater -they owe more than the
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value of their house-, in which case they lose their house to the bank. Assume the bank,
which is the mortgage holder, has liabilities of $200 and its only assets are the outstanding
mortgages of the households. If there are no shocks to house prices, households will repay
their debt and the bank will break even. Finally, assume that the government knows the
distribution of house prices, but does not observe the price of each individual house.
Suppose there is a completely unexpected one-time shock to house prices that lowers
the price of the house owned by H2 to $80, while the price of H1 remains at $100. After
the shock, the house owned by H2 is worth less than the mortgage debt, so H2 optimally
defaults and its house is foreclosed upon. Given the 20% price discount on foreclosed
housing, the bank only recovers $64 out of the $80 worth the house of H2. Household H1
will repay its debt, as its house price is still worth $100. The bank is now insolvent, as its
$164 revenues are not enough to cover the $200 worth of liabilities.
To preserve the solvency of the bank, the government can choose either of two policies.
On one hand, the government can offer subsidies to households to prevent default. Given
that the government knows the distribution of house prices, it knows that the household
that is underwater would need $20 to find it optimal to repay its mortgage. However, the
government does not observe individual house prices so, if it offers subsidies to mortgage
repayments, both households will claim to be underwater to receive the $20. Therefore,
the subsidy policy to prevent the default of H2 would cost $40 and would preserve the
solvency of the bank, but the government will have to levy $20 with distortionary taxation
to pay to strategic defaulters -household H1-. On the other hand, the government could
let H2 default and offer a bailout to the bank. In this case, the economy would assume the
cost of the dead-weight loss generated by the foreclosure, equal to $16. The cost of the
dead-weight loss is smaller than the subsidies given to strategic defaulters, so a bailout
policy would be welfare maximizing. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of either policy.
Now, assume there are, instead, two households of the type H2 and one household
of the type H1 described above. A subsidy policy that prevents default would have to
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offer $20 to each household in the economy. The cost of such a policy would be $60, out
of which $20 correspond to subsidies to strategic defaulters. Otherwise, the government
could offer a bailout for each of the two foreclosed houses, and the economy would pay
the dead-weight loss, equal to $32. In this case, the dead-weight loss is larger than the
amount necessary to subsidize strategic defaulters, so a subsidy policy is preferable.
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$100 $100
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Household 2
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$20 Subsidy
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$100

$80

Repays

$100 $100
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$100

Mort. House
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Mort. House
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Household
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(a) Subsidy Policy

(b) Bailout Policy

Figure 2: Subsidy vs. Bailout policy
The welfare maximizing policy depends on the size of strategic default, which corresponds to the proportion of households of type H1 versus H2 in the example. If the
economy is populated with a large number of households of type H2, who would default
absent any subsidy program, the cost of the information friction is low and a subsidy
policy is optimal. If, in contrast, the proportion of H1 households is large, a subsidy policy
will spend a large amount on strategic defaulters. In this case, it is optimal to bail out the
banks.
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1.4 Quantitative Model
In this section, I introduce a heterogeneous agents’, life-cycle model with housing and
mortgage markets. Section 1.4.1 describes the economy and defines the problem of the
households, Section 1.4.2 describes the problem of the mortgage holders, Section 1.4.3
states the problem of production firms, and Section 1.4.4 defines the problem of the
government. Later sections describe a baseline calibration of this economy to the pre-crisis
U.S. economy and perform counterfactual experiments to assess the optimal policy.

1.4.1

Household’s Problem

Demographics
The economy is composed of a continuum of households of constant size. Households
live for at most T periods, after which they die with probability equal to 1. At age
t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, the individual faces an exogenous probability πt of surviving to the next
period. By assumption, π T = 0. By the law of large numbers, πt not only is the probability
of surviving to the next period, but also the effective amount of people that survive to
age t + 1. I assume there is no population growth and every period a cohort of newborns
of size 1 enters the economy, so at every point in time the total population size remains


T
t
constant at 1 + ∑t=1
π
∏ j=1 j .

Preferences
Households derive utility according to a period utility function u(c, s, l) from non-durable
consumption c, housing services s, and labor l. Non-durable consumption is the numeraire
good in the economy, and housing can be owned or rented at market-determined prices Ph
and q, respectively. Labor is supplied on a labor market with a competitively determined
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wage w per effective unit of labor supplied. Individuals discount the future according to a
T
discount factor β and maximize their expected lifetime utility E ∑t=1
βt u(c, h, l).

Income Dynamics
Every period, the labor productivity of an individual of age t is the product of two
components: an idiosyncratic shock et ∈ E , and a deterministic age-dependent productivity
ēt , so that, given an amount of labor supplied l, the effective units of labor supplied in the
market are: et ēt l. As in Storesletten et al. (2004), the idiosyncratic productivity shock et
follows an autoregressive process, given by:

log(et+1 ) = ρe log(et ) + σe et+1 ,

et ∼ N(0, 1)

(1)

where ρe < 1 is the persistence of the productivity process, and σe is the standard deviation
of the innovations. The AR(1) process is approximated by a 3-state Markov process with
transition probability matrix denoted as Fe (et+1 |et ), using the procedure described in
Tauchen (1986). The age-dependent productivity ēt follows an increasing path over the first
periods of the cycle, followed by a decreasing path up to age 65 after which individuals
retire, as documented by Hansen (1993).
Labor income is subject to a marginal income tax τl levied by the government to pay
for government expenditures. In addition, the government levies social security taxes
τss , so total after-tax income is equal to (1 − τl − τss )et ēt wl. Taxation is distortionary, so
higher government expenditures will generate larger distortions in the economy. After age
65, individuals retire and receive social security benefits b set in equilibrium through a
pay-as-you-go social security system.
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Housing
There is a perfectly inelastic supply of housing H̄ in the economy available for renting
and owning at market-determined prices q and Ph , respectively. As in Jeske et al. (2013)
and Elenev et al. (2016), I separate the investment and consumption motives of housing
and assume that only rental housing can be used for consumption as housing services s,
so there is no owner-occupied housing. Households decide to own housing h only for
investment purposes and receive benefits through the returns of renting out their property.
The set of available houses for owning and renting is given by H := [0, h̄] I assume that
home-owners can choose to rent any amount s ∈ H, potentially different from the amount
owned h ∈ H. If households own more than what they rent, h > s, I will denote them net
owners, whereas those that rent more than they own, s > h, are net renters.
Every period, owned housing is subject to an idiosyncratic depreciation shock δ ∈
∆ := [δ, δ̄], which is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Fδ (δ) so
home-owners face an idiosyncratic shock to their house value. I assume δ < 0 < δ̄ so
there is idiosyncratic risk of having an increase or fall in the house value. This assumption
embodies the uninsurable idiosyncratic house price risk that home-owners face (Case and
Shiller, 1989; Jeske et al., 2013).
At the end of every period, in order to have a constant housing supply equal to H, I
assume that the homeowner must pay for the house depreciation δPh h whenever δ > 0,
and receives an additional income equal to |δPh h| whenever δ < 0.
The idiosyncratic depreciation δ is private information for the household and is only
partially observed by the government, motivated by Mayer et al. (2014) and Foote et al.
(2008). Assuming that the household draws δ0 ∈ ∆, the government observes δ0 with
probability 1 − p, and δ ∈ ∆\{δ0 } with probability p. Given that the decision to default
depends on δ, the government does not perfectly observe which households find it optimal
to default. In particular, given that all the other state variables of the household are
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observable by the government, with probability 1 − p the government correctly observes
the decision to default of an individual with state variables (t, e, a, h, m), while with
probability p the government potentially observes a different default decision.

Financial Assets and Mortgage Markets
Households can buy one-period risk-free bonds at on financial markets at a price Pa =
1/(1 + r f ), where r f is the risk-free rate of return set in equilibrium. In addition to
risk-free bonds, individuals have access to collateralized long-term mortgages to buy h
units of housing. A mortgage of size m that pledges h units of housing as collateral,
given to a household with productivity e, age t and risk-free bonds a is a contract that
delivers Pm (t, e, a, h, m)m in the current period and requires a payment equal to m every
period in the future. I assume that every period the mortgage debt disappears with
probability 1 − ρ, so expected mortgage payments follow a decreasing path over time
and last for a finite number of periods on average (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2015).
The loan-by-loan pricing function Pm (·) is described in section 1.4.2, where the problem
of the mortgage originators is fully characterized. Issuing a mortgage of size m has

h
i  
j
ρ j−t
a one-time cost Fissue · ∑ Tj=t Πi=t πi 1+r
m, equal to a fraction Fissue of the total
outstanding debt given the existence of search costs in mortgage origination (Hurst and
Stafford, 2004). Finally, individuals face a Loan-To-Value constraint at origination, such

h
i  
j
ρ j−t
m/ Ph h < LTV. Equivalently, the minimum downpayment
that ∑ Tj=t Πi=t πi 1+r
required to issue a mortgage is set to 1 − LTV.
Individuals have the option to default on their mortgage debt after the idiosyncratic
depreciation shock δ is realized, subject to losing the property pledged as collateral. In
addition to losing the collateral, individuals cannot access the mortgage market in the
period of default but can re-enter the market in any future period. Although in the U.S.
there is recourse in most States (Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011), in which case households lose
also part of their risk-free assets to cover the difference between the outstanding debt and
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the house value, I assume there is no recourse in the economy and leave this for future work.
Households also have the option to refinance their mortgage debt. Refinancing a mortgage
is equivalent to issuing a new mortgage and using its proceeds to repay the outstanding
debt of the original mortgage. This means that households that choose to refinance their
h
i  

j
ρ j−t
mortgage have to pay the proportional fixed cost Fre f · ∑ Tj=t Πi=t πi 1+r
m0 over
the newly issued mortgage m0 . Note that the cost of issuing a new mortgage Fissue is
potentially different from the cost of refinancing an existing mortgage Fre f .

Government Policies
In steady state, the government plays a passive role in the economy and only manages
the social security system: it levies social security taxes τss and distributes a pension b
to retired households. Whenever there is an unexpected aggregate shock, or a “crisis
period”, I assume that two policy instruments become available to the government: 1)
distribute subsidies to mortgage refinancing and 2) offer bailouts to mortgage holders.
The motivation for this assumption is that historically these instruments have become
available to the governments after Congress approval during severe crisis periods like the
Great Depression and the Great Recession. During the Great Recession, these instruments
became available through TARP and HAMP. In contrast, during “normal” times - that is,
in the steady state - governments do not offer bailouts to banks nor implement long-term
policies to favor mortgage refinancing.
This section describes the policy instruments available to the government during crisis
periods, while the optimization problem the government solves is postponed to Section
1.4.4.
First, to prevent foreclosures the government subsidizes mortgage refinancing at a
rate τ, which means that households that choose to refinance have to pay only (1 − τ)F ·

h
i  
j
ρ j−t
m0 on the new mortgage issued m0 . As in the Emergency Economic
∑ Tj=t Πi=t πi 1+r
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Stabilization Act, the subsidy is contingent on the mortgage refinancing being executed, to
avoid households claiming the subsidy and defaulting on the same period. The purpose
of this subsidy is to reduce the number of mortgage defaults by reducing the relative cost
of refinancing.
Subsidies are given according to an eligibility rule chosen by the government every
period. The eligibility rule potentially depends on all the state variables observed by
the government, including the idiosyncratic house price shock δ. That is, an eligibility
rule is a function Γ : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ → {0, 1} that determines which
households receive subsidies, where ∆ is the idiosyncratic depreciation observed by the
government, which need not be equal to the realized depreciation of the household (recall
the information friction described in section 1.4.1). This means that if the government
implements an eligibility rule that explicitly targets particular values of observed δ to
receive the subsidy, it will potentially make mistakes with probability p: households
whose realized δ makes them eligible might not receive the subsidy, while households
whose realized δ makes them non-eligible might receive it. As with the eligibility rule,
the mortgage refinancing subsidy can also differ across the distribution of households so
τ : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ → [0, 1].
Second, the government offers bailouts B to the mortgage holders to cover for their
losses whenever there is an unexpected rise in foreclosures. Bailouts are pure lump-sum
transfers. Henceforth, I will refer to the set of government policies as Θ : {τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl }.

Household’s Problem
Every period, given the individual state variables (t, e, a, h, m, δ), aggregate state variables
denoted by Ω, government policies Θ, a pricing function for mortgages Pm (t, e, a, h, m; Ω, Θ),
and prices Ph , q, r f and w, households choose the amount of savings to take on to the next
period a0 , housing to own h0 , housing services to rent s, consumption c, mortgage units to
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acquire m0 and whether to default, keep or refinance their current mortgage. The recursive
formulation of the problem of the household is defined by the following equation:
V(t,e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) =
max{V keep (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ), V de f (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ), E p V re f (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ)}
(2)
where V keep , V de f ault and V re f inance are the value functions associated with keeping, defaulting and refinancing the current mortgage, respectively. The expectation E p on the
decision to refinance depends on the partial observability of δ by the government and,
therefore, the probability of mistakes in subsidy assignation p. A household that is eligible
for the refinance subsidy and chooses to refinance might not end up receiving it, whereas a
household that is not eligible might end up receiving it. This will become clear below. The
value function associated with keeping the current mortgage is described by the following
problem:
V keep (t, e, a,h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) =

max u(c, s) + πt βEe0 |e,δ0 ,m0 V(t + 1, e0 , a0 , h, m0 , δ0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 ),

c,s,h0 ,a0 ≥0
l ∈[0,1]

s.t.

(3)

c + m + qs + Pa a0 +

m0 =

δhw
= (1 − τl − τss )eēt wl + a + qh
A




m

w.p.

ρ



0

w.p.

1−ρ

δ0 ∼ Fδ (δ0 ),

e0 ∼ Fe (e0 |e),

Ω0 = G(Ω),
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V keep (T + 1, ·) = 0

where G is the law of motion of the aggregate state variables. If the household decides to
keep the current mortgage, the payments are equal to m and the mortgage amount will
remain outstanding in t + 1 with probability ρ. With probability 1 − ρ the mortgage debt is
reset to zero. The last term on the left-hand side of the budget constraint is the cost of the
house depreciation δPh h, which must be covered by the home-owner at the end of every
period. Note that when δ < 0, I am assuming that the household receives an additional
income. Given the assumption that households live for at most T periods, I normalize
the value at age T + 1 to be equal to zero so the final period problem is static. The value
function for households that default is described by:
V de f (t, e, a,h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) =

max

c,s,h0 ,a0 ,m0 ≥0
l ∈[0,1]

u(c, s) + πt βEe0 |e,δ0 ,m0 ,ã0 V(t + 1, e0 , ã0 , 0, 0, δ0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 )

s.t.
(4)

c + qs + Pa a0 = (1 − τl − τss )eēt wl + a
δ0 ∼ Fδ (δ0 ),

e0 ∼ Fe (e0 |e),

Ω0 = G(Ω),

V de f (T + 1, ·) = 0

Households that choose to default do not have to make mortgage payments and lose the
house pledged as collateral before paying for the idiosyncratic depreciation, so larger
values of δ will make more attractive the option to default. Finally, a household that
chooses to refinance faces uncertainty on whether the government will make mistakes in
mortgage assignation, so long as p > 0. The expected value for a household that chooses
to refinance is given by:
E p V re f (t, e, a, h, m, δ;Ω, Θ) =
(1 − p)V re f ,1− p (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) + pV re f ,p (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ)
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The value function V re f ,1− p for households that decide to refinance their mortgage and
receive the correct mortgage subsidy is:
V re f ,1− p (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) =

max

c,s,h0 ,a0 ,m0 ≥0
l ∈[0,1]

u(c, s) + πt βEe0 |e,δ0 ,m̃0 V(t + 1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m̃0 , δ0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 ),

(5)
T

∑

c+

h

j
Πi=t πi

j=t

i  ρ  j−t
1+r

!

m + (1 − Γ(·)τ(·))Fm0 + qs + Ph h0 + Pa a0 =

(1 − τl − τss )eēt wl + a + Ph h −

m̃0 =




m0


0

δ0 ∼ Fδ (δ0 ),
T

∑
j=t

h

w.p.
w.p.





Fissue




F = Fre f






0

ρ
1−ρ

e0 ∼ Fe (e0 |e),

i h ρ i j−t
j
Πi=t πi
1+r

Ω0 = G(Ω),

δPh hw
+ qh0 + Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω, Θ)m0
A
if

m = 0, m0 > 0

if

m > 0, m0 > 0

if

m0 = 0
V re f (T + 1, ·) = 0

!
m0 / Ph h0 < LTV

Households that decide to refinance have to repay the net present value of the outstanding mortgage debt, given by the second term on the budget constraint. Moreover, the

h
i

j
ρ  j−t
household has to pay an after-subsidy fixed cost ∑ Tj=t Πi=t πi 1+r
(1 − Γ(·)τ(·))Fm0
on the new mortgage m0 : if the household is eligible, Γ(t, e, a, h, m, δ) = 1, there is a subsidy
equal to τ(t, e, a, h, m, δ) on the cost of mortgage refinancing. Otherwise, the household
has to pay the full amount. Moreover, the fraction F depends on whether the household
is issuing a new mortgage (Fissue ) or refinancing a current mortgage (Fre f ). Households
that choose to prepay the outstanding debt (m0 = 0) have to pay no fixed cost (so F = 0).
The last term on the budget constraint, Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω, Θ)m0 , is the amount received
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for the new mortgage m0 . The last constraint is a Loan-To-Value constraint. The value
function V re f ,p for households that decide to refinance their mortgage and do not receive
the correct mortgage subsidy is:
V re f ,1− p (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω, Θ) =

max

c,s,h0 ,a0 ,m0 ≥0
l ∈[0,1]

u(c, s) + πt βEe0 |e,δ0 ,m̃0 V(t + 1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m̃0 , δ0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 ),

(6)
T

∑

c+

h

j
Πi=t πi

j=t

i  ρ  j−t
1+r

!

m + (1 − (1 − Γ(·))τ(·))Fm0 + qs + Ph h0 + Pa a0 =

(1 − τl − τss )eēt wl + a + Ph h −

m̃0 =




m0


0

w.p.
w.p.

δ0 ∼ Fδ (δ0 ),
T

∑

h

j
Πi=t πi

j=t

ρ

F=

1−ρ

e0 ∼ Fe (e0 |e),
i h ρ i j−t
1+r





Fissue




F






0

re f

Ω0 = G(Ω),

δPh hw
+ qh0 + Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω, Θ)m0
A
if

m = 0, m0 > 0

if

m > 0, m0 > 0

if

m0 = 0
V re f (T + 1, ·) = 0

!
m0 / Ph h0 < LTV

Note that the only difference with equation (5) is that, in the case of a mistake, households
that receive the subsidy are those for which Γ(t, e, a, h, m, δ) = 0. In case of a mistake,
eligible households do not receive any subsidy, and ineligible households do receive it.
In an economy with perfect information p = 0, the household faces no uncertainty on
mortgage refinancing subsidy assignation.
The following proposition proves some results on the value function for households in
this economy:
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Proposition 1. Assume u(c, s) is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Then
V is:
1. Continuous
2. Increasing on a and h
3. decreasing on m and δ
If the productivity persistence parameter ρe > 0 then V is also increasing on e.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Because of the discrete choice between keeping, refinancing and defaulting on the
current mortgage, the value function V need not be concave nor differentiable.

1.4.2

Mortgage Originators

I assume that in this economy there is no secondary mortgage market, so mortgages are
held and serviced by originators. In this way, I assume that mortgage originators are also
the owners of each mortgage, which will let me abstract from any possible mismatch of
incentives for mortgage refinancing between mortgage investors and servicers. I will refer
to them as mortgage investors, mortgage holders or mortgage originators interchangeably
throughout the rest of the paper.
There is a continuum of size 1 of mortgage originators, so mortgages are supplied
in a competitive market. Mortgage origination firms are owned by all households, so
every period each household receives a lump-sum transfer equal to the profits of the firms.
Competition is present loan-by-loan, so the origination of each loan is subject to a zero
expected profit condition. The pricing function satisfies the following equality:
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Pm (t, e, a0 ,h0 , m0 ; Ω, Θ)m0 =



πt ρ
1 + rf






Ee0 ,δ0 d(s0 ; Ω, Θ) (1 − Ψ)Ph (1 − δ0 )h0 − δ0 Ph h0 +
|
{z
}
Default

0

s(s ; Ω, Θ)

T

∑

h

j
Πi=t+1 πi

j=t+1

|

i  ρ  j−(t+1)
1+r

{z

!
m0 +
}

Refinance



(1 − d(s0 ; Ω, Θ))(1 − s(s0 ; Ω, Θ))(m0 + Pm (t + 1, e0 , a00 , h0 , m0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 )m0 )
|
{z
}

(7)

Keep mortgage

where s0 = (t + 1, e0 , δ0 , a0 , h0 , m0 ) denotes individual state variables, d(·) is the policy
function for default, that takes the value of one if the household chooses to default and
zero otherwise, and s(·) is the policy function for mortgage refinancing. The pricing
function Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω, Θ) is such that the outlays of the bank at t are equal to the
expected value of the assets of the bank in t + 1 in case the household chooses to: a) default,
b) refinance, or c) keep the current mortgage. If the household defaults, the bank receives
the after-depreciation value of the house at a price discount Ψ. I assume that, in order to
keep the economy’s housing supply constant, in case of default the bank has to pay for the
depreciation of the house, represented by the second term on the value of default to the
bank. If the household chooses to refinance, the bank receives the total outstanding debt,
which is the net present value of future mortgage payments. If the household chooses to
keep the current mortgage, the bank receives the payment m0 and holds an asset worth
Pm (t + 1, e0 , a00 , h0 , m0 ; Ω0 , Θ0 )m0 at the end of the period. Note that period t + 1 is discounted
taking into account the probability ρ that the mortgage is outstanding at t + 1 as well as
the survival probability of the household πt .
In steady state, equation (7) holds with equality ex-post by the law of large numbers.
The outlays of the mortgage holder on every loan are exactly equal to the realized net
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present value of payments/assets whenever there are no aggregate unexpected shocks.
Note, however, that equation (7) need not hold with equality ex-post whenever there is an
aggregate unexpected shock to Ω. An unexpected shock to Ω will potentially change the
default and refinance decisions of households, as well as house prices, so the realized net
present value of assets to mortgage investors need not equal the outlays of the previous
period. Whenever this happens, the government will ensure that the equation holds
ex-post.

1.4.3

Production Firms’ Problem

Final good production firms produce according to a simple linear technology f (L) = AL,
where only labor is used. Firms produce on a perfectly competitive market, so market
wages per efficiency unit of labor are directly pinned down by the technology factor A,
such that in equilibrium w = A.

1.4.4

Government’s Problem

In steady state or, equivalently, whenever there are no aggregate unexpected shocks to
the economy (Ω), the government only manages the social security system: levies social
security taxes τss to working-age households and pays social security proceedings b to
retired households.
Whenever an aggregate unexpected shock hits the economy, two instruments become
available to the government: subsidies to mortgage refinancing τ and bailouts to mortgage
holders B. These instruments are available only during the period of the unexpected
shock and disappear thereafter. The government chooses optimally these instruments to
maximize a utilitarian welfare function, subject to keeping the ex-post profits of mortgage
originators equal to zero.
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In order to finance the expenditures of these policy instruments, the government issues
long-term debt worth A after the unexpected shock, in the form of a consol bond that
pays a coupon A · r in every period in the future. To pay the coupon every period, the
government levies labor income taxes τl . At period j, the problem of the government is:
Z

max

s0

τ(·),Γ(·),B,τl

Z
s

V(s0 ; Ω j , τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl )dΦ j (s0 ),

s.t.

(8)

Pm (s−δ ; Ω j−1 , Θ j−1 )m0 dΦ j−1 (s) =
!
Z
 0


πt ρ
d(s ; Ω j , τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl ) (1 − Ψ)Ph (1 − δ0 )h0 − δ0 Ph h0 +
0
1
+
r
s
f
!
i  ρ  j−(t+1)
T h
j
0
m0 +
s(s ; Ω j , τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl ) ∑ Πi=t+1 πi
1
+
r
j=t+1

(1 − d(·))(1 − s(·))(m0 + Pm (s00 −δ ; Ω j , τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl )m0 ) dΦ j (s0 ) + B

(1 − p)

p

Z
s0

s0

T

∑

Γ(s0 )τ(s0 ) F ·

j=t

"

Z

A · ri =

b·

"

Z

s0

(1 − Γ(s0 ))τ(s0 ) F ·

h

j
Πi=t πi
T

∑
j=t

Z
s0

τl eēt wldΦi (s0 ),

1{t ≥ tret }dΦ j (s0 ) =

h

i h ρ i j−t
1+r

j
Πi=t πi

!

#
m0 s(·)dΦ j (s0 )+

i h ρ i j−t
1+r

!

#
m0 s(·)dΦ j (s0 ) + B = A

∀i > j

Z
s0

1{t < tret }τss eēt wl

(Ex-Post Solvency)

(Bud. Bal. j)

(Bud. Bal. i > j)

dΦ j (s0 )

(Social Security)

where j stands for the period of the aggregate unexpected shock, j − 1 for the previous
period, and individual state variables are summarized by s = (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 , δ), s0 = (t +
1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m0 , δ0 ), s00 −δ = (t + 1, e0 , a00 , h0 , m0 ) and s0 −δ = (t + 1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m0 ). Note that I
explicitly denoted the dependence of the value and policy functions on the instruments
of the government τ(·), Γ(·), B, τl , rather than with Θ. The ex-post solvency condition is
the aggregation of the zero-profit condition for the mortgage pricing function (equation 7)
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overall mortgage contracts in the economy at period j. The left-hand side of this equation
is the value of the liabilities of mortgage originators, which equal the outlays in period
j − 1, whereas the right-hand side is the value of the bank’s assets in period j plus the
bailout transferred to the bank. The budget balance condition at period j states that the
total amount of government mortgage refinancing subsidies plus bailouts to mortgage
holders must equal the amount of consol bond issued. Note that if p > 0, the government
might distribute subsidies to households that are not eligible (1 − Γ(·) = 1). The budget
balance condition at i > j states that the government must finance the coupon payments of
the consol bonds with labor income taxes. Lastly, the social security restriction describes a
balanced budget constraint in the social security system.
Note that the government can achieve the ex-post efficiency constraint through two
channels: 1) by choosing B, such that the first restriction holds (Ex-Post Solvency), or 2)
by choosing τ(·), Γ(·) and τl such that households change their optimal choices and the
equality holds.

1.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, I state the definition of an equilibrium in this environment. I allow for
the possibility of aggregate unexpected shocks from happening, so all functions and
equilibrium prices depend on the aggregate states of the economy Ω, as well as on
government policies Θ which need not be trivial when an aggregate shocks occur. Index j
denotes the period.
Definition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A recursive competitive equilibrium are
a value function V : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ × {Ω j , Θ} −→ R, policy functions
for default and refinancing d, s : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ × {Ω j , Θ} −→ {0, 1},
and all other policy functions gc , gm , gh , gr , ga : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ ×

{Ω j , Θ} −→ R+ for the household, a pricing function Pm : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H ×
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M × {Ω j , Θ} −→ R+ for mortgages, government policies Θ(Ω j−1 , Ω j ), a price for rental
housing q ∈ R+ , a price for new housing Ph ∈ R+ , a wage w ∈ R+ , a risk-free interest rate
r ∈ R+ , an aggregate law of motion G(Ω) and distributions Φ : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H ×

M × ∆ × {Ω j , Θ} −→ [0, 1] such that:
1. [Households Optimize] Given prices Pm (·), Ph q, w and r, aggregate states Ω, government policy functions Θ and the aggregate law of motion G the value function V
solves the household’s problem (2), with d, s, gkeep , gc , gm , gh , gr and ga the respective
policy functions.
2. [Mortgage Originators Optimize] Given Ph , q, w and r, aggregate states Ω, government policy functions Θ and the aggregate law of motion G, the pricing function
Pm (·) for mortgages satisfies an expected zero-profit condition loan by loan, given by
equation (7). Any profits are transferred in a lump-sum fashion to households, who
own these firms.

3. [Rental Market Clears] The rental housing price q is such that demand for rental
housing is equal to the total supply of housing in the economy:
Z
s

gr (s)dΦ(s)

=

H̄

4. [Housing Market Clears] The housing price Ph is such that home-ownership is equal
to total housing supply:
Z
s

gh (s)dΦ(s)

=

H̄

5. [Financial Assets Market Clears] The risk-free rate r is such that savings in the
economy equal total mortgage outlays by mortgage investors:
Z
s

ga (s)dΦ(s)

=
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Z
s

Pm (s)gm (s)dΦ(s)

6. [Production Firms Optimize] The wage per efficiency unit of labor w is pinned
down by the technology parameter:

w=A

7. [Government Optimizes] If Ω0 = G(Ω), the government only manages social security
and the pension b given to retired households is such that there is budget balance on
the social security system:

b·

Z

1{t ≥ t }dΦ(s)
ret

s

=

Z
s

1{t < tret }τss eēt wgl (s)dΦ(s)

If Ω0 6= G(Ω) - that is, after an aggregate shock - the government solves problem 8.
8. [Resource Constraint] The resource constraint holds:

A·

Z
s

eēt gl (s)dΦ(s)

=

"

Z
s

T

gc (s) + δPh h + F

∑
j=t

h

i h ρ i j−t
j
Πi=t πi
1+r

!

#
gm (s) dΦ(s)

9. [Distribution Consistency] The distribution Φ(t, ·), for t ∈ {2, . . . , T } is consistent
with the policy functions for the households, the Markov transition probabilities for
the idiosyncratic shocks, the aggregate law of motion G and the initial distribution
Φ(1, ·).
10. [Aggregate Law of Motion Consistency] The aggregate law of motion is consistent
with the distribution Φ, policy functions for the households and the Markov transition
probabilities for the idiosyncratic shocks.
Agents in this economy assign zero probability to any aggregate shock and, therefore,
do not have expectations with respect to the policies the government might implement
during mortgage crises. For this reason, agents do not take overly risky behaviors in steady
state, and the model completely abstracts from moral hazard.
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Note that this definition of equilibrium allows for the possibility of aggregate shocks
from happening. Definition 2 in the appendix defines the steady state equilibrium in this
economy, where no aggregate shocks occur, so Definition 2 is a particular case of Definition
1.

1.6 Calibration
This section describes the functional forms and parameter values used to calibrate the
model to the pre-crisis steady state U.S. economy. Details on the computation of the model
are available in Section .1.2 in the appendix.

Demographics
I set T =30 , such that one period in my model corresponds to 2 years of life. Individuals
enter the economy at the age of 20 (t = 1) and live up to age 80 (t =30 ). This timing
captures the life-cycle patterns of consumption and housing investments while keeping
the computation of the model tractable. Every period, an individual of age t survives to
period t + 1 according to an exogenous probability πt , which corresponds to the empirical
survival probabilities from the Actuarial Life Tables of the Social Security Administration8 .
I assume that individuals of age T = 30 (80 years old) die with probability exactly equal to
one. I assume that households retire at age 65, which means that tret =22 in my model.

Preferences
I use the following parameterization for the utility function:

T

∑ βt πt
t=1

"

(ψcκ + (1 − ψ)hκ )
1−σ

1− σ
κ

8. The life table and survival probabilities can be found at this link.
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1+ 1

l η
− θl
1 + η1

#

Where the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing is equal to
1/(1 − κ). Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) make a review of the findings in the
literature and argue that this elasticity varies according to the model specification and
samples used for estimation. I set the value of κ to -0.1 , which is close to the estimates
presented in their review. The Frisch elasticity is given by η. Following the macro estimates
of the parameter η on life cycle models, I set 1/η =0.5 (for a review on the macro and
micro estimates, see Keane and Rogerson (2015)). Finally, I set σ =2 and β =0.96 which
are standard in the literature, and the weight parameter of the disutility of labor θl =5 to
match an average labor supply equal to 0.34.

Labor Productivity
The productivity of households has two components: 1) an idiosyncratic shock, and 2) a
life-cycle component. The idiosyncratic component follows the AR(1) process described by
equation (1), where I set ρy =0.95 and σe =0.22 , which correspond to 2-year values close
to the estimates of Storesletten et al. (2004)9 . In order to compute the model, I discretize
the idiosyncratic productivity process with a 3-state Markov Chain approximation using
the method by Tauchen (1986). I set my =1 , so the points in the Markov Chain are at

±1 standard deviations from the mean, resulting in a grid for the stochastic productivity
given by {0.602, 1.0, 1.661}, and a transition probability matrix:



0.9507
0.0492
0.0




 0.036 0.9272 0.036 




0.0
0.0492 0.9507

The life-cycle component of productivity is set to match the estimates of Hansen (1993), so
average productivity is hump-shaped over the life cycle.
9. ρy = 0.982 and σe = 0.1 ×

√

2.
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Financial Markets
The parameter ρ, which corresponds to the rate at which mortgage debt survives over
time, is chosen so the average duration of mortgage payments lasts 25 years, which in
the current calibration corresponds to 12 periods. That is, I choose ρ =0.92 . I set the
costs of issuing new debt and refinancing existing debt to Fissue =0.015 and Fre f =0.025 ,
respectively, which fall inside the range of estimates by Hurst and Stafford (2004). This
means that to issue new debt, the household must pay 1.5% of the value of the total
outstanding debt, while to refinance it has to pay 2.5%. Lastly, as in Garriga and Hedlund
(2016), a Loan-To-Value limit of LTV = 1.25 is assumed. In equilibrium, this limit will not
be binding.
Table 1 summarizes the values of the parameters chosen for the initial steady state
calibration.

Endogenously Calibrated Parameters
To make the computation feasible I set the idiosyncratic depreciation shock to take values
on a three-point grid distributed uniformly over the interval δ ∈ [δ, δ̄]. The values of δ and
δ̄ are endogenously calibrated so a) the foreclosure rate matches the two-year average of
3.0% during the pre-crisis period, 1991-2007, and the average homeownership rate matches
66.5% for the same period, corresponding to the estimates by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis10 .
The parameter ψ is the weight of non-durable consumption with respect to overall
consumption. According to the NIPA tables and the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Personal
Consumption Expenditure data, the expenditures on housing services account for around
14.1% − 15% of overall expenditures (Jeske et al., 2013; Corbae and Quintin, 2015). I set ψ
10. Estimates can be found on this link.
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Value

Target/Source

Preferences
β
σ
κ
η
θl
πt

0.96
2
-0.1
0.5
5
-

Literature
Literature
Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)
Keane and Rogerson (2015)
Average L = 0.34
U.S. Actuarial Life Tables

Demographics
T
tret

30
22

One period =2 years
Retirement at 65 years

0.95
0.22
1
-

Storesletten et al. (2004)
Storesletten et al. (2004)
±1 standard deviation
Hansen (1993)

0.92
0.015
0.025
1.25

25 years average mortgage duration
Hurst and Stafford (2004)
Hurst and Stafford (2004)
Garriga and Hedlund (2016)

Productivity
λe
σe
m
ēt
Financial Market
ρ
Fissue
Fre f
LTV

Table 1: Parameter values
such that the ratio of nominal expenditures on housing services with respect to nondurable
consumption is equal to 0.141. Table 2 shows the values of δ, δ̄ and ψ.
Given that the information problem arises when the government offers subsidies to
mortgage refinancing, the calibration of the parameter p is postponed to Section 1.7, where
I calibrate the model to match the Great Recession and HAMP and TARP are implemented.
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1.6.1

Steady State

Table 2 summarizes the moments of the baseline calibration in the initial steady state and
the data.

Parameter

Value

Variable

Data

Model

3.0%
66.5%
14.1%

2.4 %
65.5 %
14.2 %

10 − 14.5%
62%
1.51

13.4 %
64.5 %
1.52

Targeted Moments
δ̄
δ
ψ

0.119
-0.345
0.84

Default rate
Ownership rate
Rent/Cons expenditures
Untargeted Moments
Std. Dev. of δ
Average home equity
Median size (sq ft.): own/rent

Table 2: Model and Data Moments
In addition to matching the targeted moments described above, the model matches
untargeted moments related to the housing and mortgage markets. First, the model’s
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic house price shock lies within the range estimated
by the literature. As estimated by Giacoletti (2016), using the CoreLogic repeat-sales data
from San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
component of house price risk over a period of up to two years is between 10% and 14.5%.
The standard deviation that results from the endogenously chosen grid for idiosyncratic
house price risk, which corresponds to a uniform distribution in the model, is equal to 13.4
%. Second, the model’s average home equity, equal to 64.5 %, is close to the 62% observed
in the data. Furthermore, the home equity cumulative distribution function generated
by the model, illustrated in Figure 3, closely matches the distribution obtained from the
Survey of Consumer Finances 2007, as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015). In the model,
the lower tail of the distribution is heavier, but the rest of the distribution is close to the
data. A potential explanation why the model does not closely match the left tail of the
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distribution is that, in the model, I assume that households start their life with no assets
or housing. In the data, there are households at age 20 that hold financial assets and
housing mainly because they receive inter-vivos transfers and bequests, or because they
start working before age 20. Figure 22 in the appendix illustrates the life-cycle averages of
home equity in the model and the data and shows this mismatch at the beginning of the
life-cycle. Finally, the model closely matches the ratio of the median size of owner-occupied
versus rental housing, obtained by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) from the American
Community Survey of 2007.
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Figure 3: Home Equity Cummulative Distribution - Model vs. Data (SCF 2007)

Figure 4a shows the steady state distribution of home-owners, according to their age
and home equity. There is a positive correlation between age and equity, with a correlation
coefficient equal to 0.56 in the model. As households grow over their life cycle and make
their mortgage payments, they increase the percentage owned of their house and, therefore,
their home equity. There is a mass of 36.8% of home-owners that have no mortgage debt,
so their home equity is equal to 100%. These households have made all of their mortgage
payments. Figure 4b illustrates the distribution of home-owners according to their savings
and home equity. The correlation coefficient between both variables is only slightly positive
(equal to 0.06), as both financial assets and housing are substitutes of each other. Some

36

households accumulate savings until they have enough assets to repay their mortgage
debt, which increases their equity but reduces their financial assets.

0.10
0.025
0.08

0.020

0.06

%

%

0.015

0.04

0.010

0.02
0.00
1.0

)

−20

40
20
0
0.2

ui
ty

0
30

ui
ty

40

0.6
As
se 0.4
ts
($)

(%

40
20

Eq

60
Ag 50
e

80
60

0.8

(%

80
60

70

Eq

0.000
80

)

0.005

−20
0.0

(a) Distribution of home-owners on the ageequity state space

(b) Distribution of home-owners on the savingsequity state space

Figure 4: State space distributions.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of net renters in my model, which are households that
rent more than what they own. The percentage of net renters follows a decreasing path
at the beginning of the life cycle, close to what happens with renters on the Survey of
Consumer Finances of 2007. However, given that households know they are going to die
with probability one on their last period of life, they sell all of their owned housing at the
end of the cycle. This is opposite to what is observed in the data, as in my model there are
no bequests and the probability of death is equal to one at age 80. This is not true in the
data, because households have bequest motives, and individuals do not die with certainty
at age 80. Figure 22 in the appendix illustrates other life-cycle averages of the model.

Default in Steady State
In the model, there is default in steady state. Households that choose to default lose their
collateral, are left out of the mortgage market for the period of default, equal to two years,
and have to pay the fixed cost if they want to issue a new mortgage in the future. Table 3
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Figure 5: Home Equity Cummulative Distribution - Model vs. Data (SCF 2007)

characterizes households that choose to default, according to their level of savings a and
the income and house value shocks during the period of default.11 Of the individuals that
default, 100% do so after drawing a negative shock on their house value, corresponding to
the largest depreciation δ = δ̄. Within defaulters, there are individuals with and without
savings. Of those households without savings, 79.61 % choose to default after a negative
income shock. These households find it impossible to continue repaying their mortgage,
as this would imply negative levels of non-durable consumption during the period of the
shock. In contrast, of the defaulters with positive savings, only 21.17 % choose to default
after a negative income shock. These households decide to default on their mortgage, even
though their income and assets would allow them to continue making mortgage payments.

Without savings: a = 0

With savings: a > 0

House value shock
Income shock

100 %
79.61 %

100 %
21.17 %

Total default

0.78 %

1.7 %

Table 3: % of defaulters with income and price shocks on the period of default.

11. For this exercise, an income shock occurs when the household draws the lowest possible productivity
shock. A price shock occurs when the household draws the largest possible depreciation shock.

38

Panel (a) in Figure 6 illustrates the average default rate by age, as a percentage of
home-owners that hold a mortgage in each age group. Default is largest among young
households and decreases over the life-cycle. This happens because households have low
levels of savings at the beginning of their life cycle. After a negative income shock these
households cannot continue making mortgage payments, either because in the present
their income is too low, or because, given the persistence of the shock, their future income
will not be sufficient to repay the loan. In contrast, older households have savings that
serve as a buffer in case of a negative income shock.
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Figure 6: Model average default rate (%) (a) by age, and (b) home equity (%)

Panel (b) in Figure 6 illustrates the default rate by home equity. Default occurs only
for households with negative equity, or underwater, and reaches 46% for households with
sufficiently negative equity. Only 31.5% of households underwater choose to default. As
the literature has pointed out, being underwater is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for default. It is necessary because if the household is not underwater it can always choose
to sell the house, repay the mortgage and obtain positive profit. This is not true when the
household is underwater and the outstanding debt is larger than the value of the house.
Being underwater is not a sufficient condition to default for the following reasons. First,
there are fixed costs of mortgage origination, so a household that defaults today will have
to pay a fixed cost to originate a new mortgage in the future. This might prevent if from
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defaulting on the mortgage. Second, in my model mortgages are long-term contracts,
whose terms are fixed at the moment of origination. A household that is underwater
might prefer to keep the current contract whenever the terms of the mortgage, that were
set at the origination period, are better than the expected terms of a new mortgage in
the future. For example, before the crisis, a wealthy and productive household would
originate a mortgage with prime interest rates. If in the future this household receives a
low-probability, negative productivity shock that reduces its future credit-worthiness, such
as a long unemployment spell, it might prefer to stick to its original contract, as any future
mortgage will be underwritten at higher interest rates.

Mortgage Refinancing in Steady State
Figure 7 illustrates the percentage of homeowners that decide to refinance their mortgage
on the age-equity state space. In contrast to default, mortgage refinancing occurs at a later
stage in the life cycle and is made by households that have positive home equity. For these
households with positive equity, it is never optimal to default, as they can always sell their
house, repay their total outstanding debt and keep the profits. However, they might prefer
Mortgages
are arefinanced
reasons.
to refinance
to get
mortgage for
withtwo
better
terms.They can be refinanced to decrease the
size of the mortgage, such that future mortgage payments are lower, or can be refinanced
to borrow funds, which increases the size of the mortgage and the future mortgage
payments. Figure 8 illustrates the average mortgage refinancing rate for households that
choose to refinance upwards, or increase their debt, and for those that choose to refinance
downwards, or decrease their debt.

Refinancing a mortgage upwards implies increasing present consumption at the expense of increasing mortgage payments and, thus, lower future consumption. In contrast,
refinancing a mortgage downwards implies increasing future consumption at the expense
of present consumption. Given that productivity follows a hump-shaped path over the life
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Figure 8: Mortgage refinancing as a (%) of home-owners by age. Solid line: refinancing to increase
mortgage size. Dashed line: refinancing to decrease mortgage size.

cycle and households smooth consumption, the mortgage refinancing rate to increase debt
is larger early in the life cycle, whereas the refinancing rate to decrease debt is larger later
in the cycle.
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In particular, households that have the highest income at the beginning of their life
cycles are the ones that choose to refinance their mortgages upwards. Given that the
idiosyncratic component of productivity is persistent and the age component is humpshaped, these households expect a high income path in the future, so choose to refinance
upwards early in their lives to smooth consumption. Similarly, households that have high
productivity shocks in the peak of the productivity cycle, between ages 45-55, choose to
refinance downwards, to substitute present consumption with future consumption.

1.7 The Great Recession
In order to generate a shock that induces a large drop in house prices and an increase in
the foreclosure rate, I assume that while the economy is in steady state agents face two
completely unexpected shocks that last for 3 periods: 1) a drop in the age component
of productivity, so the drop in earnings by age group is close to the findings of Glover
et al. (2014) during the Great Recession, summarized in Table 4, and 2) an increase in the
minimum downpayment requirement to 25% of the house price, such that the maximum
Loan-To-Value at origination falls from its initial steady state value LTV = 1.25 to 0.75. The
second shock is justified by the Federal Reserve’s Willingness to Lend Survey, according to
which the number of banks that declared tightening of credit standards rose from almost
zero to above 50% in 2007, and the median downpayment requirement more than doubled,
from a pre-crisis level of 5% to 13% (Boz and Mendoza, 2014).

For the baseline calibration, I assume that the government implements a subsidy-bailout
policy analogous to TARP and HAMP, described below.
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Age group

Per capita earnings

20 − 29
30 − 39
40 − 49
50 − 59
60 − 69
70+

−12.8%
−11.1%
−8.8%
−9.6%
−4.4%
+0.3%

Table 4: Productivity Shock

1.7.1

HAMP

Through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the government offered
subsidies to mortgage refinancing for households in financial distress. Households with
mortgages that satisfied the following conditions were eligible: 1. payments-to-income had
to be greater than or equal to 31% of monthly gross income, 2. the household must have
been delinquent or in danger of falling behind on mortgage payments, 3. the property
pledged as collateral had to be owner-occupied and the primary residence of the household,
4. the property had to be a single-family property with 1-4 units and an unmodified
first-lien mortgage balance of up to $729, 750, 5. the mortgage had to be originated before
January 1st, 2009, and 6. the mortgage modification had to pass a net present value test
that would make the mortgage holder better off after the modification (Agarwal et al.,
2017). The program aimed at reducing mortgage payments to exactly 31% of monthly
income. When designed, the government allocated $75 billion to HAMP.
In the baseline calibration of the model, households that satisfy conditions analogous
to 1. and 2. are eligible for a mortgage refinancing subsidy. That is, access to HAMP
is granted to households that satisfy two conditions. First, they must have payments-toincome above some threshold described below. Second, given that I don’t model strategic
complementarities that lead some households to “strategically default”, while others don’t,
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I assume that once the subsidy program is announced, all households claim to be “in
danger of falling behind on mortgage payments”. The government then observes the
households’ state variables s̃ and grants subsidies to those for whom default is optimal
according to s̃. Given that the government does not perfectly observe the individual
state variables, it will subsidize households for which default is optimal according to the
observed s̃, but is not according to the realized s, which are the strategic defaulters in my
model. In equilibrium, the probability of observing an incorrect state, p, will be calibrated
such that strategic default accounts for 10% of total default, as described in Section 1.7.2.

1.7.2

The Information Parameter p

Mayer et al. (2014) estimate the magnitude of strategic default when mortgage refinancing
programs are implemented. The authors use an exogenous settlement between the U.S.
Federal Government and Countrywide Financial Corporation in 2008 - before HAMP -,
in which Countrywide agreed to “offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers” with
subprime, first-lien mortgages. Immediately after the announcement, delinquency rates
of eligible households increased 10% yearly, compared to non-eligible mortgages and
mortgages of the same class from other financial institutions. Furthermore, the increase
was larger among households with large available credit on credit cards and lower current
LTV, who were least likely to default otherwise.
Even though 10% is a point estimate of strategic default for the specific case of the
settlement between Countrywide and the Federal Government, given the lack of other
estimates for strategic default during the Great Recession, I assume that in the case of
HAMP strategic default accounted for exactly 10% of total default. This assumption might
overstate total strategic default, as HAMP only allowed refinancing that reduced paymentsto-income exactly to 31%, while the Countrywide settlement allowed for unconstrained
refinancing. In this sense, households might have had more incentives to strategically
default during the Countrywide settlement.
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To obtain a 10% strategic default, I set the parameter p = 0.016 such that, in equilibrium,
in 1.6% of the cases the government observes states s̃ that are associated with default
for households that would not choose to default according to their realized s. These
households receive the benefits of HAMP, even though they would not have defaulted in
the absence of the program.

1.7.3

TARP

The Troubled Assets Relief Program was implemented to preserve the solvency of systemically important financial institutions. Although, initially $700 billion were allocated to
the purchase of troubled assets, by late 2008 TARP had only invested $243 billion through
the Capital Purchase Program. Under Section 202 of the EESA, the Office of Management
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to perform a
semiannual risk-adjusted net present value of TARP. The first of such reports, published
by the CBO in January, 2009, estimated a risk-adjusted net present value of the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) equal to −$61 billion (Calomiris and Khan, 2015). In the baseline
calibration, I assume that TARP is a one-time transfer from the government to the mortgage
investors to cover for the losses after the aggregate shock.

1.7.4

Results and Counter-factual Experiments

I model HAMP and TARP as one-time programs that are implemented in the same period
of the aggregate shock and last only for one period, which corresponds to two years.
The reason for a one-period duration is that, once the aggregate shock takes place, there
is no uncertainty in the economy, as agents perfectly foresee the transition path of the
economy towards the steady state. Therefore, any policy to preserve the solvency of
mortgage originators can be implemented in the first period of the shock. The duration I
am assuming is not far from what happened with TARP, where most of the investments
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undertaken by late 2008 were reversed in less than a year, as the financial institutions
recovered. In contrast, HAMP lasted through December 2016, and was modified over the
years.
In the baseline calibration, the government implements TARP and HAMP so as to
preserve ex-post solvency of mortgage originators, where 45% of the resources correspond
to direct transfers to the mortgage investors (TARP), and 55% as subsidies to mortgage
refinancing (HAMP). These numbers match the proportion of expenditures during the
Great Recession, where the government expected to spend $60 billion on implicit bailouts
through TARP, and allocated $75 billion to HAMP. For these proportions to hold in the
model, the payments-to-income eligibility threshold for HAMP is set at 27.5%, which is
close to the 31% threshold observed in the data. The subsidy is contingent on mortgage
refinancing, which means that households cannot obtain the subsidy and default in the
same period. The size of the subsidy is such that, in the period of the transfer, payments
to income would be exactly 27.5% if the household continued under the same debt
contract. In my model, however, households receive this transfer and have to refinance
their mortgage without constraint.
The solid lines in Figure 9 illustrate the behavior of housing prices and foreclosures
in the baseline calibration, when the government implements HAMP and TARP. The
aggregate shock generates a decrease in house prices of 21%, while foreclosure rates in the
model almost tripled from 2.4 % to 6.8%. This behavior is close to what happened during
the Great Recession, illustrated in Figure 1. As an external check, the model does well
at replicating the percentage of households underwater during the recession, which is a
non-targeted moment, equal to 16.2% in the model and 15% in the data (Melzer, 2017).
It is worth explaining the behavior of the foreclosure rate during the transition path.
Initially, there is a sharp increase in the foreclosure rate, which rapidly reverts and falls
below the pre-crisis level, finally returning back to the initial steady state after 20 years.
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Figure 9: Transitional dynamics of (a) house prices and (b) foreclosure rate.

This happens because during the peak of the crisis a large fraction of households is left
with negative home equity and lower incomes due to the productivity shock. Some of
them choose to default and others choose to refinance. Those who receive HAMP benefits
are able to modify their mortgages to better terms and move out of the lower part of the
equity distribution, having a lower risk of default in the future. For this reason, default is
below the pre-crisis level for some periods after the crisis. As the economy recovers and
the distribution of households returns back to steady state, the default rate rises to the
initial levels. Figure 10 illustrates the behavior of the equity distribution over the transition.
In the first period of the shock, the distribution shifts to the left. Given that default and
refinancing rates increase during the crisis, after some periods the equity distribution shifts
to the right and slowly converges to the pre-crisis distribution.

Figure 9 illustrates two counter-factual experiments. In the first one, denoted “Subsidyonly Policy” in the figure, the government completely eliminates TARP and lowers the
payments-to-income eligibility threshold of HAMP to 22.5%, so as to reduce foreclosures
up to the level where mortgage originators have no losses. Note that, since the aggregate
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Figure 10: Equity distribution during transitional dynamics.

shock lasts for three periods and households default and refinance while the shock lasts,
foreclosures are below the pre-crisis level for some years after the shock disappears. Given
this, in order to preserve the solvency in the first period, default need not be reduced to the
pre-crisis level. Using a utilitarian welfare function, welfare increases 0.2% in consumption
equivalent terms, as compared to the baseline calibration.
There are two reasons for this. First, the welfare cost of the dead-weight loss associated
with foreclosures is larger than the welfare cost caused by the distortion generated by the
taxation levied to subsidize strategic defaulters. This happens because the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply is not sufficiently large, so increasing taxes to subsidize an additional 10%
of mortgage holders - strategic defaulters - does not generate a large welfare cost in the
economy. Moreover, redistributing resources to strategic defaulters is not bad per se, so the
welfare gain of strategic defaulters outweighs part of the distortion generated by taxation.
In contrast, a 20% dead-weight loss of foreclosed houses generates unambiguously negative
welfare consequences that outweigh the cost of strategic default. In this sense, it is welfare
preferable to implement a subsidy policy that prevents foreclosures from happening, than
to allow households to default and offer bailouts to mortgage holders to cover the ex-post
losses.
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The second reason is more subtle. As discussed at the end of Section 2.5.4, being
underwater is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for mortgage default, and only
households that are sufficiently underwater choose the default. For this reason, after a
negative house price shock, the government has to spend fewer resources to prevent
foreclosures through mortgage refinancing subsidies, than to cover for the losses of that
default, given that the default could be prevented with a transfer that is smaller than
the negative balance. For this reason, the government can preserve the solvency of the
banks by spending fewer resources on mortgage refinancing subsidies, than by covering
its ex-post losses.
In the second experiment, denoted “Bailout-only Policy” on the figure, the government
completely eliminates HAMP and only makes a bailout to mortgage originators to preserve
ex-post solvency. In this case, default increases, as illustrated on the right panel of Figure
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9, and welfare decreases 0.8% in consumption equivalent terms.
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Figure 11: Welfare gains in consumption equivalent terms (%) under a subsidy-only policy, by
home equity (%).

Given that subsidies redistribute resources within the economy, there are some groups
that benefit more from a subsidy-only policy. Figure 11 illustrates the average welfare gains
of implementing the subsidy-only policy instead of the baseline HAMP-TARP, according
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to home equity. Home-owners with −40% to −20% of equity have the largest gains, as
they are the most indebted ones and receive the largest subsidies. This group would be
willing to reduce its lifetime consumption up to 2.5% in the HAMP-TARP baseline, to be
in the subsidy-only scenario. Households with equity between −20% and 0% also receive
a large portion of the subsidies and would be willing to reduce their consumption up
to 0.9% in order to be in the subsidy-only policy. The welfare gains of households with
equity between 0% and 60% are small, as only a small fraction of them receive subsidies.
Households that have equity above 60% on their home experience negative welfare gains,
as under the subsidy-only case house prices do not fall as much, when compared to
the baseline scenario (see Figure 9). Given that these households are the largest house
investors, higher prices during the crisis reduce the future returns on their investments.
Moreover, they do not receive subsidies so, on average, the subsidy-only program reduces
their welfare. Finally, the group of households that do not own a house experience a
welfare gain of 0.11% in consumption terms, because on the subsidy-only scenario the
government levies fewer taxes.
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Figure 12: Default rate by age, before and after the Great Recession.

Figure 12 illustrates default by age, before and during the Great Recession. Given
that young households suffered the largest drop in earnings and were the most indebted

50

ones, the default rate increased more among them, when compared to the pre-crisis level.
Although the HAMP policy targeted households with high Payments-to-Income, which is
a variable that is correlated with age, a better eligibility rule should have an age component
that targets the youngest households. In that way, the government could achieve a larger
reduction in foreclosures, at a lower cost.
A final counter-factual experiment does precisely that, by eliminating TARP and
implementing a subsidy-only policy, where the eligibility rule is modified. Under the new
policy, only households that were not defaulting in the initial steady state and choose
to default after the shock are eligible. That is, the subsidies are targeted mostly at the
youngest homeowners. Moreover, the size of the subsidy is the same as is HAMP but
has an additional component which decreases with age. Under this scenario, using a
utilitarian welfare function yields welfare gains of 0.4% in consumption equivalent terms.
This means that a better-designed subsidy policy based on observable characteristics can
yield welfare improvements during mortgage crises.

1.8 Concluding Remarks
Housing crises are events in which a decrease in aggregate house prices leads to higherthan-expected foreclosure rates, generating potentially large losses to mortgage investors.
To preserve the solvency of financial institutions, which are the largest investors in the mortgage market, governments have historically implemented two policies: a) offer bailouts to
institutions to cover for their losses, and b) subsidize the mortgage refinancing of households to prevent additional foreclosures. During the Great Recession, foreclosures tripled
after a house price drop of over 20%. Through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, the government implemented the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), through
which it implicitly bailed out troubled financial institutions through asset purchases, and
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the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), which offered subsidies for the
mortgage refinancing of households in risk of default.
This paper studies the welfare-maximizing policy to preserve the solvency of financial institutions, assuming that the planner can offer bailouts and mortgage refinancing
subsidies. The use of these instruments involves a trade-off, determined by two frictions.
On one hand, foreclosed houses lose 20% of their value during the foreclosure process,
as houses get damaged during the process and depreciation is larger because of vacancy.
Therefore, if the government offers bailouts to investors rather than subsidies to households to prevent foreclosures, the economy has to bear the welfare cost of the dead-weight
loss.
On the other hand, the literature has identified an idiosyncratic component in house
prices, which is not perfectly observable by the government. Given that mortgage default
depends on house prices, the government does not have perfect information on individual
households’ decision to default. When offered subsidies, households have incentives to
engage in strategic default to qualify for the benefits of the subsidy program. A subsidy
policy avoids the dead-weight loss of foreclosed houses, since it prevents mortgage default,
but subsidizes households that would not default in the absence of the program. If taxation
is distortionary, the taxes levied to subsidize strategic default generate a welfare loss in
the economy, through a distortion in the labor decision of households.
This paper quantitatively assesses the welfare maximizing-policy during mortgage
crises. Specifically, a heterogeneous agents’ model is calibrated to the pre-crisis U.S.
economy, where the trade-off between bailouts and subsidies is disciplined using empirical
micro estimates on the dead-weight loss of foreclosed houses and the size of strategic
default. In equilibrium, the welfare cost generated by the dead-weight loss is larger than
the distortion generated by the taxation levied to subsidize strategic defaulters, given the
Frisch elasticity of labor estimated in the macro literature. For this reason, a subsidy-only
policy would have generated welfare gains of up to 0.4%, measured as the consumption
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equivalent variation, when compared to the baseline calibration that matches the TARP
and HAMP programs. Given that a subsidy policy implies a redistribution of resources
within the economy, the welfare gains are heterogeneous. Households on the left tail of
the equity distribution, which benefit the most from a subsidy program, obtain the largest
welfare gains. In contrast, a bailout-only policy would have generated a welfare loss of
0.8%.
The set-up I use has three main shortcomings. First, I assume that the Great Recession
was generated by exogenous shocks to fundamentals. In my model, any bailout offered to
financial institutions has the sole effect of transferring funds to cover the losses, without
any effect on house prices. Different results would be obtained under the assumption that
the Great Recession was generated by changes in expectations. In that alternative setting,
a bailout policy could be a mechanism to align expectations toward an equilibrium in
which housing prices do not fall as much. This means that, to the extent that the Great
Recession was expectations-driven, my paper understates the potential welfare gains of
using bailouts over subsidies.
Second, I explicitly ignore the moral hazard concerns of bailing out banks or subsidizing
households. Clearly, both policies can generate incentives for banks and households to
engage in overly-risky behaviors, affecting the likelihood of future crises and, therefore,
having welfare consequences. To avoid moral hazard issues, I assume that the crisis was
a zero-probability event, so neither households nor banks had expectations about the
policies the government would implement during a crisis. The moral hazard consequences
of government policies during mortgage crises are a topic left for future research.
Finally, a recent strand of the literature evaluates the impact of government bailouts
during crises, through the financial accelerator channel. Bailouts may reduce the risk
of banks running out of equity, which reduces the financing costs of the economy and
increases economic activity. For computational reasons, this paper does not model the
amplification effects of government policies through their effect on the balance sheets of
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banks. I abstract from this effect by assuming that aggregate shocks are zero-probability
events in the economy, so in the steady state banks, finance their activities at the risk-free
rate. In this sense, my paper under-estimates the benefits of a bailout policy.
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Chapter 2

General Equilibrium Effects of
Student Loans on the Provision and
Demand for Higher Education
We characterize the outcomes of the tertiary education market in a context where borrowing constraints bind, there is a two-tier college system operating under monopolistic
competition in which colleges differ by the quality offered, and returns to education
depend on the quality of the school. Our main finding shows that subsidized student
loans can lead to a widening gap in the quality of services provided by higher education institutions. This happens because the demand for elite institutions unambiguously
increases when individuals can borrow. This does not happen in non-elite institutions,
since relaxing borrowing constraints makes some individuals move from non-elite to
elite institutions. The higher increase in demand for elite institutions allows them to
increase prices and investment per student. The motivation of this paper is the case of
Colombia, which implemented massive student loan policies during the last decade and
experienced a widening in the gap of quality supplied by elite and non-elite universities.
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Such results show that, when analyzed in general equilibrium, subsidized loan policies
can have regressive effects on the income distribution.

2.1 Introduction
The market for higher education has received significant attention in the economics
literature. In particular, the effects that subsidized loan policies have on the demand
side of the market have been widely studied, given the dramatic increase in student debt
during the last two decades in the U.S. Overall, there is a consensus in the literature on the
fact that credit constraints explain only a small fraction of enrollment decisions in higher
education in the U.S. However, this is not the case in developing countries, where student
financial aid systems are weak and evidence suggests that college enrollment is highly
determined by family wealth (Bank, 2003, 2012).12 Within this context, the implementation
of subsidized student loan policies increases the demand for education, which may have
additional equilibrium effects, such as increases in tuition prices and changes in the quality
of services offered by colleges.
Understanding the effects of subsidized student loan policies is of central importance,
given the massive investments that have been made in student credit programs during the
last two decades in the developing world, Latin America and some African countries. The
demand side effects of these policies in a context where borrowing constraints determine
enrollment decisions have been studied by the literature and the conclusions are certainly
appealing: an expansion in student loans increases the demand for higher education
among the most able students, which reduces the inefficiency that exists when very highability individuals with low initial wealth cannot access tertiary education (Canton and
Blom, 2004). This partial equilibrium analysis unambiguously suggests that such policies

12. In this paper we use the terms “college” and “universities” indistinctly
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have welfare improving effects on its beneficiaries. As a consequence, these programs have
often received the support of international organizations, such as the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank13 .
However, the implementation of subsidized student loan programs has general equilibrium effects that have not been studied by the literature. The increase in demand for
education generated by student loan policies can potentially affect tuition prices and
quality offered by certain colleges. This general equilibrium effects can affect the welfare
of individuals that do not have access to the loan programs, which might offset the overall
benefits of the policies.14
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the general equilibrium effects that
subsidized student loan policies have on the quality of education provided by different
tiers of colleges. We assume there are two tiers of colleges, which we denote low and
high-quality, or elite and non-elite colleges, that operate under monopolistic competition
(Dennis Epple and Sieg, 2006). Colleges choose the skills thresholds for admission, tuition
rates, and investments per student to maximize the quality of the education offered, which
is a function of the skills of the student body and on total investments per student. In
equilibrium, students who attend elite colleges have higher expected returns in the labor
market, when compared to students who attend to the non-elite system. Individuals
choose whether and which college to attend, given the expected returns of each option.
We characterize the demand for higher education, the incentives of each tier to invest and
admit students, and the equilibrium consequences of subsidized-loan policies.
13. These institutions have contributed to different student loan projects in the developing world. For example,
the World Bank has been financing the Colombian ACCES program since 2002 and committed in 2014 to
lend $200 million during the period 2014-2019. Recently, the IDB provided a $10 million dollar loan to the
Higher Education Finance Fund in 2012, to finance student loan programs in 4 Latin American countries.
14. ? argues that in an incomplete markets setting, although increasing borrowing limits increases the welfare
of borrowing constrained individuals, in equilibrium this also leads to an increase in the interest rate
paid by the borrowers. The two effects oppose each other, so the effect of loosening borrowing limits on
welfare is ambiguous and follows a U-shape. Although we do not take into account the effect of borrowing
constraints on the interest rate and assume government student loans are subject to an exogenous interest
rate, his findings strengthen our theory that student loan policies might have negative effects on welfare,
in equilibrium.
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We find a set of equilibria in which a subsidized student loan policy widens the gap
of the quality supplied by elite and non-elite institutions. When the loan program is
implemented, the demand for elite colleges unambiguously increases, as the loans loosen
the borrowing constraints of high-skilled individuals with low wealth. Higher demand
allows elite universities to increase the skill acceptance threshold and, as a consequence,
the average skills of the student body, while maintaining budget balancedness. As long
as the skills of the student body and investments per student are complements in the
production function for education quality, colleges have incentives to increase tuition and
investments per student, generating a further increase in quality. In contrast, the demand
for non-elite colleges does not necessarily increase with the student loan policy. Even
though some individuals that would not study in the absence of the program will enroll
in non-elite schools, some others that would attend non-elite institutions in the absence of
the program will decide to attend elite schools when they have access to loans. The effect
of the subsidy program on the average skills of the student body of non-elite colleges does
not necessarily increase, nor do the investments per student. This generates a widening of
the gap of the education quality provided.
In addition to studying the response of education quality to subsidized student loan
policies, our analysis is novel given that we focus on developing countries, as opposed to
the structural literature that has only explored the U.S. context, as far as our knowledge
goes. The educational sector in developing economies is particularly different from that
of developed economies, for three main reasons. First, there is evidence that credit
constraints play a role in determining college enrollment decisions among households
of developing countries (Melguizo et al., 2015), as opposed to the case of developed
countries. Second, in many developing countries, private institutions own a larger share
of the market for higher education, as compared to European countries or even the U.S.
(see Figure 1). This is important because public institutions may not be as responsive to
market incentives, but rather follow the social planner’s objectives. In contrast, private
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institutions are potentially more responsive to market signals, so any change in demand
will generate stronger equilibrium effects in developing economies. Third, enrollment
rates in developing countries are very low, when compared to enrollment in developed
countries. As documented by Mestieri (2016), there is an existing positive correlation
between enrollment rates and income per capita at a cross-country level.
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Figure 1: % of enrollment in private institutions by country.

The main purpose of this paper is to rationalize how a widening of the education quality
gap can arise as a consequence of a subsidized student loan policy. This would imply that
student loan programs also have downsides when studied in general equilibrium, and
all of this should be taken into account for future policy design. We focus in the case of
Colombia, a developing country that undertook a massive expansion of publicly supplied
student loan availability during the last decade. We use a novel dataset that allows us to
analyze the evolution of various measures of quality of education before and after the
policy was implemented. After the introduction of the policy, the number of students
enrolled increased. However, there is evidence consistent with a widening gap in the
quality of elite and non-elite universities, measured as average test scores in entry and
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exit examination tests, the number of professors per students and various measures of
academic production such as articles published per faculty.
Finally, our analysis gives us tools to discuss the design of the optimal student loan
policy in a context where the government has outside funds that has to allocate within the
existing population. From a partial equilibrium perspective, we find that the student loan
policy that maximizes utilitarian welfare and enrollment is one that gives priority to the
lowest-ability individuals that are borrowing constrained and would like to study. The
reasoning behind this is the following: high-ability individuals will receive higher incomes
over their lifetime, regardless of their education level. Since marginal utility is decreasing,
the benefits of studying to have additional income are relatively small. In addition, those
that are borrowing constrained and study will not be able to smooth consumption. In this
sense, they face a higher opportunity cost of education. Therefore, relaxing the constraint
for high ability individuals will change the study decision of fewer individuals, than if the
constraint were relaxed among lower ability individuals.
However, from a general equilibrium perspective, there is an opposing force in action,
which suggests that the optimal policy should offer subsidized loans to the most able.
Individuals choose whether and where to study according to the quality offered by each
college, since their future earnings depend on it. The quality offered by colleges, in turn, is
a composite of the average ability of the student body and investments per student made
by the college. As assumed by the literature, these two inputs are complements in the
quality production function. In this regard, the best quality-enhancing student loan policy
would maximize the average student ability, which would increase returns to investments
per student, and would lead to higher quality offered.
In this regard, there are two opposing forces shaping the optimal student loan policy.
Relaxing the borrowing constraints of lower ability households will have the highest
impact on school enrollment, but will reduce the returns to investments per student done
by schools and the quality of education. In contrast, relaxing the borrowing limits of high
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ability households maximizes the education quality offered, but enrollment is not as large.
The issue becomes even more complex once we incorporate a two-tier education system,
in which colleges might respond differently in their pricing, admissions and investment
policies when faced to a demand shock of this nature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the relevant literature. In Section 2.3 we describe a model of the market for higher education, characterize
the demand for a two-tiered education system and explains the mechanism through which
borrowing constraints affect equilibrium quality supplied. In this section, we illustrate
the main theoretical results of the paper. That is, a policy leading to subsidized loans can
increase the gap of quality of education. We describe the case and Colombia and illustrate
how this case is consistent with what we predict in the theoretical model in Section 2.4. In
Section 2.5 we describe the numerical analysis and calibration exercise. We conclude in
Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to various lines of the literature on the economics of education. First,
our paper is related to the literature studying the relevance of borrowing constraints in the
access to higher education. Given that we are studying the welfare effects of government
loan policies in developing countries, knowing whether borrowing constraints matter is of
central importance. Although there is evidence suggesting that borrowing constraints do
not determine school attendance of students in advanced economies, the opposite is the
case for developing economies. Second, our paper is related to the literature that studies
general equilibria in the market for education. This literature has mostly studied what is
known as the “Bennett Hypothesis”15 . Our paper adds to this literature in two dimensions.
First, we study equilibrium effects that go beyond prices, as we analyze the effects on the
15. The “Bennett Hypothesis” states that an expansion in the number of grants provided to students are almost
totally appropriated by colleges through increases in tuition prices.
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quality offered by colleges. Second, this literature has been focused extensively in the
United States. In this paper, we provide a new context of analysis for general equilibrium
effects in the market for higher education: a developing economy where credit constraints
bind. Finally, our paper is related to the industrial organization literature analyzing the
behavior of colleges in non-competitive markets. We implement the framework proposed
by Dennis Epple and Sieg (2006) and extend it to assess the general equilibrum effects
of tuition prices, college quality, and admittance rules, in the context of a developing
economy.

2.2.1

The Role of Borrowing Constraints

There seems to be a consensus in the literature suggesting that the effects of borrowing
constraints on the post-secondary decisions of youngsters are negligible. Using the 1979
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), Carneiro and Heckman (2002)
find evidence that borrowing constraints and family income account for a very small
fraction of post-secondary school attendance decisions, while early childhood differences
are determinant. According to their estimates, only between 0% and 8% of high school
graduates are actually borrowing constrained. Similarly, Keane and Wolpin (2001) find that,
although borrowing constraints are tight in the U.S. and individuals cannot even borrow the
amount to cover one year of schooling, their existence does not determine the decision to
study. In counterfactual experiments, when the authors remove the borrowing constraints,
the educational attainment does not change significantly. Borrowing constraints only affect
labor supply and savings decisions of students.
Dinarsky (2003) measures the impact of the exogenous elimination of the Social Security
Student Benefit Program in 1982 on school attendance in the U.S. This program provided
monthly payments to college students who had a family member who was deceased,
disabled, or a retired social security beneficiary. The paper finds that the exogenous
reduction in aid led to a decrease in the probability of being enrolled by students at
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the margin. However, the author argues that this cannot be interpreted as existence
of borrowing constraints, since grants do not only relax the borrowing constraints of
households, but change also the relative price of education.
More recent studies argue that, although credit constraints did not seem to affect the
schooling decision some decades ago, during the last two decades they might be playing
an important role in post-secondary schooling in the United States. Using data from the
1979 and 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97), Belley and
Lochner (2007) find a dramatic increase in the importance of family income on school
attainment, after controlling for family background and ability as in the previous studies.
Similarly, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) estimate a structural model that suggests
that, although American households were not borrowing constrained during the 1980s,
during the last decade family income has been determinant in schooling decisions. They
argue that in the last two decades there have been rising costs and returns to education,
while government student loan programs have not grown at the same pace, so people have
become borrowing constrained.
Although there is not much research that studies the role of credit constraints in
educational choices in developing countries, the existing evidence seems to unambiguously
point towards the importance of borrowing constraints in the educational decisions. As
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) state, “one important difference between Mexico and the U.S.,
for instance, might be the wider availability of scholarships and student loans in the U.S., cannot
be found in Mexico for higher education.” Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) and Kaufmann
(2014) provide evidence suggesting that liquidity constraints do determine the postsecondary schooling decision in Mexico. They use data that characterizes the expected
returns of education for every household in their sample. If credit constraints were not
binding, there should exist a positive gradient between subjective expected returns from
schooling and school attendance. Their results show that this gradient breaks for the
lowest income households in their sample. Under their interpretation, this is evidence of

63

existing borrowing constraints. Solis (2013) studies the existence of borrowing constraints
in Chile. Using administrative data on the entire sample of individuals that participate
in the college admissions’ process, he uses a regression discontinuity approach to study
the impact of providing educational loans. After controlling for socio-economic covariates,
individuals right above the eligibility threshold for receiving educational loans have a
significantly higher probability of enrolling in college than those right below the threshold.
The author finds evidence suggesting a positive gradient between income and enrolment
among those households that have no access to the government loans. This gradient
disappears for individuals that access the program. Also using a regression discontinuity
approach, Marc Gurgand and Melonio (2011) find evidence that the enrolment to college
of households without access to student loans is 20 percentage points lower in South
Africa. Regarding the Colombian case, Melguizo et al. (2015) find evidence that the
implementation of a massive government loan program in the past decade, which is the
topic of this paper, did increase student enrolment.

2.2.2

General Equilibrium Effects and the Bennett Hypothesis

During the last decade, the literature that has tried to explain what has become to be
known as the Bennett Hypothesis: expansions of government-supplied student aid for
education have been almost almost entirely appropriated by colleges through an increase
in tuition prices. As the former U.S. Secretary of Education stated in 1987, ”If anything,
increases in financial aid in recent years have enabled colleges and universities blithely to raise
their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase.”16 Singell
and Stone (2007) study the effect that Pell Grants have had on tuition prices of public and
private schools. They study the Pell Program, which has been the biggest post-secondary
educational loan program in the United States. In 1999, the Pell Grants were awarded to 3
million students across more than 6000 colleges, out of a total of 9 million students. The
16. William Bennett to the New York Times, 1987.
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authors estimate the impact of Pell Grants per student on tuition charged by universities,
using a panel of 1554 colleges from 1989 to 1996. They find that the increase in Pell Grants
caused an almost one-to-one increase in the price of tuition charged by private and public
out-of-state colleges. However, they find no such a causality on the in-state tuition charged
by public schools. In contrast, Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2002) find evidence that private and
public out-of-state tuition prices were not affected by government loans, while in-state
tuition by public colleges were. Finally, David O. Lucca and Shen (2016) use exogenous
variation in the legislation that rules Pell Grants, to study the relationship between student
aid and tuition.
Gordon and Hedlund (2015) study the increase in tuition prices by estimating a
structural model in which universities provide human capital and households decide their
investments in education. They study the rise in college tuition over the last decades,
as a reaction to cuts in state appropriations, an increase in the costs of skilled labor in
other industries, and an increase in government supplied loans. The authors find out
that the increase in government loans explains 102% of the tuition increase, as opposed
to only 16% of the other two hypotheses. This result provides evidence in favor of the
Bennett Hypothesis. Our paper differs from theirs in the sense that we want to study
the equilibrium effects on quality provided and welfare effects of relaxing borrowing
constraints in a context in which they matter. The authors study increases in the borrowing
limits in the context of the U.S. As has been already argued, there is evidence that these
constraints are of secondary importance on the decision to attend school. Therefore,
relaxing these limits does not improve efficiency. In contrast, in countries in which the
borrowing constraints are binding, relaxing them does generate efficiency improvements.

2.2.3

The Education firms

Our paper makes part of the literature that models universities as firms in the educational
sector. Universities produce human capital and use households both as inputs and
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costumers. This approach has been used to study different questions regarding postsecondary education. For instance, Hector Chade and Smith (2014) model the universities
as an oligopoly with a fixed number of universities (firms), in which the goods produced
by universities (education) are ranked exogenously by all households in the same way.
Universities only choose admission standards, so as to fill a fixed capacity of students and
maximize the ability of the student body. The paper studies the role of frictions in the
application process on the student sorting between universities. Namely, the model has
information frictions and fixed costs of application. The authors, as Caucutt (2001), treat
the utility that households receive of attending each of the universities as exogenous and
independent from the product offered by each university. We endogenize the valuation of
households as a function of the equilibrium quality offered. The authors do not include
tuition prices as a policy of universities, assume an exogenous valuation for the universities
and take the size of universities as fixed. We depart from all of these assumptions, but
assume there are no frictions in the application process. The reason is that our purpose
is not to study the outcome of the application process but, instead, model the strategic
interactions in the post-secondary education sector between universities and households.
The educational sector in our model closely mimics Dennis Epple and Sieg (2006). In
their paper, the authors model the supply side of the educational sector as an oligopoly
sector in which a fixed amount of colleges interact to attract students and maximize the
quality of the education they offer, subject to a balanced budget constraint. Quality by
universities is a composite of average student ability, to resemble peer effects in schooling,
and the average investments per student. This treatment of quality has been standard in
the literature that models schools (Caucutt, 2001). Households value quality as an input
on their utility function. In their model, households play a passive role in their model,
since their purpose is not to estimate equilibrium interactions between households and
firms. Rather, they concentrate in studying thoroughly the supply side. Furthermore,
they estimate their model by using a “club goods” approach, instead of explicitly solving
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the Nash equilibrium of the monopolistically competitive market. We depart from this
approach, since we consider that the strategic interactions between colleges are of first
order importance to explain the different reaction of elite and non-elite institutions to
subsidized student loan policies.
Finally, we treat wages of college graduates as a function of the quality supplied by
the school attended. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been used in
structural estimations in the past, but there is empirical evidence that relates future wages
to the quality of the education. Black and Smith (2006) estimate a latent model in which
quality is a latent variable, and there are “signals” of quality. They find out that SAT
scores, faculty-student ratio, rejection rate, freshmen retention rate, and faculty salaries are
significant signals of quality. Furthermore, the latent variable of quality significantly affects
post-college wages of individuals. Similarly, Dan Black and Daniel (2005) find evidence
that quality increases post college earnings, driven by higher wages. Leaving quality aside,
there is extensive evidence that estimates positive returns to college attendance in terms of
higher future wages (Zimmerman, 2014; Harry Anthony Patrinos and Sakellariou, 2006).
OECD and Bank (2012) estimates that average starting earnings for individuals with a
bachelor’s degree were 4 times higher than those of individuals with high-school degree.
Although these estimates do not control for unobservable household characteristics, other
estimates find that people with post-secondary degrees earn significantly higher wages in
Latin America (L. Gasparini and Acosta, 2011).

2.3 A Model of the Market for Higher Education with Credit Constraints
There are two types of agents in the economy: households and universities. There is
a government that offers educational credits to high-ability individuals that decide to
attend college, at an exogenous interest rate R ≥ r, where r is the risk free interest rate.
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In additition, the government subsidizes the interest paid by the poorest households that
access the credit, at a subsidy rate s. In order to finance these subsidies, the government
levies a marginal tax, τ, to every household in the economy. The government policies are
exogenous, fixed before the economy starts and satisfy budget balance. Given these policies,
the market of higher education operates under monopolistic competition. Universities
supply human capital in the market for education, by choosing a tuition price, a minimum
ability level for admission and a level of investment per student. Given government and
university policies, the households decide if they want to study in any university at the
prevailing market prices.

2.3.1

Households

Households are born with innate ability and wealth (θ, b), according to a bivariate distribution F(θ, b) over the space [0, 1] × [b, b̄]. Individuals live for two periods, after which they
die with probability equal to one. In period 1, individuals choose either to study at the
university or work in the non-skilled labor market at a wage w per efficiency unit of labor.
Individuals that do not study receive a wage θw, do not have access to credit markets and
can save at the risk-free rate r. There are two universities in the economy denoted by h
and l. Each university sets a threshold θ j for j = h, l such that only students that have
ability θ ≥ θ j are admitted to university j, and we assume that this information is public17 .
Therefore, individuals with θ < min{θ h , θ l } cannot study and have to work. Individuals
who decide to study at university j cannot work, and have to pay a tuition, P j , set by the
university.
In order to finance education, the government offers student loans of up to the price
of the tuition, P j , at the interest rate R to people that decide to study and have an ability
level θ ≥ θmin . In addition, students with low wealth, b ≤ bmax , that decide to study and
17. We assume that θ j , j = h, l is a public threshold, since our purpose is not to study the frictions in the college
application process, as opposed to some papers in the literature that model explicitly these information
frictions (Hector Chade and Smith, 2014; Fu, 2014).
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have access to the loan will receive a subsidy on the interest rate, s. Loans are given
conditional on studying, and individuals that study and are eligible for the loan choose
whether to borrow from the government or not. In order to finance these subsidies, the
government levies a proportional tax, τ, to every individual in the economy. Individuals
for which θ < θmin are borrowing constrained and can only finance education with their
initial wealth. Therefore, in the first period the household decides its level of consumption,
c, whether to study or not in any university, h, l, and the level of savings, a, which can be
potentially negative for households that study and satisfy the government conditions for
the educational loans.
In the second period, the households are either non-, low- or high-skilled, depending
on whether they decided to study in the first period and which college they attended.
Those who decided to study in period 1, will enter the j-skilled labor market in period
2, and receive a wage equal to wθ(1 + z j ), where z j is a skill premium that is university
specific. This quality is an equilibrium object that depends on the quality of the student
body and investments per student, and is fully characterized in the next section. We
assume that individuals have perfect foresight of the value of z j for j = h, l when they
optimize. Individuals who do not study will become part of the non-skilled labor force at
a wage wθ. We exclude the possibility of default in the model by assuming that repayment
is fully enforced, so in the second period individuals that have government debt will
repay their student loan. Given prices R, r, w, government policies τ, s, university policies
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{θ j , P j } j=h,l , and perfect foresight about education quality {zl , zh }, a household that is
eligible for studying at the university j, θ ≥ θ j , and decides to study gets a utility equal to:

V j (θ, b) = max
c,a

u(c) + βu(c0 ),

s.t.

(1)

c + a + P j = b · (1 − τ)

(2)

c0 = a(1 + r) · 1{a≥0} + a(1 + R̃) · 1{a<0} + wθ(1 + z j )


 R(1 − s) if b ≤ b

max
R̃ =


R
if b > bmax

(3)

a ≥ −1{θ ≥θmin } · P j ,

c0 ≥ 0

c ≥ 0,

(4)
(5)

Individuals that decide not to study, get the following utility:

V N (θ, b) = max
c,a

u(c) + βu(c0 ),

s.t.

(6)

c + a = b · (1 − τ) + wθ

(7)

c0 = a(1 + r) + wθ

(8)

a ≥ 0,

c ≥ 0,

c0 ≥ 0

(9)

The individual with ability and wealth (θ, b) decides to study at university j whenever
θ ≥ θ j and V j (θ, b) ≥ V N (θ, b), and V j (θ, b) ≥ V − j (θ, b) if they can attend to the other
university − j, i.e. θ ≥ θ − j . Otherwise, the individual decides not to study. Therefore, the
household’s value function is given by:




max{V h (θ, b), V l (θ, b), V N (θ, b)} if θ ≥ max{θ h , θ l }




V(θ, b) = max{V j (θ, b), V N (θ, b)} if θ − j > θ ≥ θ j






V N (θ, b) if θ < min{θ h , θ l }
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Figure 2: Representation of the education decisions on the state space.
The following section gives a detailed characterization of the demand for both tiers
of schools in the state space. This characterization will allow us to give insights on the
optimal student loan policy on a monopolistically competitive market.

Characterization of the Demand
For a given set of initial parameters, the shaded region in Figure 2 illustrates the individuals
that choose to study in the state space when both universities set their acceptance threshold
to 0 and there are no government-supplied student loans. The following sequence of
theorems characterize the demand for college education on the state space, and its close
relationship with borrowing constraints. This will let us derive some results about the
socially optimal student loan policy. First, we describe the college decision for households
that are unconstrained.
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Theorem 1. Among the unconstrained households, the decision of whether and where
to study is independent of initial wealth, b, and follows a cut-off rule on θ. That is, there
exist θ and θ̄ such that:

• If θ ≤ θ, the individual will not study.
• If θ ≤ θ ≤ θ̄, the individual will attend the low-quality college.
• If θ̄ ≤ θ, the individual will attend the high-quality college.

where:
1+r
θ¯l =
w



Pl
zl − (1 + r)


,

1+r
θ¯h =
w



Ph − Pl
zh − zl



Proof. See Proof .2.1
Theorem 1 is a result of the fact that ability θ, unskilled labor w and quality of the
school attended z j are complements. In particular, this complementarity implies: a) among
the unconstrained individuals, those with higher ability face higher marginal returns of
education, so will choose, ceteris paribus, a higher quality school for a given wealth, b)
as the wages of unskilled labor w increase, the marginal returns to education rise for
every θ, so marginal individuals will shift to higher levels of education, c) if college j,
for j ∈ {l, h}, increases its price Pj or reduces its quality z j , marginal individuals will
change their schooling decision in the expected direction. That is, if Pj increases or z j
decreases, marginal individuals will change their decision of attending school j. Finally, d)
if the interest rate r increases, present consumption becomes more valuable than future
consumption, so marginal individuals will reduce their present expenditures in education.
Theorem 2 characterizes the individuals that, given their decision to attend college j, are
borrowing constrained.
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j

Theorem 2. Given an ability θ, there exist cut-offs, b̄u (θ), j ∈ { N, l, h}, on the initial wealth,
j

such that individuals with b ≥ b̄u (θ) that attend college j will not be borrowing constrained.
Individuals that attend college j and have b < b̄ j (θ) will be borrowing constrained and will
not be able to smooth consumption over time. The cut-offs are linear, increasing in θ and
take the form:

b¯uN (θ) = − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)) − wθ(1 − ( β(1 + r))−1/σ )

b¯ul (θ) = Pl + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zl ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
b¯uh (θ) = Ph + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zh ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))

Proof. See Proof .2.1
Given a level of education and initial wealth, individuals with a higher θ have higher
lifetime income and in an unconstrained world would consume more in every period of
their lives. Given the existence of a borrowing limit Ā, for a sufficiently high θ individuals
will be borrowing constrained. As a consequence, the initial wealth that individuals
must have not to be borrowing constrained is increasing in ability. Figure 2 illustrates
j

j

the cut-off functions b̄u (θ) on the state space. As illustrated, individuals above the b̄u (θ)
function, will decide to study in college j whenever her θ falls inside the corresponding
interval in the cut-offs defined in Theorem 1. Note also that individuals that are borrowing
constrained when studying at college l will also be borrowing constrained when studying
in h, assuming a higher price of education in the high-quality college (which, of course,
j

is an equilibrium object). Moreover, the functions b̄u (θ) are steeper when the quality z j
increases, since quality of schooling and ability are complements. Finally, we do not
consider the case in which individuals are borrowing constrained when they do not study.
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Since in our context, individuals that do not study earn the same wage in every period,
they will only be borrowing constrained when the interest rate β(1 + r) << 1. However, for
a reasonable calibration, individuals will be able to smooth consumption. The following
two theorems illustrate the study decision of individuals that are borrowing constrained.
Theorem 3. Given ability θ, the decision to study in the low-quality college, l, or not study
at all, follows a cut-off strategy on b, such that individuals with b ≥ b̄cl (θ) will attend
college l, and those with b < b̄cl (θ) will not study. The cut-off is characterized implicitly by
equation (1) in the proof. Moreover, if the intertemporal elasiticity of substitution is lower
than 1 the cutoff is U-shaped and there exists a θ ∗ such that b̄cl (θ) is:
• decreasing in θ for θ ≤ θ ∗
• increasing in θ for θ ≥ θ ∗
where θ ∗ solves:



1
1−σ



∗

1− σ

(b(θ ) − Pl + Ā)


+

β
1−σ



(wθ ∗ (1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)1−σ −

Φ(wθ ∗ (2 + r) + b(θ ∗ )(1 + r))1−σ = 0

wX(1 + zl ) − w(2 + r)
b(θ) = θ
− X Ā
1+r


Φ(1 − σ)(2 + r)
X=
β(1 + zl )


1/ σ

Proof. See Proof .2.1.
The cut-off b̄cl (θ) is illustrated in Figure 2, where we assume that the utility function is
CRRA with σ = 2, as is common in the literature, so the intertemporal elasticity is lower
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than 1. The individuals who are constrained (below b̄ul (θ)) will choose either to study at l
or not, if their initial wealth exceeds b̄cl (θ). The cut-off is U-shaped because two effects are
in action. First, the “complementarity” effect means that, given a b, individuals with higher
θ will have higher marginal returns from studying, so are willing to study even though
they will not be able to smooth consumption. Therefore, the cut-off is initially decreasing.
However, the “constrainedness” effect dominates after some point: given an initial wealth
b, individuals with higher θ will face a larger wedge in their Euler equation, meaning
that they will be able to smooth consumption to a lower extent. When the wedge is large
enough, individuals will prefer not to study and smooth consumption by deciding not to
study. Of course, this results strongly depends on the value of σ chosen, and continues
to hold for any σ > 1. For the sake of exposition, in Appendix .2.1 we characterize the
demand for education with a linear utility function (that is, when σ = 0 and there is
an infinite elasticity of substitution). Figure 23 illustrates the decision of individuals in
the state space. As can be expected, in the linear case individuals derive no utility from
consumption smoothing, so there does not exist such a “constrainedness” effect. In this
case, the threshold is never increasing. The next theorem characterizes the cut-off for
individuals that are constrained when studying at h. The results are parallel to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Given ability θ, the decision to study in h or l, follows a cut-off strategy on b,
such that individuals with b ≥ b̄ch (θ) will attend college h, and those with b < b̄ch (θ) will
attend l. The cut-off is characterized implicitly by equation (2) in the proof. Moreover, if
the intertemporal elasiticity of substitution is lower than 1 the cutoff is U-shaped and there
exists a θ ∗∗ such that b̄ch (θ) is:
• decreasing in θ for θ ≤ θ ∗∗
• increasing in θ for θ ≥ θ ∗∗
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where θ ∗∗ solves:



1
1−σ



(b∗ (θ ∗∗ ) − Ph + Ā)

(1−σ)


+

β
1−σ




wθ ∗∗ (1 + zh ) − (1 + r) Ā −

Φ × (wθ ∗∗ (1 + zl ) + b(1 + r) − Pl (1 + r)) = 0


b∗ (θ) = θw X ∗ (1 + zh ) − (1 + zl ) − X ∗ + Pl
∗

X =



Φ × (1 − σ)(1 + zl )
β(1 + zh )

 1/ σ

Proof. See Proof .2.1.
Having characterized the demand for education in the state space, we can say a
couple of things about the relationship between borrowing constraints and the demand.
The following result describes the differential effect of relaxing the borrowing limits to
households, Ā.
Theorem 5 (Borrowing constraints). If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower
than 1, for any given θ the cut-offs b̄cl (θ) and b̄ch (θ) are decreasing on Ā. Moreover, the
elasticities of b̄cl (θ) and b̄ch (θ) with respect to the borrowing limit Ā are decreasing on θ,
meaning that a relaxation of the borrowing constraint has a higher impact on enrollment
among the marginal individuals that have lower θ.

Proof. See Proof .2.1.
Theorem 5 states that among the constrained individuals, those with lower θ are
more sensitive to relaxing the borrowing constraints. That is, if the borrowing constraints
were relaxed by the same amount to all the individuals, more low-θ individuals would
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change their study decision. This result is a consequence of the decreasing marginal
utility. Individuals with high θ and sufficiently low initial wealth have a trade-off between
earning relatively high wages in every period and smoothing consumption it they do
not study, or studying to earn large wages in the second period at the expense of a very
low consumption in the first period. However, because of decreasing marginal utility, the
utility of a very large wage in the second period is not as large as for lower θ individuals,
so individuals will optimally decide to study only when there is a large increase in the
borrowing limits of the first period.
This result has very important implications on the design of an optimal student
loan policy in a partial equilibrium setting. If the objective of the government is to
maximize enrollment, the policy should target the lower ability individuals. As a matter
of illustration of Theorem 5, Figure 3 illustrates the number of individuals of ability
θ that change their study decision as the borrowing constraint is relaxed from Ā = 0.
As stated in Theorem 5, the individuals in the state space with low ability that would
study in the unconstrained world (those with θ ∈ [θ̄l , θ̄h ]) are more sensitive to relaxing
borrowing constraints. Therefore, increasing the borrowing capacity increases enrollment
more among the low ability individuals.

2.3.2

Universities

Universities act as firms that maximize an objective function. Given that university systems
in most countries are non-profit firms, we follow the literature on education and industrial
organization and assume that universities maximize a composite of the quality they offer
to students, denoted by z, and the economic diversity of their student body, subject to a
budget constraint. Quality offered by universities is an abstract concept. The literature
has argued that the quality offered by a school is determined both by the quality of the
student body and the investments per student done by the school. Dennis Epple and Sieg
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Figure 3: Number of students that change their study decision when borrowing constraints
change from Ā = 0 to Ā, by ability θ.
(2006), for instance, model the objective function of the university as a composite of the
average ability of the student body, the investment per student and the inverse of the
mean income. They argue that there is empirical and anecdotal evidence that shows that
colleges engage in policies to attract low income students. Universities take as given the
values of τ, s, R, w and the distribution F. Additionally, we assume that universities set
their policies simultaneously and so, the pricing and admission policies set in equilibrium
should satisfy the no profitable one shot deviation principle.
University j takes as given (τ, r, s, R, w, P− j , θ − j ) and will set the pricing and admission
policies (P j , θ j ) in order to solve the following problem:

max

{ P j ,θ j ,I j }

  α   1− α
j
zj
σb
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(10)

subject to:

α1
z j = θ˜j (I j )α2

θ˜j =

Z

(11)

θ · e j (θ, b)dF(θ, b)

Θ× B
j
j

I j · N + V (N j ) + C j = P j · N j + E j
Nj =

Z
Θ× B

e j (θ, b)dF(θ, b)

(12)
(13)
(14)

j
where θ˜j is the average ability of the individuals that attend school j. σb is the inverse

of the average income of the student body and reflects the fact that universities care about
the diversity in their student body. e j (b, θ) indicates with values zero or one if a student
with ability θ and wealth b decides to study or not. I j is the monetary amount that the
university invests per student, V j is a convex cost function, N j is the size of the student
body, C j is a fixed cost and E j the university’s endowment. Note that the policy P j does not
depend on student’s characteristics such as wealth or skills. This is not only a simplifying
assumption but also follows closely the case of Colombia where private universities do
not price-discriminate students based on ability or wealth. As will be discussed in the
relevant section, the extent of financial aid provided by such institutions is very limited in
the period of analysis.

2.3.3

Discussion

Although in principle the solution to the problem of the university might seem simple
given that there are only two variables of choice, there are several elements of the model
that increase the complexity of such decision. First of all, both policies are interdependent. When a university changes one decision variable -either the price or the admission
threshold- this will distort the incentives faced when setting the other policy. For instance,
a change in tuition price will not only change the revenue of the university but will change
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the demand in a way that we expect to see a change in the average ability of the student
body. Such a change in the average ability of the student body will affect the marginal
productivity of investments made by the university, which in turn will affect its pricing
decisions.
Moreover, we need to deal with the fact that in equilibrium no university should have
incentives to deviate. Given that both universities make the decision simultaneously and
that there are no elements of incomplete information in the model, the relevant equilibrium concept is Nash Equilibrium: no university will have incentives to deviate given the
decisions made by the other university. Note that given the nature of the problem we
cannot be sure of the existence of such equilibrium -university payoffs are not continuousand moreover, uniqueness cannot be guaranteed.
The aforementioned elements make it clear why analyzing the consequences that
subsidized loan policies will have in the market of higher education is a complex problem.
Let’s suppose that the government imposes such policy by subsidizing the interest rate
of student loans. The first effect such policy will have is an increase in the number of
students going to college. Note, however, that it is also not unreasonable to assume that
the quality of the student body will change. This is because people who changed their
decision to go to college are either those who were credit constrained or those having low
ability levels that now decide to go to college given the decrease in the opportunity cost.
We can expect that after imposing such a policy, households will react by changing
their decision of studying and universities should expect a change not only in the size
of their student body but also in their quality. Given such changes, universities might
want to change the prices charged to their students. This is due to the fact that as the
quality of the student body changes, the productivity of investment will also be affected.
Additionally, the willingness to pay for educational services is affected by such policy and
universities will react to that. Moreover, universities might want to change the admission
threshold either to improve the quality of their student body or to attract less able students
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that are willing to pay more for education. The overall effect depends on how sensitive is
the demand for education with respect to the quality of services being provided.
Finally, note that -as said previously- the decisions of universities need to be analyzed
in equilibrium. When deciding what is optimal, each college needs to take into account
what their competitor is doing in the market and there should be no room for profitable
deviations. After imposing a subsidized loan policy we might end up in an equilibrium
where one college serves a specific part of the population. For instance one college serves
a large demand for students with relatively low levels of ability whereas the other one specializes in providing high quality education for a reduced number of high ability students.
Additionally, we can have a symmetric equilibrium where both firms are indistinguishable
from one another or one in which only one firm operates in the market.

2.3.4

Government

We do not model the government as a welfare maximizing agent in the economy. We
abstract from this fact and simply analyse the impact of the change in the government
policies on the higher education market. However, we do interpret the student loan policy
implementation as a way of the government to reduce the existent inefficiency in the
educational market.
In a social planner’s solution, the efficient outcome would be one in which the high
ability individuals decide to study, independent of their wealth. Thus, the role of the
student loan policy can be interpreted as a way to reduce the existing inefficiency in the
educational sector, although we do not model it as an optimal decision. We assume that
the government has a borrowing constraint in the international borrowing markets, so is
only able to finance the education of some fraction of the individuals in the economy. For
now, we assume that the government finances individuals that have θ ≥ θmin , and of those
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that can access the loans, subsidizes the interest rate on the loan for those individuals that
have b ≤ bmax . The government sets thresholds b̄ and θ0 , such that

s · (R − 1 − r) ·

Z


Θ2 × B2

l

h



e (b, θ) + e (b, θ) × dF(θ, b) = τ

Z
Θ× B

bdF(θ, b)

(15)

where Θ2 × B2 = (Θ1 × B1 ) ∩ ([θ0 , 1] × [0, b̄]) is the set of households who study and
decide to take the subsidy.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium). Given a set of government policies, τ, s, bmax , θmin ,
and prices R, r, w, a competitive equilibrium is a set of university policies (P j , θ j , I j ) j=h,l and
household’s value function V(θ, b) and policy functions c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh (θ, b), el (θ, b), such
that:

1. Given τ, s, bmax , θmin , R, r, w, and university policies { P j , θ j , I j } j=h,l , the value function
V(θ, b) solves the household’s problem, with c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh (θ, b) and el (θ, b) being
the corresponding policy functions.
2. For each university j = h, l, it should hold that given τ, s, bmax , θmin ; prices, R, r, w;
policy functions c(θ, b), a(θ, b), eh (θ, b), el (θ, b); and policies from university − j,
(P− j , θ − j , I − j ), university j chooses policies (P j , θ j , I j ) that solve the university’s problem described in 10-14.
3. The government’s budget is balanced (equation 15 holds).
The nature of the problem makes it hard not only to compute the competitive equilibrium but also to show its existence. Note that, by only analyzing the supply side of the
market, we cannot be sure that such an equilibrium will exist in this economy. In order to
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compute the Nash equilibrium of the supply side of the market, we need to find pricing
and admission policies that are profit-maximizing given what the policies of the other
university.
The computation of such equilibrium is more involved when we note that there is an
additional fixed-point problem in the computation of the equilibrium. Universities offer
their students a given level of quality that needs to be self-fulfilled: the quality offered by
universities will attract certain students to the market but the quality of students going
to universities determines the quality offered by universities. It is not possible to use
any fixed-point theorem to show existence of a fixed point in this quality self-fulfilling
problem given that the necessary assumptions are not satisfied. In particular, note that
the fixed-point quality problem is not continuous as whenever the low-quality university
offers the same quality as the high one, all students who are beyond the ability threshold
will go to the cheapest one, generating a massive exit from one university to the other one,
generating a discontinuous jump in the quality being offered.
In order to illustrate this point extensively, we show in appendix .2.1 the failure to
prove existence of the equilibrium in the case of a linear utility function.

2.4 The “Revolución Educativa” of Colombia
In the present research, we will use Colombia as a natural experiment of a country that
implemented a rapid credit expansion program to alleviate credit constraints. Colombia is
a developing country which by the beginning of last decade had low enrollment rates in
post-secondary education, and significant differences in enrollment by quintiles of income.
As will be argued, the majority of students came from high-income families, and the
existence of financial constraints kept high-ability individuals from the lowest quintiles out
of the education market. During the last decade, the government engaged into the strategy
Revolucion Educativa, aimed at increasing the education coverage at all levels. During the
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decade, there were substantial increases in enrollment and educational credit access (see
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Figure 4: Enrollment, income and financial aid.

2.4.1

Enrollment and inequality

At the beginning of last decade, college enrollment in Colombia was among the lowest
in Latin America and a student financial aid system was almost non-existent. In 2000,
23.2% of the people between 18 and 23 years old enrolled in tertiary education, below
the enrollment rates of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, and very close to the
enrollment rates of Mexico. Because of a lack of a well-functioning financial aid system,
less than 5%18 of the entering cohorts had any kind of public or private financial support
(Bank, 2003, 2012). By the end of the decade, the enrollment rates grew to 37%, and
reached 50% in 2015. The fraction of students with some type of credit increased to almost
25% of the entering cohorts (see Figure 4(a)).
Access to education has always been unequal and, despite the fast growth of enrollment,
many disparities persist. In 2013, only 45% of the low-income students graduated from
high school, and only 25% of them enrolled in tertiary education. Of the high-income
households, 60% graduated from high school and 54% of them enrolled in a post-secondary
18. Extracted from the dataset of indicators for tertiary education, SPADIES, from the Ministry of Education.
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institution (Melguizo et al., 2015). According to Bank (2003, 2012), the enrollment gap
between the lowest and the highest quintiles of wealth widened throughout the decade:
in 2001, the enrollement rates were of 8% in the lowest quintile and 41% in the highest,
while in 2010 these numbers grew to 10% and 52%, respectively. If quality is taken into
account, disparities are even larger as a larger proportion of the low-income students
attend non-professional institutions, which have less resources and offer lower expected
income in the future. Many theories have been used to explain the low enrollment of
low-income students, such as disparities in the quality of public and private high school
education, the high costs of tertiary education and the lack of a well-functioning financial
aid system (Melguizo et al., 2015).

2.4.2

Higher Education institutions

The university system in Colombia functions as a monopolistically competitive market in
which there are significant institutional barriers to entry, and universities do not have fixed
“production capacities”, as assumed by Hector Chade and Smith (2014) (Figure 5). There
are approximately 300 tertiary education institutions, of which around 190 are universities,
and the rest offer non-professional degrees (mainly technical and technological). Despite
the growing size of the entering cohorts throughout the decade, the number of institutions
remained almost constant, while the average size of each institution doubled, on average.
It is important to note that around 45 − 50% of the total student body is enrolled in private
tertiary education institutions (OECD and Bank, 2012). Private institutions do not have
any regulations regarding the price or investment per student they offer, although they
have to satisfy a minimum quality requirement in terms of the programs and degrees
offered. Therefore, the education market in Colombia can be studied as a monopolistically
competitive market with barriers to entry and not subject to much government regulation.
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In Colombia, every student that wants to graduate from high school has to present an
exam called SABER11 set by the Colombian Institution for Education Evaluation (ICFES),
similar to the SAT test in the U.S. Although not every tertiary education institution takes
into account the results of the SABER11 in their admission decision, 78% use it as a
criterion for admission (OECD and Bank, 2012). As SABER11 has no pass-mark, each
institution sets its own minimum threshold for admission. In contrast to what happens
in Chile and some European countries, in Colombia there is not any institution that
clears the market for admissions, so individuals apply to as many institutions as they like
and universities choose their admission standards independently (Melguizo et al., 2015).
Although not perfect, the results in the SABER11 exam can be used as a proxy for the
quality of the student body at universities. Figure 6 illustrates the average decile of the
SABER11 scores of the entering cohorts to tertiary education institutions. Throughout the
decade, universities seem to have adjusted their admissions standards in such a way that
led to a reduction in the ability of the student body, as measured by relative position in
the test scores.
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2.4.3

The ACCES Program

To alleviate the low access, in 2002 the government implemented the credit program
Access with Quality to Higher Education, ACCES, with the support of the World Bank, that
massively increased the available credit to students. The credit is awarded to students
that have test scores above a threshold set by the government, and covers up to 75% of
the tuition for the lowest income students, and up to 50% for the rest. The credit has a
subsidized zero-real interest rate for the poorest households, and a real interest rate of 8%
for the high-income students. Students that graduate from their programs have twice the
time of their study period to repay the loan. The ACCES program has full coverage, in the
sense that any student that has test scores on the highest deciles of their region can access
this credit line. The test score cut-offs vary by region, to account for disparities in the
quality of secondary education across regions with different infrastructure and economic
development. Given that the credit is awarded according to regional cutoffs, the disparities
in the ability of people accessing the credit are large. The best students from the poorest
regions might not have high ability and preparation when compared to the best students
of the principal cities, so the credit is not awarded to the highest ability individuals in
absolute terms.
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Using a regression discontinuity approach, Melguizo et al. (2015) find evidence that the
ACCES program had a positive impact on the enrollment rates, especially for individuals
that come from poor households. Although the growth in the number of students enrolled
in college may have been a consequence of other factors, such as better economic activity,
the massive increase in financing seems to be a driving factor of such a trend.

2.4.4

Product Differentiation in the Market for Higher Education

In this subsection we introduce the dataset constructed to analyze the behavior of colleges
before and after the introduction of the subsidized loan program. We use administrative
data from the Ministry of Education including the SABER-PRO examination scores of each
college. These are major-specific examinations that are mandatory in Colombia in order
to receive the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree. Additionally, we use publicly available
information scrapped from the internet regarding the academic production of professors,
as well as the academic credentials of the professorial body for each university. Moreover,
we build information regarding the major-specific tuition charged by each college in order
to track its behavior during the last ten years.
The analysis suggests that, after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy, elite
institutions engaged in significant efforts to improve the quality of services provided.
All the evidence suggest that once the subsidized loan policy was introduced, the gap
in quality between elite and non-elite institutions increased. Figure 9 shows how the
composition of the entering student body in elite institutions changed during the period
of reference when compared to non-elite institutions. When ranked according to the decile
in the distribution they are located by the SABER-11 examination score, we find that in
2007, students entering to elite institutions where, on average, located 1.5 deciles above the
average student entering to non-elite universities. After five years we see that such gap
increased to 1.7 and has remained constant until the last period of data available.
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Figure 7: Differences in quality of student body
Note: Differences in the average decile of entering cohort in SABER-11 examination scores. This
dataset is constructed using publicly available information provided by the Colombian Ministry of
Education on its official website: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1759/w3-channel.html

Differences in the quality of student body are also observed when analyzing exitlevel examination scores. Figure 8 shows the evolution of average test scores in written
comprehension and reading comprehension, for students attending elite and non-elite
colleges. The test scores are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation one
for every year in the dataset. Although in 2009 there were negligible differences between
test scores of elite and non-elite colleges, we observe that in 2014 the average student
graduating from an elite institution would score 60% of a standard deviation above the
mean whereas students in non-elite institutions would score slightly below the mean.
Taking into account that the average length of a bachelor’s degree program lasts 4.5 years,
the score for 2014 corresponds to students who were entering in 2008, approximately. This
fact is consistent with the scores for reading comprehension presented in panel B of the
corresponding figure. Moreover, reading comprehension exams were being done since
2006 and thus we have a longer panel allowing us to infer that no significant changes were
observed until cohorts graduating after 2010.

89

Written comprehension

Reading comprehension

0.6

1.0

Score

Score

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.5

0.0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2006

2008

Year
Tier 1

2010

2012

2014

Year
Tier 2

Tier 1

(a) Writing score.

Tier 2

(b) Reading comprehension score.

Figure 8: Quality supplied by colleges.
Note: Test scores are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation 1 in every year. This
information comes from the official statistics provided by the Colombian Ministry of Education.

So far we have provided evidence suggesting that the gap between elite and non-elite
institutions, when it comes to the the quality of entering and exiting cohorts, increased
after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy. However, the evidence suggest that the
behavior of universities changed beyond the quality of their student body. Figure 9 shows
that during the same period, elite universities engaged in significant efforts to increase
the ratio of professors per students when compared to non-elite institutions. In 2007, the
difference in the ratio of professors per student between elite and non-elite institutions,
was under 0.02. However, for 2013 the difference more than doubled beyond 0.05.
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Figure 9: Difference in professors per student
Note: This data is publicly available at the National System for Information on Higher Education website: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/sistemasdeinformacion/1735/w3-propertyname2672.html

We can go beyond the gross statistics of professors per student and analyze the academic credentials of the faculty composition of elite and non-elite colleges. In Colombia, it
is not uncommon to see new hired faculty whose highest academic credential corresponds
to a Bachelor’s or a Master’s degree. Taking into account this fact, the trend observed in
Figure 9 would not imply by itself that elite institutions are making significant efforts to
improve the quality of their faculty body. They might be substituting PhD professors by
faculty whose highest academic credential is a Bachelor’s degree. However, In Figure 10
we find that the professors-student ratio of elite institutions increased when compared to
non-elite institutions for every category of professors: those with a PhD, with a Master’s
degree, and with a Bachelor’s degree.
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Figure 10: Evolution of Faculty composition. Professors per Student

Finally, the dataset also allows us to analyze the academic production of faculty
from every college in Colombia. We construct a dataset of articles published in refereed
journals by authors’ affiliation as well as total number of books by faculty. The results
are presented in Figure 11. When we analyze the academic production per students, as
measured by articles and books published, we also find evidence suggesting that the gap
in academic production between elite and non-elite universities increased dramatically
after the introduction of the subsidized loan policy.
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Figure 11: Gap in academic production.
Note: We constructed this dataset by scrapping information available online at the Administrative
Department of Science, Technology and Innovation (Colciencias) http://www.colciencias.gov.co/.
A more detailed description of how this dataset was constructed is available in Spanish at
http://laramaciudadana.com/universidades.html

Finally, we analyze the evolution of tuition being charged by higher education institutions. Figure 12 illustrates the behavior of the average real price of tuition during the
decade, in terms of 2004 pesos. As can be observed, there has been a steady increase
in the real price of education throughout the decade for all universities in Colombia.
Additionally, the price of the high-quality colleges seems to have peaked at a higher pace
for Law, Engineering and Medicine schools. This increasing trend suggests that the Bennett
Hypothesis might also be taking place in the Colombian context, given the fast increase in
the government provided loans to education.
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Figure 12: Evolution of average tuition prices over the decade

Finally, we conclude this subsection by summarizing the main findings we observe
from the data. We find that after the subsidized loan policy program was implemented in
Colombia, the degree of product differentiation between elite and non-elite universities in
Colombia increased. We conclude this after analyzing the trend of four key characteristics
of universities in Colombia. First, the gap in the quality of student body increased
dramatically when analyzing it via entering (SABER-11) or exiting (SABER-PRO) test
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scores. Second, we observe a gap in the professors per student ratio for every possible
category of professorship (PhD, Master’s and Bachelor’s degree). Third, the gap in
academic production, measured as number of peer-reviewed articles and books published,
per student, increased during the same period. Finally, we observe that in both, elite and
non-elite institutions, there was a significant increase in the tuition being charged for some
of the most popular degrees of study. All this evidence is consistent with the fact that after
the introduction of subsidized loan policies, the gap in quality between elite and non-elite
institutions increased significantly.

2.5 Numerical Analysis
In this section we perform a numerical analysis of the economic presented in Section
2.3 illustrating that the increased gap in quality between elite and non-elite institutions
observed in the data, can be rationalized as a consequence of the introduction of subsidized
loans for higher education.

2.5.1

Evolution of Quality

According to the specifications assumed in the model, we are able to identify the parameters
of the wage equation. For this, we will use data on the average wages of graduates from
each university in Colombia through 2007-2012, and the minimum wage, as a measure of w,
to estimate the parameters of the quality production function of universities. Per-efficiency
unit wages are given by:

wh = w · (1 + zh ),
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wl = w · (1 + zl )

Where wh and wl are the wages of high- and low-quality college graduates, given
equilibrium qualities of education zh and zl , respectively, and w is the wage of non-skilled
labor per-efficiency unit. The quality of education, z, is given by equation (11) in the
universities’ problem. We have a panel of data for 50 universities in Colombia from 2007 to
2012. We have the average ability of students in the entering cohorts, number of professors
per student and average wages during the first year after graduation. For every university
i in our sample, the following equation holds:

wi = w · (1 + κ θ¯i 1 Iiα2 )
α

Rearranging and taking logarithms:

log

w

i

w


− 1 = log κ + α1 θ¯i + α2 Ii

Assuming that there is measurement error in the wages of each of the universities, and
assuming an exclusion restriction that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables, we can estimate the following equation:


log

wi,t
−1
wt



= log κ + α1 θ¯i,t + α2 Ii,t + ηTi,t + φt + ψi + ei,t

where Ti is an indicator function that takes the value of one when the university i is
a low-quality institution, and zero otherwise. Under this specification, we can estimate
possible differences in the technology parameter, κ, between top and second tier schools.
In order to isolate possible omitted variable bias, we estimate the above model under three
different specifications, with and without time and geographic fixed effects, φt and ψi ,
respectively.
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For the estimation, we constructed a panel of the top 50 universities in Colombia,
according to a quality ranking published by the Ministry of Education in 201419 . This
panel includes data on average wages during the first year after graduation for graduates
of every school, as a measure of wi,t , the average test scores for the entering cohorts, as a
measure of θi,t , and the number of professors per student, as a measure for Ii,t . We also
have data on total operational expenditures by each school for 2014. However, with only
one year we are not able to construct the evolution of quality of universities over time.
Since the number of professors per student are a good indicator of the total expenditures
per student, we will use that variable, instead. For the non-skilled labor wages, wt , we will
use the values of the real minimum wage (in 2007 pesos). The average wages of college
graduates are strictly above the minimum wage during the period, so the dependent
variable is well defined for every college in every period. In addition, we have information
about the municipality of the school, to control for regional differences. The results of the
estimation are displayed in Table 1.
The estimates show that the elasticities α1 and α2 are fairly robust to different specifications and do not change dramatically when including control variables. Moreover, the
parameter η is negative in two of the specifications, although non statistically significative.
This means that, on average, tier 2 universities have a lower technology parameter, κ, on
their quality production function. This will be one of the main differences between tier 1
and tier 2 universities in our calibration of the model.

2.5.2

Calibration of the Model

In order to draw conclusions about the relevance of our model, we calibrate the parameters
to values that are relevant to the Colombian context. To achieve this, we will map a
life-cycle model to a two period model, so the conclusions of Section 2.3 hold. We follow
19. The ranking is published in the website of the Ministry of Education, and can be found in the following
link: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/w3-article-351855.html
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Parameter

OLS

OLS

OLS

αˆ1

0.211
(0.026)
.358
(0.361)
-0.029
(0.047)
-0.84
(0.232)

0.228
(0.026)
0.478
(0.357)
0.008
(0.043)
-0.957
(0.228)

0.168
(0.026)
0.414
(0.403)
-0.046
(0.046)
-0.163
(0.198)

Yes

Yes
Yes
382
0.567
0.000

αˆ2
η̂
ˆ
log(κ)

Time fixed effects
City fixed effects
N
R-squared
Prob > F

382
0.353
0.000

382
0.444
0.000

Robust standard errors in parenthesis
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1

Table 1: Estimates for the quality production function.
an approach similar to the one used by Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011), but in a
discrete time economy. The environment is as follows.
Individuals live for T periods, after which they die with certainty. Individuals start
their adult life at t = 0, when they must choose whether to attend the low- or high-quality
school, or not study at all. Studying lasts for S periods, so those individuals that attend
college will not receive any income during t ∈ {0, . . . , S − 1} and have to pay a per-period
price of Pj for attending school j. Moreover, during the first S periods individuals are
borrowing constrained. Those that decide not to study cannot borrow at all. Those that
decide to study, can borrow up to the exogenous limit set by the government student loan
policy, Ā. After period S − 1, the individual enters the labor market and earns a per-period
wage θw(1 + z j ), that depends on the quality of the school attended. During periods
S, . . . , T individuals only consume and save. We assume that from period S onwards,
individuals enter into perfect financial markets where debt repayments are fully enforced.
In this context, individuals can borrow any amount they want.
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Clearly, individuals that are not borrowing constrained during their study period will
perfectly smooth consumption along the life-cycle. However, those individuals that are
constrained during the first S years of life will exhibit a jump in their consumption once
they graduate from college. This setting can be easily embedded into the two-period
model described in last section, by setting the discount factors and budget constraints
appropriately. Namely, the problem for the household becomes:

max
0
c,c

c+c

0



c 1− σ
(c0 )1−σ
+ β̃
,
1−σ
1−σ

ΦS
Φ0 (1 + r)S


wθ(1 − h)(1 − l)




+ (PH h + Pl l)

y

Φr
Φ0

s.t.


+ wθ(1 + z j )

y

Φr
Φ0

Φ0r
Φ0 (1 + r)S

=

j+

b
Φ0

a ≥ Ā
y

The derivation of the parameters β̃, Φ0 , ΦS , Φro , Φr is explained in detail in the Appendix
.2.1. In this environment, all the results from Section 2.3 hold.

2.5.3

Parameterization

In our calibration, we set one period to be exactly one year. We will set some parameter
values to match the Colombian educational market. All parameter values are reported in
Table 2.
We set S = 5, so that the individuals that choose to attend a college study during 5
periods, since most professional degrees in Colombia take exactly 5 years. In Colombia,
life expectancy at birth is 73.95 years of life20 . Although the National Statistics Department
20. See life expectancy tables here.
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of Colombia (DANE) does not publish the life expectancy by age, we estimate the life
expectancy at 18 years to be 55 more years of life21 . That is, we set T = 55 to match the life
expectancy in Colombia for high-school graduates.
We set σ = 2, which a standard parameter in the literature (Fernández-Villaverde and
Krueger, 2011; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). For the real interest rate, we choose
r = 8.9%, which is the value for Colombia in 2014 published by the World Bank22 . We do
not claim that this value is representative of developing countries, since the real interest
rate for most Latin American countries has a huge variation, ranging from negative values
in Argentina (−4.1%) and Venezuela (−14.5% in 2013), to very high values like Brazil
(23.5%). We choose β = 0.92 such that β = 1/(1 + r). With these parameter values, the
discount factor in our two-period model becomes β̃ = 1.89. This reflects the fact that
the post-college period is much longer than the study period, even though individuals
discount time at a high rate.
As for the university parameters, we use the estimations of Section 2.5. In particular, we
choose α1 = 0.211, α2 = 0.358, κl = 0.8 and κ h = 0.85, obtained from the wage regressions
displayed in Table 1.

21. For instance, in the U.S. life expectancy at 18 is only 0.79 more years than life expectancy at birth. Therefore,
we will set life expectancy at 18 in Colombia to be 1.05 years above life expectancy at birth, as a conservative
estimate.
22. See the real interest rates for all the countries in this link.
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Parameter

Value

Source

Utility and discount
β

0.97

Literature

σ

2

Literature

r

2%

Colombia

w

2

Normalization

Time parameters
T

78

Colombia

S

5

Colombia

University parameters
α1

0.211

Estimation

α2

0.358

Estimation

κl

1.4

Estimation

κh

1.2

Estimation

Eh − C h

-12

Estimation

El − C l

-7

Estimation

Table 2: Parameter values

2.5.4

Results

In this section we show the results of the numerical computation of the equilibria without
the subsidized-loan policy being implemented and once it was implemented. In order
to mimic as closely as possible the post-reform equilibrium, we set up a tax rate of 10%
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used to fund a subsidized loan policy offering credits for higher education for people
whose income is below the median income in the economy. The policy implemented in
Colombia is designed as a subsidy to the interest rate paid by students. In the model we
set up the subsidy in such a way that students that have access to it only have to pay 50%
of the interests accumulated in students debts. In addition to having an income below
the median, a student who wants to qualify for the policy must have an ability level in
the top 30%23 . Table 3 illustrates the results before and after the implementation of the
student loan policies. As can be observed, after the reform there is a widening gap in the
quality offered by each university. Elite universities offer a higher quality, while non-elite
universities reduce it. There is also a market segmentation, where better students attend
the elite institution, and the ability of the students attending the low-quality institutions
falls.
Table 3: Equilibria computations

Elite institutions

Non-elite institutions

Pre-reform

Post-reform

Students attending

5,863

9,431

Average ability of student body

0.48

0.64

Quality offered

1.01

1.19

Students attending

6,971

6,753

Average ability of student body

0.41

0.38

Quality offered

0.53

0.42

23. The institutional details of the policy implemented in Colombia are fully described in Melguizo et al.
(2015)
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2.6 Conclusion
Subsidized loan policies have been widely implemented in both developing and developed
economies, as a policy tool to increase college attendance. Such policies are particularly
relevant in a context where credit constraints explain college attendance decisions and
individuals are borrowing constrained. However, when implementing such policies it is
important to take into account, not only their effect on the demand side of the market, but
also the way they affect the supply side of the market by changing the incentives of the
providers of higher education.
We show that subsidized loan policies can distort the incentives of colleges providing
services of higher education in a way that can be harmful for a group of households
in the economy. Taking into account that the market for higher education operates
under a monopolistic competition setting, granting subsidized loans does not generate
an expansion in the number of providers of higher education, but rather on the same
colleges facing a new set of incentives. As elite institutions unambiguously observe an
increase in their demand, they can use their pricing and admission policies to be more
selective in their admission process and to spend more per student, which translates into
providing better services for their student body. On the contrary, the universities in the
low-quality tier will observe a migration to the high-quality group when such policies
are implemented. The result is a new equilibrium in the market for higher education
where the quality gap between elite and non-elite institutions is widened as a result of the
implementation of subsidized loan policies.
Our model is consistent with what we observe in the market for higher education
in Colombia: an expansion of the gap in the quality offered by different institutions. In
such scenario, subsidized policy loans can make some households worse off as, although
the attendance to higher education institutions becomes easier, the gains from attending
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low-quality universities is not offset by the amount households have to pay in taxes in
order to pay for the policy implemented.

104

Chapter 3

A Practical Guide to Parallelization in
Economics
3.1 Introduction
Economists, more than ever, need high-performance computing. In macroeconomics, we
want to solve models with complex constraints and heterogeneous agents to simultaneously
match micro and aggregate observations. In industrial organization, we aim to characterize
the equilibrium dynamics of industries with several players and multiple state variables.
In asset pricing, we seek to price complex assets in rich environments with numerous
state variables. In corporate finance, we like to track the behavior of firms with rich
balance sheets and intertemporal choices of funding. In international economics, we are
interested in analyzing multisectoral models of trade. In econometrics, we have to evaluate
and simulate from moment conditions and likelihood functions that often fail to have
closed-form solutions. And machine learning and big data are becoming ubiquitous in the
field.
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One of the most important strategies to achieve the required performance to solve and
estimate the models cited above is to take advantage of parallel computing. Nowadays,
even basic laptops come from the factory with multiple cores (physical or virtual), either
in one central processing unit (CPU) or several CPUs. And nearly all of them come with a
graphics processing unit (GPU) that can be employed for numerical computations. Many
departments of economics and most universities have large servers that researchers can
operate (a few even have supercomputer centers that welcome economists). Furthermore,
cloud computing services, such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud or Google Cloud
Compute Engine, offer, for economical prices, access to large servers with dozens of CPUs
and GPUs, effectively making massively parallel programming available to all academic
economists.
Unfortunately, there are barriers to engaging in parallel computing in economics. Most
books that deal with parallelization are aimed at natural scientists and engineers. The
examples presented and the recommendations outlined, valuable as they are in those areas,
are sometimes hard to translate into applications in economics. And graduate students in
economics have taken rarely many courses in programming and computer science.
Over the years, we have taught parallel programming to many cohorts of young
economists. Thus, it has become clear to us that an introductory guide to parallelization in
economics would be useful both as a basis for our lectures and as a resource for students
and junior researchers at other institutions.
In this guide, we discuss, first, why much of modern scientific computing is done in
parallel (Section 3.2). Then, we move on to explain what parallel programming is with
two simple examples (Section 3.3). And while parallel programming is a fantastic way to
improve the performance of solving many problems, it is not suitable for all applications.
We explain this point in Section 3.4 with two fundamental problems in economics: a value
function iteration and a Markov chain Monte Carlo. While the former is perfectly gathered
for parallelization, the latter is much more challenging to parallelize. That is why, in
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Section 3.5, we introduce a life-cycle model as our testbed for the rest of the paper. The
life-cycle model is sufficiently rich as to be an approximation to problems that a researcher
would like to solve in “real life.” At the same time, parallelization of the model is not
trivial. While we can parallelize its solution over the assets and productivity variables,
we cannot parallelize over the age of the individual. Section 3.6, then, briefly introduces
the different types of computers that a typical economist might encounter in her parallel
computations. We spend some time explaining what a cloud service is and how to take
advantage of it.
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 are the core of the paper. In Section 3.7, we outline the main
approaches to parallelization in CPUs, with Julia, Matlab, R, Python, C++--OpenMP,
Rcpp--OpenMP, and C++--MPI. In Section 3.8, we present CUDA and OpenACC. In these
sections, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each approach while we compute
the same life-cycle model that we presented in Section 3.5. We do not envision that a
reader will study through each part of these two sections in full detail. A reader can, for
instance, pick those approaches that she finds more attractive and study them thoroughly
while only browsing the other ones (although we strongly recommend reading Subsection
3.7.1, as it presents several key ideas that we will repeat for all programming languages).
Regardless of the situation, the reader should follow our explanations while checking
the code we have posted at the Github repository of this paper and forking it with her
improvements. Learning computation without trying it oneself is nearly impossible, and
in the case of parallelization, even more so. We cannot stress this point enough.
We conclude the guide with a mention in Section 3.9 of existing alternatives for parallel
computation beyond CPUs and GPUs (such as manycore processors, field-programmable
gate arrays, and tensor processor units) and with some brief remarks summarizing our
computational results in Section 3.10.
Before we get into the main body of the guide, we must highlight three points. First, this
guide’s goal is pedagogical. Our codes were written putting clarity ahead of performance
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as a basic criterion. We did not optimize them to each language or employe advanced
coding styles. Instead, we compute the same model in the same way across languages
and compare the performance of parallel computing, using as the benchmark the serial
computation for each language. Most students in economics do not come to the field from
computer science or engineering, and they prefer clearer codes to sophisticated ones. This
means that, for example, we will employ too few anonymous functions, too many loops,
and too much old-style imperative programming (also vectorization and related techniques
work less well in the problems we deal with in economics than in other fields; see Aruoba
and Fernández-Villaverde, 2015). While there is much to be said about improving coding
style among economists, that is a battle for another day. You teach one lesson at a time.
Second, we do not cover all possible combinations of languages, parallelization techniques, and computers. Doing so would be next to impossible and, in any case, not
particularly useful. We are, instead, highly selective. There is no point, for instance, in
covering parallelization in Java or Swift. Neither of these languages is designed for
scientific computation, nor are they widely used by economists. Among programming
languages, perhaps the only absence that some readers might miss is Fortran. In previous
related exercises (Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde, 2015), we kept Fortran more as
a nod to old times than out of conviction. But, by now, we feel justified in dropping
it. Not only does Fortran not deliver any speed advantage with respect to C++, but it
also perpetuates approaches to numerical computation that are increasingly obsolete in
a world of massive parallelization. To program well in parallel, for instance, one needs
to understand MapReduce and employ rich data structures. Fortran fail to meet those
requirements. While keeping legacy code and libraries may require knowledge of Fortran
for some researchers, there is no point in young students learning what is by now an
outdated language despite all the efforts to modernize it in the most recent standards
(such as the soon-to-be-released Fortran 2018). Among programming techniques, we

108

skip POSIX and Boost threads and threading building blocks (too low level for most
users) and OpenCL (as we believe that OpenACC is a better way to go).
Perhaps the only topic of importance that we miss is the use of Spark (possibly
with Scala), a general-purpose cluster computing system particularly well-adapted for
the manipulation of large data sets.24 Future editions of this guide might correct that
shortcoming, but the current version is sufficiently long, and we are afraid of losing focus
by introducing a whole new set of issues related to data parallelization.
Third, we will not explain how to write algorithms in parallel since this would require a
book in itself (although we will cite several relevant books as we move along as references
for the interested reader). This lack of explanation implies that we will not enter into
a taxonomy of computer architectures and parallel programming models (such as the
celebrated Flynn’s classification) beyond passing references to the differences between
parallelism in tasks and parallelism in data or the comparison between the shared memory
of OpenMP and the message passing structure of MPI.
With these three considerations in mind, we can enter into the main body of the guide.

3.2 Why Parallel?
In 1965, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, enunciated the most famous law of
the computer world: the number of components (i.e., transistors) per integrated circuit
(i.e., per “chip”) will double each year (Moore, 1965). Although this number was later
downgraded by Moore himself to a mere doubling every two years (Moore, 1975), this path
of exponential growth in the quantity of transistor chips incorporated is nothing short
of astonishing. Moore’s law predicts that the computational capability of human-made
machines will advance as much during the next 24 months as it has done from the dawn
of mechanical devices until today.
24. See https://spark.apache.org/.
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Figure 1: Number of transistors

But Moore’s law has been nearly as breathtaking in terms of its forecasting success.
Figure 1 plots how the number of transistors has evolved from 1971 to 2017.25 Moore’s
law predicted that the representative chip would have 8,388,608 times more transistors
by 2017 than in 1971. Indeed, the 2017 32-core AMD Epyc processor has 8,347,800 times
more transistors than the 1971 Intel 4004 processor. If you look, however, at the end of
the sample, there are some indications that the law may be slowing down to a doubling
of transistor count every 2.5 years: the 32-core AMD Epyc processor has many more
transistors than other processors of its generation and it achieves that density because it
suffers from higher cache latency.
The recent hints of a slowdown in the rate of transistor growth might be telltale signs
of future developments. Although the demise of Moore’s law has been announced in the
past and technology has kept on surprising skeptics, there are reasons to believe that we
are approaching the maximum number of transistors in a chip, perhaps in a decade or
two. Not only does the electricity consumption of a chip go up by x4 when the transistor
25. Data from Figure 1 come from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor_count.
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size falls by a factor x, but we must endure considerable increases in the heat generated by
the chip and in its manufacturing costs.
At a more fundamental level, there are inherent limits on serial chips imposed by
the speed of light (30 cm/ns) and the transmission limit of copper wire (9 cm/ns). This
means that there are hard constraints on the speed at which a processor can compute an
operation and that it is virtually impossible to build a serial Teraflop machine without
resorting to parallelization.26 Even more relevant is the observation that the real bottleneck
for scientific computing is often memory access. Random Access Memory (RAM) latency
has been only improving around 10 percent a year.

Figure 2: Cray-1, 1975

That is why the industry has moved from building machines such as the serial Cray-1,
in 1975 (Figure 2), to the massively parallel Sunway TaihuLight (Figure 3), the fastest
26. A Teraflop is 1012 floating point operations per second (i.e., the number of calculations involving real
numbers). As a point of comparison, the Microsoft Xbox One X has a top theoretical performance of 6
Teraflops thanks to its aggressive reliance on GPUs.
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supercomputer in the world as of April 2018.27 The Cray-1, built around the idea of vector
processing, aimed to deliver high performance through the simultaneous operations on
one-dimensional arrays (vectors, in more traditional mathematical language).28 Although
the Cray-1 represented a leap over existing machines, it required a specific arranging of
the memory and other components (the circular benches around the main machine that
can be seen in Figure 2 were essential for the power supply to be delivered at the right
place) as well as quite specialized software. These specificities meant that the cost curve
could not be bent sufficiently quickly and that the limitations of single processor machines
could not be overcome.

Figure 3: Sunway TaihuLight, 2016

The solution to these limits is employing more processors. This is the route followed
by the Sunway TaihuLight. The computer is built around 40,960 manycore processors,
each with 256 cores, for a total of 10,649,600 cores. Instead of a single piece of machinery
like the Cray-1, Figure 3 shows rows of cabinets with racks of processors, each handling a
27. Link to Wikipedia image of Figure 2 and link to Flickr image of Figure 3.
28. This computer was named after Seymour Cray (1925-1996), whose pioneering vision created modern
high-performance computing (see Murray, 1997). The company he founded to manufacture this machine,
Cray Research, led the industry for decades. Modern-day Cray Inc. descendes from the original Cray
Research after several turbulent changes in ownership. An early example of a parallel computer was the
pathbreaking CDC 6600, released in 1964.
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part of some computation. Thanks to this parallelization, the 160 Megaflops (106 ) Cray-1
has been replaced by the 125.4 Petaflop (1015 ) Sunway TaihuLight, an increase in speed of
around 0.78 ∗ 109 . Without these speed gains, everyday computational jobs on which we
have grown to depend –such as high-definition video rending, machine learning, search
engines, or the tasks behind Spotify, Facebook, and blockchain– would not be feasible.

3.3 What Is Parallel Programming?
The main idea behind parallel programming is deceptively simple: if we have access to
several processors (either in the same computer or in networked computers), we can divide
a complex problem into easier pieces and send each of these components to a different
processor. Within the field of high-performance computing, this division can be done
either for numerical analysis –for example, to multiply two matrices– or for the handling
of large amounts of data –for instance, the computation of a sample average through
MapReduce.
Let us develop these two examples to understand the basic idea. In our first example,
we have two matrices:





 a11
A=
a21
and

a12 

a22





 b11
B=
b21

b12 

b22

and we want to find:




 a11 b11 + a12 b21
C = A×B = 
a21 b11 + a22 b21
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a11 b12 + a12 b22 
.
a21 b12 + a22 b22

Imagine, as well, that we have access to a machine with five processors. We can select one
of these processors as a “master” and the other four as “workers” (sometimes, and less
delicately, also called “slaves”). The master processor will send ( a11 , a12 , b11 , b21 ) to the
first worker and ask it to compute a11 b11 + a12 b21 . Similarly, it will send ( a11 , a12 , b12 , b22 )
to the second worker and ask it to compute a11 b12 + a12 b22 and so on with the third and
fourth workers. Then, the results of the four computations will be returned to the master,
which will put all of them together to generate C. The advantage of this approach is that
while the first worker is computing a11 b11 + a12 b21 , the second worker can, at the same
time, find a11 b12 + a12 b22 . In comparison, a serial code in one processor will need to finish
the computation of a11 b11 + a12 b21 before moving into computing a11 b12 + a12 b22 .
Doing a parallelization to multiply two matrices 2 × 2 is not efficient: we will lose
more time transferring information between master and workers than we will gain from
parallelizing the computation of each of the four entries of C. But a simple extension of
this algorithm will parallelize the multiplication of matrices with hundreds of rows and
columns, a costly task that appears in all sorts of scientific computations (for instance,
when we compute a standard OLS estimator with many regressors and large data sets),
and generate significant time gains.
In our second example, we want to find the average of a sample of observations:

y = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

and, again, we have access to a machine with five processors divided between a master
and four workers. The master can send {1, 2} to the first worker to compute the average
of the first two observations, {3, 4} to the second worker to compute the average of the
next two observations, and so on with the third and fourth workers. Then, the four
averages are returned to the master, which computes the average of the four sub-averages

{1.5, 3.5, 5.5, 7.5}. Thanks to the linearity of the average operator, the average of sub-
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averages, 4.5, is indeed the average of y. As was the case for our matrix multiplication
example, computing the average of 8 observations by parallelization is inefficient because
of the overheads in transmitting information between master and workers.
But this approach is a transparent example of the MapReduce programming model,
a successful paradigm for the handling of millions of observations (among other tasks,
later we will show how it can be applied as well to the solution of a life-cycle model).
MapReduce is composed of two steps: a Map operator that takes an input and generates a
set of intermediate values (in this case the input is y and the intermediate inputs are the
sub-sample averages) and a Reduce operator that transforms the intermediate values into
a useful final value, which, in our example, computes the average of the four sub-sample
averages. In addition, MapReduce can be applied recursively, and therefore, the final value
can be used as on intermediate input in another computation.29
The previous two examples highlight two separate issues: first, the need to develop
algorithms that divide problems of interest into components that can be parallelized;
second, the need to have coding techniques that can “tell” the computer how to distribute
the work between a master and workers.
In the next pages, we can offer only a very parsimonious introduction for economists
to these issues, and the interested reader should consult more complete references. A few
books we have found particularly useful to extend our knowledge include:

1. Introduction to High Performance Computing for Scientists and Engineers by Hager
and Wellein (2011).
2. An Introduction to Parallel Programming by Pacheco (2011).
29. MapReduce’s name derives from two combinators in Lisp, a deeply influential functional programming
language created in 1958, map and reduce. Google developed the modern-day MapReduce approach to
handle the immense amounts of data its search engine requires. Hadoop is a popular implementation
of MapReduce. Currently, a more efficient alternative, Spark, based on the resilient distributed data set
(RDD), is quickly overtaking Hadoop as a weapon of choice in handling large data problems with massive
parallelization.
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3. Principles of Parallel Programming by Lin and Snyder (2008).
4. Parallel Programming for Multicore and Cluster Systems by Rünger and Rauber
(2013).
5. Structured Parallel Programming: Patterns for Efficient Computation by McCool
et al. (2012).

Below, we will cite some additional books as we deal with the concrete aspects of
parallelization.

3.4 When Do We Parallelize?
The two examples above show the promise of parallelization for high-performance computing, but also its potential drawbacks regarding algorithmic design and communication
among processors.

Figure 4: Granularity
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Problems in high-performance computing can be classified according to their scalability
(i.e., how effectively we can divide the original problem of interest into smaller tasks) and
granularity (i.e., the measure of the amount of work involved in each computational task
in which the original problem of interest is subdivided). Depending on their scalability,
problems are either strongly scalable –i.e., inherently easy to parallelize– and weakly
scalable –i.e., inherently difficult to parallelize. Depending on their granularity, problems
can be coarse –i.e., requiring more computation than communication between a master
and workers –or fine –i.e., requiring more communication than computation. In Figure 4,
we plot two columns representing the tasks involved in the computation of two problems.
The left column is a computation requiring mostly computation and little communication
among processors. The right column, in comparison, is a problem with much more
communication. While the former problem is a good candidate for parallelization, the
latter is not.
However, whether the problem is easy to parallelize may depend on the way you set
it up. You need to take advantage of the architecture of your computer and exploit it to
the maximum. This will help you to control for overheads (for instance, in the example of
sample average computation, the final sum of sub-sample averages) and achieve optimal
load balancing (we need to assign to each different processor chunks of the problem that
require roughly the same amount of time).
These considerations dictate relying on productivity tools such as a state-of-the-art IDE
(integrated development environment), a debugger, and a profiler that can handle parallel
code. Without these tools, coding, debugging, and profiling your program for accuracy
and performance can become most difficult, as there is much more potential for mistakes
and inefficiencies in a parallel code than in a serial one. Also, these productivity tools
may help you achieve a better tradeoff between speed-ups delivered by parallelization and
coding time. There is no point in parallelizing a code if doing so takes more time than the

117

savings in running time, even after considering the numerous times a code might need to
be run during a whole research project.
To illustrate some of these ideas, we introduce two common applications in economics:
one where parallelization works wonderfully well and one where it struggles to achieve
speed improvements.

3.4.1

An application where parallelization works: Value function iteration

Our first application is a computational problem where parallelization works with ease:
the canonical value function iteration problem.
Let us assume that we have a social planner that is maximizing the discounted utility
of a representative household in a standard deterministic neoclassical growth model. The
recursive representation of the problem of this social planner can be written in terms of a
value function V(·) as:



V (k ) = max u (c) + βV k0
k0

s.t. c = kα + (1 − δ) k − k0

where k is aggregate capital in the current period, k0 the aggregate capital in the next
period, c the consumption of the representative household, u(·) the period utility function,
β the discount factor, α the elasticity of output to capital, and δ the depreciation rate.
The solution of the social planner’s problem can be found by applying value function
iteration. Imagine that we have access to j processors in a parallel pool. Then, we can
implement the following algorithm:
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Data:


Grid of capital with j points, k ∈ k1 , k2 , ..., k j .
Initial guess of value function over the capital grid V 0 (k ).
Tolerance ε.
Result:
Converged value function V ∞ (k )
Optimal decision rule k0 = g∞ (k)
while sup V n (k ) − V n−1 (k ) < ε do
Send the problem:



max u (c) + βV n k0
k0

s.t. c = kα1 + (1 − δ) k1 − k0

to processor 1 to get V n+1 (k1 ). Store optimal decision rule k0 = gn+1 (k1 ).
Send the problem associated with k i to worker i.


When all processors are done, gather V n+1 (k i ) for k ∈ k1 , k2 , ..., k j back and
construct V n (k).
end
Algorithm 1: Parallelized value function iteration
The intuition of the algorithm is straightforward. Given a current guess of the value
function V n (k ), processor m ≤ j can solve for the optimal choice of capital next period
given capital k m without worrying about what other processors are doing for other points
in the grid of capital. Once every processor has solved for the optimal choice of capital,
we can gather all V n+1 (k m ) and move to the next iteration. This scheme is often called the
“fork-join” paradigm.
Figure 5 illustrates the execution of the fork-join parallel code that would compute
the model presented above. At every iteration n, the master node splits the computation
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across the parallel workers (fork). When all processors are done with the computations,
the information is passed back to the master node (join) and the process is repeated.

Figure 5: Fork-join parallel programming

The algorithm is easily generalized to the case where we have more grid points j
j

than workers w by sending to each processor b w c grid points (and the remaining points
j

j − w ∗ b w c to any worker). Furthermore, this parallelization algorithm is efficient, as it
allows an increase in speed that can be nearly linear in the number of processors, and it is
easy to code and debug.30

3.4.2

An application where parallelization struggles: A random walk
Metropolis-Hastings

Our second application is a computational task where parallelization faces a difficult time:
a random walk Metropolis-Hastings, the archetypical Markov chain Monte Carlo method.

30. The speed-up will depend on the quantity of information moved and the quality of the hardware
performing the communication among the processors. Also, the gain in efficiency is diminished by the
difficulty in applying properties of the solution such as the monotonicity of the decision rule of the social
planner (i.e., g∞ (k j ) < g∞ (k j+1 )) that simplify the computation involved in the max operator in the Bellman
equation. However, when the number of grid points is sufficiently larger than the number of workers, this
difficulty is only a minor inconvenience. Furthermore, there are several “tricks” to incorporate additional
information in the iteration to capture most of the gains from monotonicity.
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Many problems in econometrics require drawing from a distribution. More concretely,
we want to draw a sequence of θ1 , θ2 , θ3 , ..., such that:

θi ∼ P (·) .

This draw may allow us to simulate some stochastic process where the θ’s are the innovations or to evaluate functions of interest of the distribution –such as its moments–
appealing to a law of large numbers (i.e., the theoretical mean of the distribution will be
well approximated by the mean of the drawn θ’s).
In principle, computers face a difficult time drawing a random number: they are, after
all, deterministic machines that follow a predetermined set of instructions. Computer scientists and applied mathematicians have developed, nevertheless, deterministic algorithms
that generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers and whose properties are, up to
some cycle, very close to those of a truly random sequence.31
These pseudo-random number generators typically produce a sequence of draws
that mimics a draw from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. Through different change-ofdistribution transformations, such a sequence from a uniform distribution can yield a
sequence from a wide family of known parametric distributions (Devroye, 1986, provides
an encyclopedic treatment of such transformations).
The challenge appears when the distribution P (·) does not belong to any known
family. In fact, it is often the case that we cannot even write down P (·), although we
can numerically evaluate it at an arbitrary point θi . This happens, for example, with
the likelihood function of a dynamic equilibrium model: a filter (either linear, such as
the Kalman filter, or non-linear, such as the particle filter in Fernández-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramı́rez, 2007) provides the researcher with a procedure to evaluate the likelihood
31. When true randomness is absolutely required, such as in cryptography, one can rely on different physical
phenomena built into hardware with true random number generators. This is, however, rarely necessary
in economics.
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of the model given some observations for arbitrary parameter values, but not how to
write a closed-form expression for it. We want to draw from this likelihood function to
implement a Bayesian approach (after the likelihood has been multiplied by a prior) or to
maximize it, from a frequentist perspective, through some stochastic optimization search
algorithm.
A random walk Metropolis-Hastings is an algorithm that allows us to draw from an
arbitrary distribution a Markov chain whose ergodic properties replicate those of the
distribution of interest. The arrival of the random walk Metropolis-Hastings and other
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods in the 1990s revolutionized econometrics and led to
an explosion of research in Bayesian methods (Robert, 2007) and estimation by simulation
(Gourieroux and Monfort, 1997).
The algorithm is as follows:
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Data:
Distribution of interest P (·).
Initial value of the chain θ1 .
Scaling of the innovation λ.
Result:
Sequence {θ1 , θ2 , ..., θm }.
while n ≤ m do
Given a state of the chain θn−1 , generate a proposal:

θ ∗ = θn−1 + λε, ε ∼ N (0, 1)

Compute:
P (θ ∗ )
α = min 1,
P ( θ n −1 )




Set:

θn = θ ∗ with probability α
θn = θn−1 with probability 1 − α

end
Algorithm 2: Random walk Metropolis-Hastings
The key of the algorithm is to generate a proposal θ ∗ for the new state of the chain
through a random walk specification

θ ∗ = θn−1 + λε, ε ∼ N (0, 1)
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(the proposal is the new state plus an innovation) that is accepted with some probability α
P (θ ∗ )
α = min 1,
P ( θ n −1 )




construed to induce the desired ergodic properties of the drawn sequence. By appropriately
tuning λ, we can get an optimal acceptance rate and achieve faster convergence (Roberts
et al., 1997).
From the perspective of parallelization, the problem of the algorithm is that to generate
θ ∗ , we need θn−1 , so we cannot instruct processor i to compute θn−1 and, at the same
time, instruct processor j to compute θn . The Markov property of the chain makes it an
inherently serial algorithm. Thus, we cannot easily subdivide the problem. The “obvious”
solution of running parallel chains fails because it violates the asymptotic properties of the
chain: we need a long sequence of size m, not many short sequences that add up to m, as
the latter might not have traveled to the ergodic regions of the distribution.
Researchers have attempted to come up with proposals to parallelize the random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (see, among others, Ingvar, 2010, and Calderhead,
2014). Also, in economics, other parts of the problem (such as the evaluation of the
distribution P (·)) can be parallelized. For example, if P (·) comes from a particle filter,
such a filter is easy to parallelize. But despite these partial remedies, at the end of
the day, the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is not a good candidate for
parallelization. Unfortunately, many other problems in economics (such as those involving
long simulations) suffer from the same drawback. Parallelization is a great tool for many
computational challenges in economics, but not for all.
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3.4.3

The road ahead

We will now move on to show how to parallelize in a realistic application in economics: a
life-cycle model of consumption-saving. Slightly more complex versions of this model are
at the core of much research in economics regarding consumption and savings across ages
(Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011), portfolio choice (Cocco, 2005), household formation (Chang, 2017), human capital accumulation (Ben-Porath, 1967), housing decisions
(Zarruk-Valencia, 2017), taxation policies (Nishiyama and Smetters, 2014), social security
reform (Conesa and Krueger, 1999), etc. Not only is the application simple enough to
fulfill its pedagogical goals, but it also presents sufficient sophistication as to illustrate the
most relevant features of parallelization.

3.5 A Life-Cycle Model
We consider the following model for our experiments. We have an economy populated by
a continuum of individuals of measure one who live for T periods. Individuals supply
inelastically one unit of labor each period and receive labor income according to a marketdetermined wage, w, and an idiosyncratic and uninsurable productivity shock e. This
shock follows an age-independent Markov chain, with the probability of moving from
shock e j to ek given by P(ek |e j ). Individuals have access to one-period risk-free bonds, x,
with return given by a market-determined net interest rate, r.
Given the age, t, an exogenous productivity shock, e, and savings from last period, x,
the individual chooses the optimal amount of consumption, c, and savings to carry for
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next period, x 0 . The problem of the household during periods t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
is described by the following Bellman equation:

V(t, x, e) = max

{c≥0,x 0 }

u(c) + βEV(t + 1, x 0 , e0 )

s.t. c + x 0 = (1 + r)x + ew
e0 ∼ P(e0 |e),

for some initial savings and productivity shock.32 The problem of the household in period
T is just to consume all resources, yielding a terminal condition for the value function:

V(T, x, e) = u((1 + r)x + ew).

A terminal condition, such as a value of bequests or altruism for future generations, could
be easily added.
As referred to earlier, even this simple life-cycle model has important features related
to parallelization. First, it is a problem with three state variables. This means that if the
number of grid points on each variable is sufficiently large, the model might take some
time to compute. If another state variable is included, the model might become infeasible
to estimate. For instance, any model that studies health, housing, durable goods, or the
consequences of having multiple financial assets implies keeping track of additional state
variables and estimation requires the repeated solution of the model for many different
parameter values. Second, although there are three state variables, the problem is not
parallelizable along the three dimensions, as will become clear later.

32. For the purpose of this paper, we do not need to worry too much about how we specify those initial
conditions, and we would compute the solution of the model for all possible initial conditions within a
grid. In real research applications, the initial conditions are usually given by the desire to match observed
data.
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The following pseudo-code summarizes how to compute the model in serial using a
standard backward-induction scheme:
Data:
Grid for assets X = { x1 , . . . , xnx }.
Grid for shocks E = {e1 , . . . , ene }.
Transition matrix P(e0 |e).
Result:
Value function V(t, xi , e j ) for t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., n x , and j = 1, ..., ne .
for ∀ xi ∈ X and e j ∈ E do
V(T, xi , e j ) = u((1 + r)xi + e j w)
end
for t = T − 1, . . . , 1, do
Use V(t + 1, xi , e j ) to solve:
ne

V(t, xi , e j ) = max

{c,x 0 ∈ X }

u(c) + β ∑ P(ek |e j )V(t + 1, x 0 , ek )
k=1

s.t. c + x 0 = (1 + r)xi + e j w

end
Algorithm 3: Life-cycle value function
Note that the expectation in the right-hand side of the Bellman operator has been
substituted by a sum over future value functions by taking advantage of the Markov chain
structure of the productivity shock.
The Julia code in Box 1 computes the value function in serial:
In the code, the function Value computes the maximum value attainable given state
variables age, ix, ie. We loop over all possible combinations of the state variables to
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for(age = T:-1:1)
for(ix = 1:nx)
for(ie = 1:ne)
V[age, ix, ie] = Value(age, ix, ie);
end
end
end
Box 1: Julia code to compute the value function.

get our value function. The function Value is described in Box 2. The function searches,
among all the possible values of the grid for assets, for the optimal level of savings for the
next period. For the last period of life, the function picks, trivially, zero savings (if we had
a terminal condition such as a valuation for bequests, such a choice could be different).
We could have more sophisticated search methods but, for our argument, a simple grid
search is most transparent.
This life-cycle problem can be parallelized along the saving and productivity shock
dimensions (x and e), but not along the age dimension. Given the age of the household, t,
the computation of V(t, xi , e j ) is independent of the computation of V(t, xi0 , e j0 ), for i 6= i0 ,
j 6= j0 . While one of the processors computes V(t, xi , e j ), another processor can compute
V(t, xi0 , e j0 ) without them having to communicate. For a given t, a parallel algorithm could
split the grid points along the x and e dimensions, and assign different computations to
each of the processors, so that total computation speed can be significantly reduced. In
other words, the problem can be parallelized along the x and e dimensions in the same
way that we parallelized the basic value function iteration in Subsection 3.4.1. This is
not the case, however, for the age dimension. For the computation of any V(t, xi , e j ), the
computer has to first have computed V(t + 1, xi , e j ). The computation is, by its very nature,
recursive along t.

128

function Value(age, ix, ie)
VV = -10^3;
for(ixp = 1:nx)
expected = 0.0;
if(age < T)
for(iep = 1:ne)
expected = expected + P[ie, iep]*V[age+1, ixp, iep];
end
end
cons = (1 + r)*xgrid[ix] + egrid[ie]*w - xgrid[ixp];
utility = (cons^(1-ssigma))/(1-ssigma) + bbeta*expected;
if(cons <= 0)
utility = -10^5;
end
if(utility >= VV)
VV = utility;
end
end
return(VV);
end
Box 2: Julia code to compute the value function, given state variables age, ix, ie.

The following pseudo-code computes the model in parallel:
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begin
1. Set t = T.
2. Given t, one processor can compute V(t, xi , e j ), while another processor
computes V(t, xi0 , e j0 ).
3. When the different processors are done computing V(t, xi , e j ), ∀ xi ∈ X and

∀e j ∈ E, set t = t − 1. Go to 1.
end
Algorithm 4: Parallelizing the value function
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the performance of each of the processors of an 8-thread
CPU when the process is executed in serial (Figure 6) and in parallel with the maximum
number of threads (Figure 7). While in the first figure only one processor works (CPU2,
represented by the line that jumps in the middle), in the second figure all 8 CPUs are
occupied.

Figure 6: 1 Core used for computation
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Figure 7: 8 Cores used for computation

3.6 Different Computers
Before we show how to implement Algorithm 4 in practice, we must spend some time
discussing how the choice of a particular computer matters for parallelization and how we
implement it.
Amdahl’s law (name after the computer architect Gene Amdahl) states that the speedup of a program using multiple processors in parallel is limited by the time needed for the
sequential fraction of the program. That is, if 25 percent of the computation is inherently
serial, even a machine with thousands of processors cannot lower computation time below
25 percent of its duration when running serially. Thus, the speed of each processor is still
of paramount relevance.
Similarly (and as we will describe below in more detail for each programming language), we face the fixed cost of starting a thread or a process/worker when we want to
distribute computations among workers, transfer shared data to them, and synchronize
results. These tasks are time intensive and, often, they depend more on the hardware
allowing the communication among processors than on the quality of the processors
themselves. Indeed, much of the cost of state-of-the-art supercomputers is in top-of-theline equipment that maximizes network bandwidth and minimizes latency, not in the
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processors. Furthermore, the primary barrier facing extremely large machines is load
imbalance among processors. In actual applications, it is difficult to use more than 10
percent of the theoretically available computing power.
These issues are somewhat less relevant for users of workstations and desktops with
just a few processors, but cannot be completely ignored. For instance, an Intel CoreTM
i9-7980XE Extreme Edition has 18 cores and can run up to 36 threads. A performance
workstation equipped with such a processor is priced at less than $5,000 and, thus,
affordable to many researchers. This unprecedented level of sophistication for a personal
computer requires an investment of time and effort in getting to know the limits a particular
computer imposes on parallelization. A thorough discussion of such issues is well beyond
the scope of this chapter (and would be, in any case, contingent on rapidly evolving
hardware).
We would be remiss, however, if we did not mention other hardware possibilities.
For example, many institutions provide affiliated researchers with large servers, some
of them with dozens of cores, and even with mighty supercomputers. Similarly, several
companies offer computing services on demand over the internet. The main advantage of
these services is the replacement of a large initial capital cost (purchasing a workstation)
for a variable cost (use-as-needed), the supply of constant updates in the hardware, and
the avoidance of maintenance considerations (at times acute in a department of economics
where IT support can be spotty).
A popular example of those services is Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), which
allows requesting nearly as much computational power as one would desire in economics.33
As of April 2018, you can rent on-demand 8 processors with 32 GiB of memory, running
on Linux and gathered for general purposes for $0.3712 per hour and 96 processors with
384 GiB of memory for $4.608 per hour. These prices mean that one can use 96 processors

33. https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/, where in addition, the reader can find complete documentation of how
to create and operate an instance online.
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for an entire month, non-stop, for $3,318.34 Prices can be substantially cheaper if the user
is willing to pay for spot pricing at lower-demand times.
The access to EC2 is straightforward. After setting up an account, one can go to Amazon
EC2, click on “Launch a virtual machine” and follow the webpage links (for example, one
can select Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS, an instance that runs on the well-known Ubuntu
distribution of Linux).
The only difficulty lies in the need to use a public key. The required steps are i) create
a new key pair; ii) download the key; iii) store it in a secure place (usually ∼./ssh/); and
iv) run an instance.
On an Ubuntu terminal this requires, first, transfering the folder from local to instance
with scp:
$ scp -i "/path/PUBLICKEY.pem" -r "/pathfrom/FOLDER/"
ubuntu@52.3.251.249:~

Second, to make sure the key is not publicly available:
$ chmod 400 "/path/PUBLICKEY.pem"

And, third, to connect to instance with ssh:
$ ssh -i "/path/PUBLICKEY.pem" ubuntu@52.3.251.249

Once the instance is running, the terminal where it operates works like any other Linux
terminal and the user can execute its parallel codes.

34. https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/on-demand/. If one considers the expected life of a server before
it becomes obsolete plus the burden of maintenance in terms of time and effort, the user cost of the server
per month might be quite higher than $3,318.
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3.7 Parallelization Schemes on CPUs
We are now ready to review several of the most popular parallelization schemes that take
advantage of having access to multiple cores (physical or virtual), either in one or several
CPUs. This is the most traditional form of parallelism. In Section 3.8, we will review
parallelization schemes for GPUs and mixed approaches that can use both CPUs and
GPUs. This second form of parallelism has gained much attention during the last decade
and it deserves its own section.
Except for the case of MPI in Subsection 3.7.8 with its rich set of operations, the schemes
in this section will be, in some form or another, simple variations of two different ideas:
the for loop and Map and Reduce. In the for loop approach, we add a statement before
the for loop that we want to parallelize. For example, in the code displayed in Box 2, if
we want to parallelize the computation of the value function along the productivity (x)
grid, we add a statement on the code specifying that the for(ix = 1:nx) loop should be
computed in parallel. This approach is simple to implement, transparent in its working,
and efficient for many computations. However, it faces scalability constraints.
In comparison, a Map function receives as inputs the function Value described in Box
1 and a data structure containing every possible combination of the state variables, and
returns the value associated which each of them. This computation is done in parallel, so
there is no need to loop over all state variables as in Box 2. Although our particular case
does not require it, a Reduce function takes the values computed by the Map and reduces
them in the desired way, such as taking the average or the sum of them.
In most programming languages, there is at least one package/extension to perform
parallel computing, and most follow one of the two procedures described above. Some of
them require the programmer to add a statement before the loop that should be computed
in parallel, while some others require the use of a Map function. In the remaining sections
of this paper, we show how to implement these schemes in some of the most popular
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programming languages in economics. More concretely, we will deal with Julia, Matlab,
R, Python, C++ with OpenMP, and Rcpp with OpenMP. We will close with explanations of
how to apply MPI, which can interact with different programming languages.35

3.7.1

Julia - Parallel for

Julia is a modern, expressive, open-source programming language with excellent abstraction, functional, and metaprogramming capabilities. Designed from the start for
high-performance numerical computing, Julia is particularly well-suited for economics.
A design principle of Julia was to provide tools for easy and efficient parallelization of
numerical code. One of those tools is the @parallel for, most convenient for “small tasks,”
that is, for situations where there are few computations on each parallel iteration. This
might be because we have few control variables, or few grid points on control variables, or
the computation requires relatively few steps.36
To implement @parallel for, we start by setting up the number of workers according
to the architecture of our machine with the instruction addprocs():

addprocs(6) # Here we have 6; check the number of processors you have
available

35. As we indicated in the introduction, we do not try to be exhaustive in our coverage of programming
languages, as such an exercise would be too cumbersome. Furthermore, the set of languages we select
spans other alternatives with minimal changes. For example, once one understands how to implement
parallelization in C++ with OpenMP, doing the same in Scala or Fortran is straightforward. For a comparison of programming languages in economics that motivates our choice of languages for this exercise, see
Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde (2015).
36. See Julia Parallel Computing. These paragraphs follow the syntax Julia v0.6.2, the current release as of
April 2018. Some details may change before the release of the first “stable” 1.0 version, announced for
some time in late 2018. Our computations are done with Julia v0.6.0, which has minimal changes with
respect to Julia v0.6.2.
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In Julia, as in most languages described below, initializing the pool of workers can
take some time. However, the programmer has to consider that this is a one-time fixed
cost that does not depend on the size of the problem. If the parallel pool is initialized to
perform a time-consuming task or to repeat the same task multiple times, the fixed cost
vanishes as a proportion of total computation time. However, if the user only uses the
parallel pool to perform a one-time small task, initializing the pool of workers might make
parallel computing more time expensive than serial computing.
When variables are declared in Julia, they are not part of the shared memory by
default. That is, variables are not generally observable/accessible by workers. To grant
the workers access to the variables they need for their computations, we must explicitly
declare those variables to be accessible/modifiable by workers. If we only want a variable
to be observed by workers, but not modified on parallel iterations, we should declare it as
global with @everywhere:

@everywhere T = 10;
#...
@everywhere gridx = zeros(nx);

However, there are some variables that we want the parallel workers to modify simultaneously in each iteration. In our example, we want the workers to modify the entries of
the value function matrix V that are assigned to them. To accomplish this, we declare these
variables as SharedArray:

V = SharedArray(Float64, (T, nx, ne),
init = V -> V[Base.localindexes(V)] = myid());
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Once the required variables have been declared to be observable and modifiable by the
workers, we should explicitly state the for loop we want to be executed in parallel. For
this, it suffices to add the directive @parallel before the for statement. For example, if
we want to compute in parallel the values assigned to each point in the savings grid, we
add @parallel before the for loop associated with the x grid:

@parallel for(ix = 1:1:nx)
# ...
end

As explained above, our life-cycle problem can be parallelized across the savings and
productivity dimensions, x and e, but not across age, t. This means that, for every t, we
should assign grid points in the E × X space to each worker to compute the value assigned
to those points, gather back the computations, stack them on the matrix V(t, ·, ·), iterate to
t − 1, and repeat. Before iterating to t − 1, we need all the workers to finish their job so
that we can collect all the information in V(t, ·, ·). To make sure that every worker finishes
its job before iterating to t − 1, we must add the directive @sync before the @parallel for
statement:

@sync @parallel for(ix = 1:1:nx)
# ...
end

These three elements (i) declaring observable and modifiable variables, ii) a directive
@parallel for loop, and iii) a directive @sync) are all one needs to run the code in parallel
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in Julia. The execution of the code in the REPL terminal or the batch model is the same
as for any other Julia file.
There is, however, an important further point to discuss. In our example, we stated that
the problem could be computed in parallel across two dimensions: x and e. It turns out
that, in Julia, it is not possible to embed a @parallel for loop inside another @parallel
for loop. The programmer must choose whether to perform parallel computing on one
grid but not on the other, or to convert the two nested loops into a single loop that iterates
over all the points in both grids.
Let us explore the first alternative (parallelize along one dimension, but not the other)
first. The code below presents the two possible choices of the loop to parallelize in two
columns:

nx = 350;

nx = 350;

ne = 9;

ne = 9;

for(ie = 1:ne)

for(ix = 1:nx)

@sync @parallel for(ix = 1:nx)

@sync @parallel for(ie = 1:ne)

# ...

# ...

end

end

end

end

Although the choice of computing in parallel the x or the e grid might seem innocuous,
the implied performance differences are large. Computing in parallel the loop corresponding to the x grid is much faster. The reason is mainly the time spent in communication vs.
actual computation.
Note there are many more grid points in the x grid, 350, than in the e grid, 9 (this is
typical in life-cycle models; in other models, the larger grid can be another dimension).
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In the left column above, for every point in the e grid, the master node has to split the x
grid among the workers. That is, on every iteration on the e grid, the master node has to
communicate and exchange information with the workers. In the above example, with 9
points on the e grid, the master node has to move information 9 times. On each of these 9
iterations, the master node divides a grid of 350 points among 8 workers. If the tasks are
equally split, each worker will have around 43 computations on every iteration.
In the right column, when we choose to parallelize across the e grid, the opposite
happens. Since nx=350, the master node has to move information 350 times, one after
every iteration. Moreover, the computing time is small, as the 9 grid points in the e grid
are divided among 8 workers; that is, at most, two computations per worker! In this case,
the communication time is very large when compared to computation time, so parallel
computing is not only slower than in the first case, but it can be even slower than any
parallelization at all.
The second alternative collapses the two nested loops into a single loop that iterates
over all the grid points. In this case, the parallelization is performed over all the grid
points, which minimizes the communication time and maximizes the computations per
worker:

@sync @parallel for(ind = 1:(ne*nx))
ix = convert(Int, ceil(ind/ne));
ie = convert(Int, floor(mod(ind-0.05, ne))+1);
# ...
end

In the Github repository of this paper, the reader can find an example in which we
compute the baseline model described with parallel loops across both x and e dimensions.
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We repeat the computation of the model with a different number of cores for parallelization,
up to 8 cores. The experiments are performed on a laptop computer with 4 physical cores
and 8 virtual cores.37 In each case, we execute the code 20 times, to account for small
differences in performance between runs.
Figure 8a illustrates the average total computing time, with the number of cores
employed on the x−axis and the time in seconds on the y−axis. The performance gains
are substantial up to the third core, going from around 16 seconds to less than 8, but they
decrease after that. Since total time spent in communication is large, adding workers does
not necessarily increase speed. This point is stressed in Figure 8b, which plots the number
of cores against the performance gains in terms of the normalized performance of one
processor. If the parallelization was perfect and no time was spent in communication, the
performance gains should be linear. That is, doubling the number of processors should
double the speed of computation, as represented by the 45◦ line (the inherently serial part
of the code affected by Amdahl’s law is small). In reality, the performance gains are always
significantly below the optimal gains and start decreasing after the third core. To make
this argument clearer, we plot in both figures the mean of the runs and the band between
the min and max performance. Of course, in larger problems (for instance, with more
points in the state variable grids), performance might continue increasing with additional
processors. Similarly, better machines (for example, with more physical processors) might
deliver improved performance for a longer range of processors used.
When implementing parallel computing in Julia, the programmer must take into
account that the total computation speed is particularly sensitive to the use of global
(@everywhere) variables and large SharedArray objects. Many elements in shared memory
can significantly hamper the potential time gains that parallel computing brings. In
applications where shared memory is sizable, it might even be preferable to perform serial
computing.
37. More concretely, we use a Lenovo Y50-70 with Intel CoreTM i7-4710HQ CPU @2.50GHzx8, 15.6 GiB, and
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 860M/PCIe/SSE2 GPU. The operating system is Ubuntu 14.04, 64-bit.
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Figure 8: Results in Julia with different number of processors. Number of experiments:
20.

3.7.2

Julia - MapReduce

Recall that the @parallel for is designed for applications, such as our life-cycle model,
when the problems assigned to each worker are small. In cases where there are many
more control variables or where we work with fine-mesh grids, or in models with many
discrete choices, @parallel for might slow down the computation. In these situations, a
MapReduce-type of function built into Julia is a superior approach.
To do so, we must look at our life-cycle problem from a different perspective. To solve
the problem serially, we compute the maximum attainable value –given the restrictions–
for every point –t, x, and e– in the grids (see Algorithm 4). A MapReduce function, instead,
takes as inputs a function and vector of values where we want to evaluate that function
(recall our discussion in Section 3.3). In our case, the inputs would be the function Value
that computes the optimal choice given state variables, and the vector of values would be
a data structure containing all possible combinations of the points in the grids for the state
variables (or, perhaps, some relevant subset of those combinations).
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We show now how to implement this idea in practice. As before, the first step is to
initialize the number of parallel workers:

addprocs(6)

Next, we define a data structure modelState composed of all parameters and variables
needed for the computation in Value, and declare this structure as global:

@everywhere type modelState
ix::Int64
age::Int64
# ...
end

Note that the idea of creating a rich data structure to store all the state variables can be
applied to a wide class of dynamic models that goes well beyond our simple life-cycle
economy. More generally, using rich data structures allows for cleaner and less bug-prone
code, since we can define operators on the whole structure or overload already existing
ones, instead of operating on each element of the structure one at a time.38
Given that the function Value will now depend on the data structure: modelState,
instead of on each of the parameters, the function must be modified accordingly to take
the structure as an input:

38. Overloading an operator is to define a different effect of the operation when the inputs are different, i.e,
the operator “+” works differently when applied to two integers than when we apply it to two matrices of
complex numbers. Also, we can be flexible in the definition of structures. For example, we can incorporate
on them just the states of the model, but not the parameters as well, as we do in the main text.
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@everywhere function Value(currentState::modelState)
ix

= currentState.ix;

age

= currentState.age;

# ...
VV

= -10^3;

for(ixp = 1:nx)
# ...
end
return(VV);
end

Since the workers in the parallel pool must be able to observe the function Value, this
must also be declared as global with the directive @everywhere.
The last step is to use the Map-type of function to compute Value in parallel. In Julia,
this is done with the pmap function (pmap generalizes map to the parallel case), which
receives as inputs the function Value and a vector with all possible combinations of state
variables as stored in our data structure modelState:

for(age = T:-1:1)
pars = [modelState(ix, age, ..., w, r) for ind in 1:ne*nx];
s = pmap(Value,pars);
for(ind = 1:ne*nx)
ix

= convert(Int, floor((ind-0.05)/ne))+1;
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ie

= convert(Int, floor(mod(ind-0.05, ne))+1);

V[age, ix, ie] = s[ix];
end
end

Figures 9a and 9b illustrate the total computing time and the time gains, respectively,
with a different number of processors when using the pmap function. Absolute computing
times using this procedure are very large when compared to the results of the last section,
and the performance gains from adding more workers to the parallel pool are very poor.
One possible explanation is that the pmap function is designed to be applied to tasks
where each worker is assigned a large task. In our example, this is not the case. The
computation speed, in this case, could also be reduced by applying Julia-specific tricks,
such as wrapping the code inside a function. However, since the purpose of this paper is
to make the comparison as transparent as possible, we avoid applying language-specific
procedures different from the parallelization itself.
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Figure 9: Results with pmap function in Julia with different number of processors. Number
of experiments: 20.
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3.7.3

Matlab

Matlab performs parallel computing through the parallel toolbox.39 While this tool is
probably the simplest of all the alternatives covered in this paper to implement, it also
suffers from limited performance and it is expensive to purchase.
As opposed to Julia, in which variables are neither observable nor modifiable by
default by all the workers in the parallel pool, in Matlab they are. Every time you declare a
variable, it can be accessed by any worker in the parallel pool. In this way, the programmer
only has to take care of initializing the parallel pool of workers and explicitly stating which
for loop she wants to be parallelized.
To initialize the parallel pool of workers, we use the function parpool():

parpool(6)

In Matlab, as in Julia, initializing the workers in the parallel pool is also time consuming. It can take some seconds, even a considerable fraction of a minute. Again, if the
parallel pool is initialized to perform a time-consuming task or to repeat the same task
multiple times, the fixed cost of initializing the parallel pool vanishes as a proportion of
total computation time, and parallel computing might increase performance. If the code
only performs a small task, the initialization cost of parallel computing might offset its
benefits.
To state which loop is to be computed in parallel, instead of declaring the for loop,
the programmer must declare it as parfor:

for age = T:-1:1
parfor ie = 1:1:ne
39. We employ Matlab 2017b, with its corresponding parallel toolbox.
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% ...
end
end

Beyond these two steps (i.e., initializing the parallel pool and employing parfor), the
developer does not need to exert further effort and Matlab takes care of all the rest.
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Figure 10: Results in Matlab with different number of processors. Number of experiments:
20.
Total computing time in Matlab is considerably higher than in Julia with the @parallel
for procedure, as illustrated by Figure 10a. While Julia takes around 16 seconds to compute the model with one core, Matlab takes over 50 seconds. Similar to Julia, the
performance gains of using parallel computing in Matlab are not very large, as illustrated
in Figure 10b. The speed-ups are well below the perfect linear gains represented by the
45◦ line. On average, using 4 workers in the parallel pool decreases computing time by
less than 2.5 times. Computing in Matlab is very simple to implement, but does not bring
substantial benefits when compared to other languages. Indeed, after the computer reaches
the limit of physical cores, computing time deteriorates with additional virtual cores.
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3.7.4

R

Parallelization in R is important because the language’s speed in serial computations is
quite often disappointing in comparison with other alternatives (see Aruoba and FernándezVillaverde, 2015), and yet a researcher might want to code on it to take advantage of its
superior statistical and graphics capabilities.
R, as an open source language, has multiple parallel computing packages created by
different developers. Here we will cover only the widely used parallel package, although
there are other alternatives, such as the foreach and doParallel (we use R 3.4.1, which
includes parallel by default). In later sections, we will describe how to perform parallel
computing with C++ and how to embed C++ code in R through the Rcpp package, allowing
the user to expand the use of parallel computing in R.
The main functions in the parallel package for parallel computing are the parLapply
and the parSapply function, which are Map-type functions that perform the same task
as the lapply and sapply functions, respectively. lapply applies a function to a list of
variables. sapply performs the same task in a more user-friendly manner. R has strong
functional programming capabilities to manipulate lists that are often overlooked (for a
crip explanation of them, see Wickham, 2014).
To access the parallel package in R, the user must first install it and open the library:
install.packages("parallel")
library("parallel")

This package has the parLapply function. This is a parallel Map kind of function. As
we did with Julia, when the parallel procedure employs a MapReduce scheme, the user
must define the function Value:

147

Value = function(x){
age

= x$age

ix

= x$ix

...
VV = -10^3;
for(ixp in 1:nx){
# ...
}
return(VV);
}

In R there is no need to define a data structure, as the vector of parameter and state
variables can be set as a list. Also, as opposed to Julia, in R all variables are observable
and modifiable by the workers of the parallel pool. Therefore, it suffices to generate a
list that contains all parameters and every possible combination of state variables. In our
example, we perform this using the lapply function, which is a Map that returns a list with
parameters and all possible combinations of state variables:

states = lapply(1:(nx*ne), function(x) list(age=age,ix=x, ...,r=r))

Here we could have used the parLapply function to create the list of inputs to solve our
main problem. Since we want to emphasize the use of parallel computing to compute the
value function, we omit this step.
The function makeCluster initializes the desired number of workers:
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cl <- makeCluster(8)

Finally, the function parLapply(cl, states, Value) computes the function Value at
every element of the list states, which contains all combinations of state variables. The
package uses the cluster cl initialized above:

for(age in T:1){
states = lapply(1:(nx*ne), function(x) list(age=age,ix=x, ...))
s = parLapply(cl, states, Value)
}

The output of the parLapply function is a list with the elements of the evaluation of
Value at each of the elements in states. To store them in a three-dimensional matrix V,
the user must finally loop over all the elements of s and store them at V.
The results of our computation are reported in Figures 11a and 11b, where we see that
R is extremely slow at computing the model. It takes over 1600 seconds with one core, and
over 800 seconds with 8 cores (that is why we only run 5 experiments; with long run times,
small differences in performance between one run and the next are negligible). Moreover,
among all the computing languages presented in this paper, the performance gains of
parLapply in R are the smallest. Using 4 workers for the parallel computation increases
performance by just over 1.5, and using all available 8 workers reduces total computing
time almost by half. These results imply that, among the languages included in this paper,
R is the least desirable one to use for the computation of this class of models (for a similar
result, see Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde, 2015).
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Figure 11: Results in R with different number of processors. Number of experiments: 5.

3.7.5

Python

Python is an open-source, interpreted, general purpose language that has become popular
among many scientists due to its elegance, readability, and flexibility. It is also a very
easy language to learn for those without previous experience in coding in general domain
languages.
As was the case with R, there are multiple modules to perform parallel computing in
Python. In this section, we will review the Parallel function from the joblib module,
which is a Map-like function.40 Thus, the reader will notice the similarities to previous
sections that used Map-type functions.
First, we import the joblib and multiprocessing modules:

from joblib import Parallel, delayed
import multiprocessing

40. We use Python 2.7.6. joblib provides lightweight pipelining in Python and, thus, is a good choice for
our exercise. For a more general description of parallelization in Python, see Gorelick and Ozsvald (2014).
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Next, we define a data structure that contains the parameters and state variables, which
is going to be one of the inputs of the Map-type function:

class modelState(object):
def __init__(self, age, ix, ...):
self.age

= age

self.ix

= ix

# ...

In Python, the variables declared are globally observable and modifiable by the workers in
the parallel pool, so there is no need to specify their scope when defining them.
Next, we define the function Value that computes the maximum given some values of
the states:

def Value(states):
nx = states.nx
age = states.age
# ...
VV = math.pow(-10, 3)
for ixp in range(0,nx):
# ...
return[VV];
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The function Parallel, from the joblib package, receives as inputs the number
of workers of the parallel pool, the function Value, and a list of elements of the type
modelState, one for each combination of values of the state variables. This function
returns the function Value evaluated at each of the state variables. This parallelization is
done at every age t ∈ {1, . . . , T }:

results = Parallel(n_jobs=num_cores)(delayed(value_func)
(modelState(ix, age, ..., w, r)) for ind in range(0,nx*ne))

Finally, we construct the value function by storing the values of results in a matrix V:

for age in reversed(range(0,T)):
results = Parallel(n_jobs=cores)(delayed(value_func)
(modelState(ind,ne, ...)) for ind in range(0,nx*ne))
for ind in range(0,nx*ne):
ix = int(math.floor(ind/ne));
ie = int(math.floor(ind%ne));
V[age, ix, ie] = results[ind][0];

The results of the computations with Python are displayed in Figures 12a and 12b. As
in R, total computing time with one core is extremely slow. It takes almost 2,000 seconds,
on average, to compute the life-cycle model. However, parallel gains turn out to be very
good, as increasing the number of cores up to 4 decreases computing time to almost a
third. Increasing the number of cores beyond 4 does not generate any time improvements.
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When compared to Julia, Matlab, and R, the performance gains of using 4 computing
cores with the Parallel function in Python are the largest. However, given its absolute
performance, it is still not a desirable language to compute models such as the one
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Figure 12: Results in Python with different number of processors. Number of experiments:
20.
Python can be accelerated with tools such as Numba. Dealing with them here, however, requires mixing both parallelization and acceleration in Python, complicating our
expository goals. See, for more information, Gorelick and Ozsvald (2014).

3.7.6

C++ and OpenMP

So far, we have dealt with scripting languages such as Julia, Matlab, R, and Python
that allow for fast parallelization using either built-in directives or additional packages.
This approach had the advantage of simplicity: minor changes to the serial code deliver
programs that can be run in parallel. Thus, these scripting languages are great ways to
start working on parallel or to solve mid-size problems. On the other hand, our results
also show the limitations of the approach: scaling up the problem in terms of processors is
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difficult. And even with parallel processing, a researcher might still need extra speed from
each processor.
A more powerful, but also more cumbersome, approach is to switch to a compiled language and take advantage of the tools available for parallel programming in that language.
C++ is a natural choice of a compiled language because of its speed, robustness, flexibility,
industry-strength capabilities, the existence of outstanding open-source compilers such
as GCC (indeed, for all the experiments with C++ in this paper, we will use GCC 4.8.5),
excellent teaching material, and broad user base.41
One of the easiest tools to implement parallel computing in C++ is OpenMP (Open
Multi-Processing). OpenMP is an open-source application programming interface (API)
specification for parallel programming in C, C++, and Fortran in multiprocessor/core,
shared-memory machines (wrappers for OpenMP exist for other languages, including
Python and Mex files in Matlab). OpenMP was released in 1997 and its current version, as
of April 2018, is 4.5. OpenMP is managed by a review board composed of major IT firms
and it is implemented by the common compilers such as GCC and supported by standard
integrated development environments (IDEs) such as Eclipse.
OpenMP can be learned quickly as it is easy to code, and yet rather powerful. For
example, most implementations of OpenMP (although not the standard!) allow for nested
parallelization and dynamic thread changes and advanced developers can take advantage
of sophisticated heap and stack allocations. At the same time, most problems in economics
only require a reduced set of instructions from the API. However, OpenMP is limited to

41. Future standards of C++, such as C++20, plan to include executors as a building block for asynchronous,
concurrent, and parallel work. Parallel programming in C++, then, might look closer to the code of the
scripting languages. In comparison, explicitly parallel languages such as Unified Parallel C, µC++,
Charm++, Chapel, and X10 have never left the stage of small experimental languages, and we will not cover
them here. High Performance Fortran and Coarray Fortran have suffered from the demise of Fortran
outside a small niche of specialized users, dealing more often than not with legacy code from previous
decades.
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shared-memory machines, such as personal computers or certain computer clusters, and
the coder needs to worry about contention and cache coherence.42
OpenMP follows a multithreading “fork-join” paradigm: it executes the code serially
until a directive for parallel computing is found in the code. At this point, the part
of the code that can be computed in parallel is executed using multiple threads, and
communication happens between the master thread and the rest of the workers in the
parallel pool. After the parallel region is executed, the rest of the code is computed serially.
Figure 13 illustrates the execution of an OpenMP code. This suggests that a good rule of
thumb for OpenMP is to employ one thread per core.

Figure 13: OpenMP computing

The “fork-join” scheme, however, means that it is the job of the user to remove
possible dependencies across threads (for instance, variable values in thread n required
in thread n − j) and synchronize data. To avoid race conditions (some variables being
computed too early or too late), the developer can impose fence conditions and/or make
some data private to the thread, but those choices may cause performance to deteriorate.
Synchronization is expensive and loops suffer from time overheads.
We implement OpenMP as follows. First, before compilation, we must set the environmental variable OMP NUM THREADS equal to the number of cores used in the parallel
42. See http://www.openmp.org/ for the complete documentation and tutorials. Particularly instructive is the
tutorial at https://computing.llnl.gov/tutorials/openMP/. A more exhaustive treatment is Chapman
et al. (2007).
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computation of the code. In a Linux/Unix computer, this can be done with a Bash shell by
opening the terminal window and typing:

export OMP_NUM_THREADS=32

Second, at compilation time, the user must add the specific flag, depending on the
compiler. These flags tell the compiler to generate explicitly threaded code when it
encounters OpenMP directives. With the GCC compiler, the compilation flag is -fopenmp.
With the PGI compiler, the required flag is -ta=multicore. Our particular example
compiles as:

g++ Cpp_main_OpenMP.cpp -fopenmp -o -O3 Cpp_main

In the absence of this flag, the code will be compiled as regular C++ code, always a good
first step to debug and optimize the code before running it in parallel (perhaps with a less
challenging computing task, such as smaller grids or more lenient convergence tolerances).
Note that we also use the -O3 flag to generate optimized code. This flag can be omitted in
a first exercise while we debug and test the code, but, in “production” code, it accelerates
the performance of the code considerably.
Inside the code, we include the header omp.h to load the relevant library:

#include <omp.h>

Then, we add the directive #pragma omp parallel for right before each for loop we
want to parallelize. This directive has multiple options, and has to be accompanied by the
variables that are private to each worker and those that are shared. This is done using the
shared(...) and private(...) directives:
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#pragma omp parallel for shared(V, ...) private(VV, ...)
for(int ix=0; ix<nx; ix++){
// ...
}

The programmer can specify additional options for the parallelization, such as explicitly
setting barriers that synchronize every thread, setting access to shared-memory objects
by workers, dividing tasks between the master thread and the workers, setting private
threads for specific workers, and so on.
Given the simplicity of implementing parallel computing in OpenMP, it is worth using it
even for small tasks. First, as opposed to Julia and Matlab, the time taken to initialize
the parallel pool is negligible, and the code is executed almost immediately. Second, the
coding time needed to compute the code in parallel is relatively low, as only a couple of
lines of code are needed. Third, as mentioned above, you can always compile your code
without the -fopenmp flag to run the code serially to compare the results obtained with
and without parallelization and debug them.
Total computing times in OpenMP with a different number of cores are presented in
Figure 14a. As can be observed, the total time with only one core is around 4 seconds,
considerably better than Julia in Section 3.7.1 and orders of magnitude better than Matlab,
R, and Python. This is not a surprise given the advantages of compiled languages over
scripting ones. See, for similar results, Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde (2015). It is worth
recalling that the C++ code for these computations was compiled with the -O3 optimization
flag. In its absence, C++’s performance deteriorates to nearly 20 seconds (see the Appendix
for details about the consequences of different optimization options).43
43. Compilers for C++ such as GCC and Intel have options for automatic parallelization (see https://
gcc.gnu.org/wiki/AutoParInGCC and https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/522532) that try to
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Figure 14: Results in C++ with OpenMP with different number of processors. Number of
experiments: 20.
Figure 14b illustrates the performance gains with a different number of cores. The
performance grows almost linearly up to the third core; using 3 cores improves computation speed by a factor of more than 2.5. Although there seems to be no performance
gain in adding the fourth core on average, the best case of the experiments made shows
that it is possible to achieve an almost-linear gain. In the best experiment, using 4 cores
improves computation speed by a factor of more than 3.5.44 Also, in contrast to the
scripting languages, there are gains from adding virtual cores beyond the number of
physical cores. When computing the problem with 8 cores, the average computing time
falls by more than a factor of 3.

include OpenMP-like directives without any direct intervention by the programmer. Our experiences with
automatic parallelization over the years and in different applications have been disappointing.
44. The relatively high variance of the experiments is due to the short run time of the solution of the model in
C++. A fix to avoid this variance would be to increase the number of grid points. But then, the computation
of R and Python would take too long. Since the primary goal of this paper is to illustrate how each
parallelization method works –not to measure their time performance with utmost accuracy –we keep the
experiments the way they are.
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3.7.7

Rcpp and OpenMP

Having described the relatively poor performance of parallel computing in R and the great
gains in C++ at a relatively low cost, it is worth asking whether it is possible to perform
the computations in R by creating a C++ function that uses OpenMP. Fortunately, the Rcpp
package in R allows the user to create functions in C++. These functions can use OpenMP to
perform the computations in parallel.45
All the documentation of the Rcpp package is available on the Rcpp for Seamless R and
C++ Integration website. To use Rcpp, the user must first install the package and import
the library from within R:

install.packages("Rcpp")
library("Rcpp")

The user must write the C++ function with the appropriate C++ directives, as described
in Section 3.7.6:

#include <omp.h>
// ...
#pragma omp parallel for shared(...) private(...)
for(int ix = 0; ix<nx; ix++){
//...
}
45. Although other packages allow parallel computing with Rcpp, such as the RcppParallel, their implementation costs are higher. As described in the last section, with OpenMP, parallel computing can be achieved by
adding only a couple of lines of code. Also, a similar mixed-programming approach can be implemented
with Mex files in Matlab. Our experience is that Rcpp is much easier and efficient than Mex files. See, for
instance, the code and results in Aruoba and Fernández-Villaverde (2015).
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Before importing the function with Rcpp, we must explicitly state which functions in
the C++ code are to be imported to R, by adding the following code on the line before the
function C++ code:

// [[Rcpp::export]]

There are three options to set the number of workers on the parallel pool. The first one
is to set the environmental variable OMP NUM THREADS to the desired number of workers
directly from the terminal. In a Linux/Unix machine, this can be done in a .bash profile
file or from the terminal:

export OMP_NUM_THREADS=32

The second option is to include the following code right before the first parallel region of
the C++ code:

omp_set_num_threads(n)

The third option is to include the num threads(n) option on the #pragma statement, where
n is the number of desired workers in the parallel pool:

#pragma omp parallel for shared(...) private(...) num_threads(n)
for(int ix=0; ix<nx; ix++){
// ...
}
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Given that the C++ is compiled from within R, we must be sure that the OpenMP flag is
added at compilation. For this, we should add the −fopenmp flag using the Sys.setenv()
function from within R:

Sys.setenv("PKG_CXXFLAGS"=" -fopenmp")

Finally, the C++ code can be compiled and imported from R, so the function that
computes the value function can be called from R. The function sourceCpp is used to
compile the C++ code and create such a function:

sourceCpp("my_file.cpp")

The sample codes in R and C++ can be found on the Github repository of this paper.
The user can compare how the C++ code has to be modified in order to to import it with
Rcpp, and how it can be executed from R.
The results, presented in Figures 15a and 15b, are outstanding and very similar to
those from C++ with OpenMP in Section 3.7.6. This is not surprising, as Rcpp is nothing
different than compiling and executing the C++ from within R. Again, the performance
improvements are almost linear up to the third core. The best-case scenario when adding
the fourth core is almost linear. Adding workers beyond the fourth core generates small
improvements in average performance. One difference with the C++ code is that the Rcpp
code runs much faster. This is because the C++ code in Section 3.7.6 was compiled without
any optimization flag. In contrast, Rcpp compiles the code with the -O3 optimization
flag by default, which significantly improves absolute computation speeds. Section 3.10
presents the results when the C++ code is compiled with different optimization flags.
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Figure 15: Results in Rcpp with OpenMP with different number of processors. Number of
experiments: 20.

3.7.8

MPI

Despite its simplicity, OpenMP requires, as we have repeated several times, the use of
shared memory. Such a requirement limits the range of machines that we can use for
parallelization. Most large computers use distributed memory as shared memory becomes
unfeasible after some size limit. Also, the use of shared memory by OpenMP might
complicate the portability of the code among machines with different memory structures.
Beyond the requirement of the reproducibility of research, portability matters in parallel
computing more than in serial applications because a researcher may want to develop,
debug, and test the code on a computer different from the one on which the final code will
be run. For example, the former tasks can be done on a regular workstation (cheap and
convenient), while the latter is done on a large server (expensive and more cumbersome).
The natural alternative is to use MPI in C++ (or other appropriate language; MPI
has bindings for other programming languages, such as Fortran, Python, and R). MPI
stands for message passing interface, and is a library and a set of function calls that
allow communication between parallel processes executed on distributed systems, such as
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computer clusters and multicore computers. MPI ensures that the code will be portable from
one platform to another with minimal changes and it allows for outstanding optimization
of performance.
More concretely, we will use a popular open source implementation of MPI, called Open
MPI, prepared by an extensive group of contributors and supported by many members
and partners (including AMD, Amazon, Intel, and NVIDIA). This implementation conforms
with the MPI-3.1 standards and is fully documented on Open MPI’s website.46
In MPI, the whole code is executed simultaneously by every thread, and communication
directions are executed, which means that the programmer must explicitly give instructions
for the communication that should take place between workers in the parallel pool. Figure
16 illustrates the behavior of the threads in an MPI program; all workers perform tasks
simultaneously, and communication happens between them at different moments. For
instance, thread 1 sends message mα to thread 2, while it receives message mγ from thread
3. You can compare Figure 16 with the “fork-join” paradigm of OpenMP shown in Figure
13, where some parts of the code are executed in parallel and some others serially.
1

3

2

4

Send mα
Receive mα

Send m β
Send mγ

Receive m β

Receive mγ

Figure 16: MPI computing

46. A basic tutorial of MPI can be found at Linux Magazine. More advanced tutorials are at LLNL tutorials
and An MPI Tutorial. Gropp et al. (2014) is an excellent textbook on MPI.
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In particular, MPI can broadcast (transfers an array from the master to every thread),
scatter (transfers different parts of an array from the master node to every thread; note the
difference with broadcasting), and gather information (transfers an array from each of the
threads to a single array in the master node). Figure 17 illustrates the ideas of broadcasting,
scattering, and gathering of information among workers.

Figure 17: MPI Functions

This richness in capabilities means that, in comparison with the simplicity of OpenMP,
MPI is much more complex. For example, MPI 3.1 has more than 440 functions (subroutines).
This richness is required to provide the multiple directives for communication between
threads to ensure that the library can handle even the most challenging numerical problems.
While a description of all the MPI functions and their inputs would require a whole book,
some of the main ones are:
• MPI Init: initializes the threads.
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• MPI Comm size: returns the total number of MPI processes in the specified communicator.
• MPI Comm rank: returns processor rank within a communicator.
• MPI Bcast: broadcasts an array.
• MPI Scatter: scatters an array.
• MPI Gather: gathers an array.
• MPI Barrier: stops the execution until every thread reaches that point.
• MPI Send: sends messages between threads.
• MPI Recv: receives messages from another thread.
• MPI Finalize: finalizes the threads.

Other functions, such as MPI Barrier, are used to synchronize the work of each thread
in the parallel pool, as illustrated in Figure 18.
The MPI programmer must explicitly divide the state space between the workers in
the parallel pool and assign specific tasks to each worker. This strategy is, therefore, very
different from the parallel computing routines in previous subsections, in which it sufficed
to state the loop that had to be parallelized or to use a Map-type function.
The first step to start the parallel pool is to initialize the threads with the MPI Init()
function:

MPI_Init(NULL, NULL)

Then, we store the total number of threads and thread id to assign jobs:
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Figure 18: MPI synchronization with barrier function

int tid, nthreads;
MPI_Comm_rank(MPI_COMM_WORLD, &tid)
MPI_Comm_size(MPI_COMM_WORLD, &nthreads)

Next, we define the portion of state space that each thread must execute, according to
the thread id, tid:

int loop_min = (int)(tid * ceil((float) nx*ne/nthreads))
int loop_max = (int)((tid+1) * ceil((float) nx*ne/nthreads))

The MPI Bcast function instructs the master thread to send copies of the same information to every worker in the parallel pool. In our model, at every iteration t, we need
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the master thread to send a copy of the value function at t + 1. For this reason, we must
employ the MPI Bcast function at the beginning of the loop:

MPI_Bcast(Value, T*ne*nx, MPI_FLOAT, 0, MPI_COMM_WORLD);

Given that every thread will execute the same task, each one for a different portion of
the state space, we must make this explicit on the for:

for(int ind = loop_min; ind < loop_max; ind++){
ix = floor(ind/ne);
ie = ind % ne;
// ...
}

The MPI Gatherv function collects information from each worker in the pool and stacks
it in a matrix. At the end of the for loop, the master thread needs to collect the respective
computations of the value function made by each worker, and stack them in a matrix that
stores the value function. This value function is then broadcast in the next iteration to
workers, and so on:

MPI_Gatherv(Valp, ..., MPI_COMM_WORLD);

The last step is finalizing the multithreading with the function MPI Finalize.

MPI_Finalize();
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The complete code can be found on the Github repository of this paper and deserves
some attention to fully understand our paragraphs above.
When applied to our life-cycle model, the performance of MPI with C++ is excellent.
MPI takes advantage of all 8 processors and computes the problem nearly four times faster
than in serial mode (see Figures 19a and 19b). At the same time, the performance is not
outstandingly better than OpenMP’s. Up to 4 cores, the performance is almost equivalent,
being linear on average up to the third core, and the variance of performance gains growing
with the fourth core. The only significant difference is that with MPI, the variance of
performance across experiments is smaller and the average larger when using more than
four threads.
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Figure 19: Results in C++ with MPI with different number of processors. Number of
experiments: 20.
But our example was not ideal for MPI: we run the code in a machine with shared
memory and only 8 cores. If we wanted to run the code with dozens of cores, MPI would
shine and show all its potential, while OpenMP would reach its limits.
Our results highlight the trade-off between OpenMP and MPI: OpenMP is much simpler to
code and its performance is nearly as good as MPI, but it requires shared memory. MPI can
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handle even the most difficult problems (state-of-the-art numerical problems in natural
sciences and engineering are computed with MPI), but it is much harder to employ.
Our educated guess is that, for most of the computations performed in economics (and
the machines many researchers will have access to), economists will find OpenMP more
attractive than MPI, but with a sufficient number of exceptions as to justify some basic
familiarity with the latter.

3.8 Parallelization Schemes on GPUs
Over the last ten years, parallel computation on GPUs has gained much popularity among
researchers and in industry. Although initially developed for graphics rendering (thus,
their name), GPUs are particularly convenient for operations on matrices, data analysis,
and machine learning. The reason is that tasks involved in these algorithms require
operations with array manipulation similar to the ones for which GPUs are optimized. In
these problems, the serial part of the code is run in the CPU, and the GPU is used only
when the user explicitly states the part of the code to be computed in parallel. Furthermore,
GPUs are comparatively cheap and come pre-installed on nearly all computers for sale
nowadays. See Aldrich et al. (2011) and Aldrich (2014) for detailed explanations of how
GPUs work and for the application of their computational power to economics.
The advantage of GPU computing is that, unlike CPUs, which have at most a couple
of dozen processing cores, GPUs have thousands of computing cores. Table 1 presents
the number of computing cores and memory of some of the available desktop NVIDIA
GPUs (NVIDIA is the leading vendor of GPUs). And just as you can stack several CPUs
in one machine, it is also possible to install several GPUs in the same computer, which
increases performance even more (although it also complicates programming). Thus,
through GPU computing, the user can achieve much larger speed gains than with CPU
parallel computing. Depending on the type of computations performed and on the

169

GPU

CUDA Cores

Memory

GeForce GTX TITAN Z
NVIDIA TITAN Xp
GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
GeForce GTX 690
GeForce GTX 780 Ti
GeForce GTX 1080
GeForce GTX 780
GeForce GTX 980
GeForce GTX 1070
GeForce GTX 970
GeForce GTX 770

5760
3840
3584
3072
2880
2560
2304
2048
1920
1664
1536

12 GB
12 GB
11 GB
4 GB
3 GB
8 GB
3 GB
4 GB
8 GB
4 GB
2 GB

Table 1: Number of CUDA cores and memory in NVIDIA GPUs.

memory handling and communication management between the CPU and the GPU, the
performance gains range from 10 times as fast as the serial code, up to hundreds of times
faster. Examples of applications in economics well-suited for GPUs include dense linear
algebra, value function iteration, Monte Carlos, and sequential Monte Carlos.
But the thousands of cores of a GPU come at a cost: GPUs devote more transistors to
arithmetic operations rather than flow control (i.e., for branch prediction, as when you
execute an “if” conditional) and data caching. Thus, not all applications are well-suited for
computation on a GPUs (or the corresponding algorithms may require some considerable
rewriting). For instance, applications involving searching or sorting of vectors typically
require too much branching for effective GPU computing. Also, memory management can
be difficult.
Figure 20 illustrates the architecture of an NVIDIA GPU.47 The CPU is referred to as
the “host,” and the GPU is referred to as the “device.” The device is composed of grids,
47. Source for the figure: NVIDIA CUDA Compute Unified Device Architecture, Programming Guide
1.0, http://developer.download.nvidia.com/compute/cuda/1.0/NVIDIA_CUDA_Programming_Guide_1.
0.pdf.
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Figure 20: CUDA GPU architecture.

where each grid is composed of two-dimensional blocks. The dimensions of the grids and
blocks are defined by the user, with the only restriction being that each block can handle
up to 512 threads. This limitation means that the programmer must carefully divide the
tasks such that each of these blocks does not have more than 512 jobs. The user must also
take care in regard to communication and memory handling. More concretely, at every
parallel region of the code, the user must explicitly transfer variables from the CPU to the
GPU by appropriately managing the memory available in the GPU.
In this section, we will present two approaches to parallelization in GPUs: CUDA, in
Subsection 3.8.1, and OpenACC, in Subsection 3.8.2. CUDA is the traditional environment for
coding in GPUs, with plenty of examples and a wide user base. The drawback is that
CUDA requires the codes to include many low-level instructions to communicate between
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the CPU and GPU and for memory management.48 OpenACC is a more recent, but rather
promising, avenue to simplify computation in GPUs. OpenACC requires much less effort by
the coder and can work across different platforms and mixed processing environments,
but at the potential cost of slower code. We will skip a description of OpenCL, an open
standard for computing in heterogeneous platforms. While OpenCL has the advantage
of not being tied to NVIDIA GPUs, its user base is thinner and less dynamic, and its
performance is generally inferior to CUDA’s. Similarly, one can program in the GPU with
the Matlab parallel toolbox and in R with the gpuR package. However, if a researcher
needs enough speed as to require the use of a GPU, perhaps moving first to a language
more efficient than Matlab or R before diving into GPUs seems a wiser course of action.49

3.8.1

CUDA

CUDA, which stands for Computer Unified Device Architecture, is a parallel computing
model with extensions for C, C++, Fortran, and Python, among others, that allows the
implementation of parallel computing on the GPU of a computer. The CUDA model was
designed by NVIDIA. It was first released in 2007 and the current stable version, as of April
2018, is 9.2, with an extensive range of applications and a deep user base.50
The first step for parallel computing in CUDA is to explicitly define the functions that
are going to be executed from within the GPU, as opposed to those that are executed from

48. This disadvantage can partially be addressed by the use of libraries such as ArrayFire (https:
//arrayfire.com/), which allow high-level instructions and function calls. In our assessment, however, going with OpenACC seems at this moment a better idea for the long run.
49. The repository https://github.com/JuliaGPU lists several alternatives for GPU computing in Julia, but
the packages are still far from easy to employ by less experienced users.
50. An excellent exposition of CUDA is offered by Kirk and Hwu (2014).
Some tutorials
and
links
are
https://www.nvidia.com/docs/IO/116711/sc11-cuda-c-basics.pdf,
https:
//developer.nvidia.com/cuda-education, and https://devblogs.nvidia.com/parallelforall/
easy-introduction-cuda-c-and-c/.
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the CPU.51 The former should be preceded by the directive
should be preceded by

device , while the latter

global :

// Functions to be executed only from GPU
__device__ float utility(float consumption, float ssigma){
float utility = pow(cons, 1-ssigma) / (1-ssigma);
// ...
return(utility);
}
// Functions to be executed from CPU and GPU
__global__ float value(parameters params, float* V, ...){
// ...
}

Next, the user must allocate memory in the device (GPU) for the variables that are
going to be transferred from the host (CPU) at the beginning of the parallel computation.
Analogous to the malloc function in C++, the cudaMalloc allocates the required memory
in the GPU. This function has as input the name of the variable to be copied and its size,
which is defined as an element of type size t. In our case, we are going to initialize the
value function in the GPU with the name V:

float *V;
size_t sizeV = T*ne*nx*sizeof(float);

51. The reader will benefit much from following the next pages while checking the code posted on the Github
repository.
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cudaMalloc((void**) &V, sizeV);

Since we now have to handle memory in the CPU and memory in the GPU, we must
assign different names to objects that live in both. For example, the value function is going
to be kept in the host memory, but will be transferred to the device and updated at each
iteration. Hence, we must assign a name to the value function in the host, and a different
name for the value function in the device. With the cudaMalloc function above, we named
the value function living in the device as V.
Now we have to initialize the value function that lives in the host. For ease of reference,
we will precede the name of variables in the host with h, so the value function in the host
is called hV:

float *hV;
hV = (float *)malloc(sizeV);

Once memory is allocated in the GPU, the user must transfer from host to device the
variables that need to be accessed and/or modified in the parallel computations. The
function used to transfer information between host and device is cudaMemcpy, which uses
as input the object in the device memory that was already initialized (V), the object in the
host memory that is going to be copied to the device (hV), the size of the object (sizeV) and
the reserved word cudaMemcpyHostToDevice that specifies the direction of the transfer:

cudaMemcpy(V, hV, sizeV, cudaMemcpyHostToDevice);

The user should initialize and transfer any other variables that will be used in the device
for every computation in the same way.
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Next, we must take care of defining the dimensions of the blocks and grids for
parallelization in the GPU. Each thread in the GPU will have a 5-dimensional “coordinate”
given by the number of its grid, the 2-dimensional coordinate of its block, and its 2dimensional coordinate within the block. This 5-dimensional “coordinate” facilitates
parallelization. For example, if the user only wants to parallelize along one dimension
–such as the capital x dimension– she can define only one grid and one block of dimensions
1 × n x . In this way, the thread i will be assigned the task of computing the value function at
the i-th point in the grid for capital. Here, we must be careful not to violate the restriction
that any given block can have at most 512 threads, which means that n x ≤ 512 must hold.
Similarly, if the user wants to parallelize across 2 dimensions –say, the productivity e
and capital x dimensions– she can define one grid with one block of dimensions ne × n x .
Here, the thread with coordinates (i, j) inside the block will be assigned the task of
computing the value function at the i-th entry of the productivity grid and the j-th entry
of the capital grid. Again, we must ensure that ne · n x ≤ 512.
The dimensions of blocks and grids are defined as objects of type dim3, using the CUDA
constructors dimBlock and dimGrid. Remember not to assign more than 512 threads per
grid!

int block_height = 20;
int block_width = ne;
dim3 dimBlock(block_height, block_width);
dim3 dimGrid(nx/block_size, 1);

Given that it is very likely that the restriction n x · ne ≤ 512 will be violated, we define
only one grid with multiple blocks. Each block has a width of size ne and a height of
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size 20. We define as many blocks as necessary to cover all points in the productivity and
capital grids.
As already explained, the job assigned to each thread should be a function of its
coordinates inside the 5-dimensional structure defined by the user within the device. The
variables blockIdx.x, blockIdx.y, blockIdx.z, blockDim.x, ..., are used to access the
coordinates of each thread. Given these coordinates, the user should define the tasks
assigned to every thread. For example, in the case where we want to parallelize across the
productivity and capital dimensions, the function that computes the value function will
start as follows:

__global__ float value(parameters params, float* V, ...){
int ix = blockIdx.x * blockDim.x + threadIdx.x;
int ie = threadIdx.y;
// ...
}

This function will compute the value function at the ix point in the capital grid and
ie point in the productivity grid. Here, ie is simply given by the y-coordinate inside the
block, threadIdx.y, but ix is given both by the coordinate of the block, blockIdx.x, and
the x-coordinate within the block, threadIdx.x.
Finally, to compute the value function in parallel, the user can call the function value,
explicitly stating the dimensions defined above within <<<...>>>. After calling the
function, we must check that all workers finish their job before iterating to t − 1. For this,
we use the function cudaDeviceSynchronize right after calling the function value:

value<<<dimGrid, dimBlock>>>(params, V, ...);
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cudaDeviceSynchronize();

The function value is executed in the device, but is called from the host, so it is defined
as

global . Only functions that are called by the device, within parallel executions,

should be preceded by

device .

The function value is called at every iteration t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. Once the value function is
computed for a given t, the value function must be copied back to the CPU, again using the
cudaMemcpy function. However, the last input must be set as cudaMemcpyDeviceToHost, to
specify that V must be copied from device to host:

cudaMemcpy(hV, V, sizeV, cudaMemcpyDeviceToHost);

Finally, the function cudaFree is used to free the memory in the device at the end of
the computation:

cudaFree(V);

We run our CUDA code on the same machine as all the previous experiments. The
computer is equipped with a GeForce GTX 860M GPU with 640 CUDA cores and 4GiB
of memory. The average run time in 20 experiments is 1.86 seconds, slightly better, for
instance, than C++--OpenMP in 8 cores. As in the case with MPI, our problem is not complex
enough to show all the power of CUDA, but the results give, at least, a flavor of how to use
it and its potentialities.
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3.8.2

OpenACC

OpenACC is a model designed to allow parallel programming across different computer
architectures with minimum effort by the developer. It is built around a very simple set of
directives, very similar in design to OpenMP. To implement parallel computing, it suffices to
add a couple of lines of code, or directives, before a section of the code the researcher wants
to parallelize. Moreover, it is explicitly designed to be portable across different computer
architectures. This means that the same program can be compiled to be executed in parallel
using the CPU or the GPU (or mixing them), depending on the hardware available. In
this way, OpenACC can be used to perform the same task as OpenMP and MPI, with a similar
performance, but can also be used to perform GPU computing when available. Given
the similarities to its implementation in OpenMP, but the clear advantage of allowing the
user to execute the code in the GPU in addition to the CPU, OpenACC represents a more
powerful tool, although one still in relatively early stages of development. There are only
a couple of books written about it, for example, Farber (2017) and Chandrasekaran and
Juckeland (2017), neither of which is fully satisfactory.
OpenACC, like OpenMP, executes the code serially using the fork-join paradigm, until a
directive for parallel computing is found. The section of the code that is parallelizable is
then computed with the use of multiple CPU (or GPU) threads. Communication between
the master and worker threads in the parallel pool is automatically handled, although
the user can state directives to grant explicit access to variables, and to transfer objects
from the CPU to the GPU when required. After the parallel region is executed, the code is
serially executed until a new directive is found. As was the case with OpenMP, Figure 13
illustrates code execution in OpenACC.
The OpenACC website describes multiple compilers, profilers, and debuggers for
OpenACC. We use the PGI Community Edition compiler, which is a free release of PGI.
The reason for using PGI rather than GCC, as in Section 3.7.6 with OpenMP, is that the PGI
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compiler can be used with the CPUs and with NVIDIA Tesla GPUs. In this way, it suffices
to select different flags at compilation time to execute the code in the CPU or the GPU, as
will become clear in this section.
To implement the parallelization, we must include the directive #pragma acc parallel
loop right before the for loop:

#pragma acc parallel loop
for(int ix=0; ix<nx; ix++){
// ...
}

This directive has multiple options, among which the private(...) option allows
the user to specify which variables are private to each worker. The programmer can also
explicitly set barriers that synchronize every thread, synchronize the memory in the CPU
and the GPU, and so on. If we want to perform parallelization only with the CPU, in
which the memory is shared by workers, this directive and any options included are all
that is required. We can go on to compile the code, as explained below, and execute the
program. If we want to execute the code with the GPU, a data movement must be specified
between the host memory (CPU) and the device memory (GPU), given that the CPU and
GPU do not share memory.
Once compiled, the OpenACC code works as follows. The program is executed in serial
by the CPU until the first parallelization directive is encountered in the code. At this point,
the variables and objects required for each computation must be copied from the host
memory (CPU) to the device memory (GPU), before executing the code in parallel. Once
the parallel region is executed, for the program to work correctly, the objects that were
stored in the device memory must be copied back to the host memory. After that, the
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program is executed by the CPU in serial, until another parallel directive is encountered.
For this reason, the user must specify the points at which data movements should occur
between the CPU and the GPU.
The main directive for data movements is #pragma acc data copy(...), where the
variables that should be copied back and forth from CPU to GPU are specified inside the
copy(...) option. There are different options for data movements, such as copyin(...),
which only moves data from CPU to GPU, copyout(...), which only moves data from
GPU to CPU, and so on. This directive should be specified right before the #pragma acc
parallel loop that declares the beginning of a parallel region:

#pragma acc data copy(...)
#pragma acc parallel loop
for(int ix = 0; ix<nx; ix++){
//...
}

If we include the directive #pragma acc data copy(...), but compile the code to be
executed only with the CPU, this data movement directive is ignored, a convenient feature
for debugging and testing.
At this point, by choosing the appropriate compilation flag, the user can choose to
compile the code to be executed in parallel only in the CPU or in the GPU. To compile the
code to be executed by the CPU, we must include the -ta=multicore flag at compilation.
In addition, the -acc flag must be added to tell the compiler this is OpenACC code:

pgc++ Cpp_main_OpenACC.cpp -o Cpp_main -acc -ta=multicore
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If, instead, the user wants to execute the program with an NVIDIA GPU, we rely on
the -ta=nvidia flag:

pgc++ Cpp_main_OpenACC.cpp -o Cpp_main -acc -ta=nvidia

Importantly, we do not need to modify the code to parallelize with a multicore CPU
or with a GPU. This makes OpenACC a very portable parallel computing extension, and
reduces significantly the barriers to GPU computing.
When we run the code 20 times on the same computer and GPU described in previous
sections, we measure an average run time of 1.42 seconds, a record among all the options
presented so far. This result is impressive: given how easy it is to code in OpenACC and the
portability of the code among machines and processing units, OpenACC seems to be one of
the best available avenues for parallelization.

3.9 Beyond CPUs and GPUs
There are several alternatives for parallel computation beyond using CPUs and GPUs. First,
there is an intermediate option, the bootable host processors Intel Xeon PhiTM , which
can pack, in the current generation, up to 72 cores. In this guide, it is not necessary to
cover these processors, since MPI and OpenACC can easily handle them with straightforward
adaptations of the material presented in previous pages.
Similarly, we will not discuss how to use tensor processing units (TPUs) and fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGA). The former have just come on the market and are still
in an early stage of development, and we are not aware of any application in economics
that uses them. The latter are probably not efficient for most problems in economics due
to the hardware development cost. Nevertheless, for examples of this approach in finance,
where the cost considerations might be different, see the papers in Schryver (2015).
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3.10 Conclusion
As a summary of our discussion, Figure 21 illustrates the absolute performance of the
computation with each of the programming languages, according to the number of threads
used in the parallel pool (for codes in the GPU, we report a constant line, since, by
construction, we do not change the number of cores). The computation times for Julia
are calculated with the pmap function. Matlab, Python, and R are not included, because
they take much longer than the rest of the languages.
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Figure 21: Computing time (s) by language with different number of processors.
The best performance is attained when computing the model with CUDA and OpenACC
(when the latter performs the computations with the GPU). When looking only at parallel
CPU computing, the best performance is obtained with C++--OpenMP and C++--MPI. Rcpp
does an excellent job, nearly matching the speed of C++--OpenMP and C++--MPI. Julia falls
somewhat behind, pointing perhaps to the need to reconfigure our code to take advantage
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of the peculiarities of the language. Our results show also that employing Matlab, Python,
and R for this class of problems is not recommended and that parallelization does not fix
the speed problem of these languages.
We conclude our guide by reiterating that parallelization offers a fantastic avenue to
improve the performance of computations in economics. Furthermore, parallelization is
relatively easy to implement once one understands the basic concepts. Even in Julia,
where parallelization is trivial, and with a standard laptop, one can cut in half the run
time of a realistic model. If the researcher is willing to jump to OpenMP and OpenACC, the
gains are potentially much larger, especially if she has access to a more powerful computer
or cloud services.
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Appendices
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.1 Wall Street or Main Street: Who to Bail Out?
.1.1

Steady State Equilibrium

This definition is a particular case of Definition 1. In the initial and final steady states,
there is perfect foresight of house prices and foreclosures, so banks need no bailouts and
the government does not have access to the emergency policies described above. This
means that Ω and Θ are constant, so I will omit the dependency of the problem on the
aggregate variables. The following is the definition of a steady state equilibrium of this
economy.
Definition 2 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium are a value function V : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ −→ R, policy functions for default and refinancing d, s : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ −→ {0, 1},
and all other policy functions gc , gm , gh , gr , ga : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ −→ R+
for the household, a pricing function Pm : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M −→ R+ for mortgages, a price for rental housing q ∈ R+ , a price for new housing Ph ∈ R+ , a wage w ∈ R+ ,
a risk-free interest rate r ∈ R+ and distributions Φ : {1, . . . , T } × E × A × H × M × ∆ −→
[0, 1] such that:

1. [Households Optimize] Given prices Pm (·), Ph q, w and r the value function V solves
the household’s problem (2), with d, s, gkeep , gc , gm , gh , gr and ga the respective policy
functions.
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2. [Mortgage Originators Optimize] Given Ph , q, w and r, the pricing function Pm (·) for
mortgages satisfies an expected zero-profit condition loan by loan, given by equation
(7).

3. [Rental Market Clears] The rental housing price q is such that demand for rental
housing is equal to the total supply of housing in the economy:

Z
s

gr (s)dΦ(s)

=

H̄

4. [Housing Market Clears] The housing price Ph is such that home-ownership is equal
to total housing supply:
Z
s

gh (s)dΦ(s)

=

H̄

5. [Financial Assets Market Clears] The risk-free rate r is such that savings in the
economy equal total mortgage outlays by mortgage investors:

Z
s

ga (s)dΦ(s)

=

Z
s

Pm (s)gm (s)dΦ(s)

6. [Production Firms Optimize] The wage per efficiency unit of labor w is pinned
down by the technology parameter:

w=A
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7. [Social Security Budget Balance] The pension b given to retired households is such
that there is budget balance on the social security system:

b·

Z
s

1{t ≥ tret }dΦ(s)

=

Z
s

1{t < tret }τss eēt wgl (s)dΦ(s)

8. [Resource Constraint] The resource constraint holds:

A·

Z
s

eēt gl (s)dΦ(s)

=

"

Z
s

T

gc (s) + δPh h + F

∑
j=t

h

j
Πi=t πi

i h ρ i j−t
1+r

!

#
gm (s) dΦ(s)

9. [Distribution Consistency] The distribution Φ(t, ·), for t ∈ {2, . . . , T } is consistent
with the policy functions for the households, the Markov transition probabilities for
the idiosyncratic shocks and the initial distribution Φ(1, ·).
This is the definition in steady state, where no aggregate shocks occur, so banks
perfectly forecast the foreclosure rate in the economy and price the mortgages accordingly.
In equilibrium, by the law of large numbers, profits are exactly equal to zero, loan by loan,
and there is no government intervention.
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.1.2

Computation of the Model

As described in the Definition 2, in equilibrium the household’s problem must be solved
and the zero-profit condition for mortgages must hold. Note that the policy and value
functions for the household’s problem depend on the mortgage pricing function, and vice
versa. This means that both the household’s functions and mortgage pricing function
must be solved as a fixed point: a) given Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), the household’s problem
must be solved and, b) given the household’s policy functions, the zero-profit condition
for mortgages must hold.
To solve the fixed point, the computation of this model is composed by two subroutines: a) given a pricing function Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), solve the household’s problem
described in the recursive formulation in equation (2), by starting at the last period of
life and iterating backwards; and b) given the policy functions that solve the household’s
problem, solve the fixed point of the pricing function Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) given by equation
(7), by doing pricing function iteration.
Given the large number of state variables, I perform the computation using massive
parallel GPU computing, as described in Aldrich et al. (2010). Given a set of parameters,
the following algorithm is used to compute the equilibrium of the economy:

Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
0. Given parameters β, σ, κ, ψ, η, θl , πt , T, tret , λe , σe , m, ēt , ρ, . . ., start with an initial guess
for prices Ph0 , q0 , r0
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1. Set n = 0 and an initial guess for:

Mortgage pricing function:

Pm0 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω)

Policy functions:

D0 (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), C0 (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), . . .

Value function:

V 0 (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω)

2. Iteration n:
Subroutine 1 - Pricing Function Computation:
Given D n (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), C n (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), . . .
n,j

(a) Set j = 0 and Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) = Pmn (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω).
(b) Given j and the policy functions D n (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), C n (·), . . .,
n,j+1

compute Pm
n,j+1

(c) If Pm

(t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) , according to equation (7).
n,j

(t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) − Pm (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) < e, stop and set
n,j+1

Pmn+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) = Pm

(t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω).

Otherwise, set j = j + 1 and repeat (b).

Subroutine 2 - Value and Policy Functions Computation:
Given Pmn+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω):
(a) For j = T compute V n+1 (j, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), D n+1 (j, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), C n+1 (·), . . .,
by solving the static problem in equation (2)
(b) For j = T − 1, . . . , 1, given V n+1 (j + 1, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω) compute
V n+1 (j, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), . . ., by solving the equation (2)

n,j

3. If Pmn+1 (·) − Pm (·) + V n+1 (·) − V n (·) < e, continue.
Otherwise, set n = n + 1 and repeat 1.
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4. If Pmn+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and V n+1 (j, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω), D n+1 (·), C n+1 (·), . . .
are such that markets clear (Definition 2), stop.
Otherwise, set a new guess for Ph0 , q0 and r0 and go to 0.

Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
To compute the transitional dynamics of the model, assume that after the unexpected
shock the economy takes S periods before getting to the new stationary steady state, after
which it stays with certain probability.
0. Given parameters β, σ, κ, ψ, η, θl , πt , T, tret , λe , σe , m, ēt , ρ, . . ., start with an initial guess
for prices along the transition { Ps , qs , rs }Ss=1
1. Compute the pre-shock steady state and the corresponding distribution of households
Φ0 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω)
2. Iterate Backwards:
(a) s = S: Given Ps , qs , rs , compute Pms (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and V s (·), . . ., using the
algorithm for the Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (Section .1.2)
(b) Compute Pms−1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) given Pms (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and
V s (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), . . .
(c) Compute V s−1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), . . ., given Pms−1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and
V s (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), . . .
(d) If s > 1, set s = s − 1 and go to (b). Otherwise, continue.
3. Iterate Forward:
(a) s = 1: Set Φ1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) = Φ0 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω)
(b) Compute Φs+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), given Φs (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and the policy functions As (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), . . .
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(c) Compute aggregate quantities at s + 1, given prices Ps+1 , qs+1 , rs+1 , distribution of
individuals Φs+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω) and policy functions As+1 (t, e, a0 , h0 , m0 ; Ω), . . .,
as described in Definition 1.
(d) If s < S − 1, set s = s + 1 and go to (b). Otherwise, continue.
4. If markets clear at s = 1, . . . , S (Definition 1), stop. Otherwise, set a new guess for

{ Ps , qs , rs }Ss=1 and go to 1.
The tolerance level is given by e > 0, and the number of periods the economy takes to
arrive to the new steady state is assumed to be S = 10, that correspond to 20 years in the
data.
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.1.3

Proves of Propositions

Proof. The proof is done by induction on t. Define the following budget correspondence,
based on the household’s problem:


Γkeep (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω) = (l, c, a0 , s, h0 ) ∈ [0, 1] × R2+ × H2

|

c + (1 − τm )m + qs + Pa a0 + Ph δh ≤ (1 − τl )eēt wl + a + qh

In period t = T + 1, V keep (T + 1, ·) = 0, so the value function V keep (T, ·) only depends on a through the budget correspondence Γkeep (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω). Let a1 ≤ a2 .
Given that Γkeep (T, e, a1 , h, m, δ; Ω) ⊆ Γkeep (T, e, a2 , h, m, δ; Ω), it is straightforward that
V keep (T, e, a1 , h, m, δ; Ω) ≤ V keep (T, e, a2 , h, m, δ; Ω), as the maximization is done over a
larger set. Analogously, V de f (T, ·) and V re f (T, ·) are increasing on a. Given that the maximum of three functions that are increasing on a is itself increasing on a, then V(T, ·) is
increasing on a. By an analogous argument, V(T, ·) is increasing on h and decreasing on m
and δ. Continuity of V(T, ·) follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem, given that u(c, s) is
continuous, the correspondence Γkeep (t, e, a, h, m, δ; Ω) is non-empty, compact, upper- and
lower-semicontinuous.
Now, assume V(t + 1, ·) is increasing on a and h and decreasing on m and δ. Note that
V(t, ·) only depends on a, h, m and δ through the budget set. By the same argument as
above, V(t, ·) is increasing on a and h and decreasing on m and δ.
To prove that V(t, ·) is increasing on e, assume V(t + 1, ·) is increasing on e0 . Note
that for positive values of ρe , and e1 ≤ e2 the conditional distribution Fe (e0 |e2 ) first-order
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stochastically dominates Fe (e0 |e1 ), given that Fe (e0 |e2 ) ≤ Fe (e0 |e1 ), ∀e0 . Given that V(t + 1, ·)
is increasing on e, this implies that Ee0 |e2 ,δ0 ,m0 V(t + 1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m0 , δ0 ; Ω0 ) ≥ Ee0 |e1 ,δ0 ,m0 V(t +
1, e0 , a0 , h0 , m0 , δ0 ; Ω0 ) for all e0 , a0 , h0 , m0 , δ0 and Ω0 .
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.1.4

Other Figures
Owner Occupied Housing

Mortgage
0.16

1.5

Mortgages (m)

Housing (h)

0.12

1.0

0.5

0.08

0.04

0.0
20

30

40

50

60

0.00
20

70

30

40

50

Age

Age

% Home Equity by Age

Assets

60

70

60

70

1.00

0.3

Assets ($)

%

0.75

0.50

0.2

0.1
0.25

30

40

50

60

70

0.0
20

80

Age

30

40

50

Age

Model
SCF 2007

Figure 22: Life cycle averages of (a) Owner-occupied housing, (b) Mortgage size, (c) Home equity,
and (d) Savings
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.2 General Equilibrium Effects of Student Loans on the Provision
and Demand for Higher Education
.2.1

Appendix A

The problem of the households is:
0

c 1− σ
c 1− σ
+β
,
1−σ
c,l,h,a 1 − σ

max

s.t.

a + c + hPh + lPl = wθ(1 − h)(1 − l) + b
c0 = wθ + wθzh h + wθzl l + (1 + r)a

Solution of the unconstrained households:

Proof of Theorem 1. The unconstrained consumptions are:

( β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(2 + r) + (1 + r)b)

cN =

1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
0

cN =

l

c =

(wθ(2 + r) + (1 + r)b)
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

( β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(1 + zl ) + (1 + r)b − Pl (1 + r))
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
0

cl =

ch =

,

,

(wθ(1 + zl ) + (1 + r)b − Pl (1 + r))
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

( β(1 + r))−1/σ (wθ(1 + zh ) + (1 + r)b − Ph (1 + r))
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
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,

0

ch =

(wθ(1 + zh ) + (1 + r)b − Ph (1 + r))
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

The utilities of each of the options are:

u N = Φ × (wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ
ul = Φ × (wθ(1 + zl ) + b(1 + r) − Pl (1 + r))1−σ
uh = Φ × (wθ(1 + zh ) + b(1 + r) − Ph (1 + r))1−σ

where

Φ=



1
1−σ



!1− σ

1



1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

(β(1 + r))(σ−1)/σ + β



The household’s decision of whether and where to study follows a cut-off rule on θ,
and the decision is independent of initial wealth, b. The cut-offs are:

1+r
θ¯l =
w



Pl
zl − (1 + r)


,

1+r
θ¯h =
w



Ph − Pl
zh − zl



Wealth cutoff rules for households:

Proof of Theorem 2. The debt levels of the unconstrained households are:
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aN =

al =

ah =

wθ(1 − (β(1 + r))−1/σ ) + b
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

b − Pl − (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zl )
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)
b − Ph − (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zh )
1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)

Given the exogenous borrowing constraint Ā, for a given θ we can construct a cut-off
b̄(θ) on the initial wealth such that individuals with b < b̄(θ) are constrained and b ≥ b̄(θ)
are unconstrained. These are given by:

a N ≥ Ā

⇔

b ≥ − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)) − wθ(1 − ( β(1 + r))−1/σ )

al ≥ Ā

⇔

b ≥ Pl + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zl ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))

ah ≥ Ā

⇔

b ≥ Ph + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zh ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))

That is, the cut-offs are:

b¯uN (θ) = − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r)) − wθ(1 − ( β(1 + r))−1/σ )
b¯ul (θ) = Pl + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zl ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
b¯uh (θ) = Ph + (β(1 + r))−1/σ wθ(1 + zh ) − Ā(1 + ( β(1 + r))−1/σ (1 + r))
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This subdivides the state space in three subregions, as shown in the following Figure 2.

Solution of the constrained households:
Next, we have to consider the decision of studying of those households that are constrained.
Note that, although if an individual is borrowing constrained when he decides to study,
he might prefer to study and not smooth consumption, than not studying and being able
to smooth consumption. Therefore, we must compare the utility of studying while being
constrained, with the utility of not studying and being unconstrained. The constrained
consumptions are given by:

0

ccN = wθ + b + Ā,

ccN = wθ − (1 + r) Ā
0

clc = b − Pl + Ā,

ccl = wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā

cch = b − Ph + Ā,

cch = wθ(1 + zh ) − (1 + r) Ā

0

There are three decisions to characterize:
1. Whether to study in l or not study, for individuals that are constrained when studying
in l. These individuals will study in l whenever:


1
1−σ


(b − Pl + Ā)

1− σ


+

β
1−σ



(wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)1−σ −

Φ × (wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ ≥ 0
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2. Whether to study in l or in h, for individuals that are constrained when studying in h
but not constrained when studying in l. These individuals will study in h whenever:


1
1−σ



(b − Ph + Ā)

1− σ


+

β
1−σ



(wθ(1 + zh ) − (1 + r) Ā)

1− σ

−

Φ × (wθ(1 + zl ) + b(1 + r) − Pl (1 + r))1−σ ≥ 0

3. Whether to study in l or in h, for individuals that are constrained when they decide
to study in h or l. These individuals will study in h whenever:




1
1−σ

1
1−σ



(b − Ph + Ā)



(b − Pl + Ā)

1− σ


+



1− σ

−

β
1−σ

β
1−σ



(wθ(1 + zh ) − (1 + r) Ā)



(wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)

1− σ

1− σ

≥0

The cut-offs that define the college decision for constrained individuals are defined in
the following theorem proofs:

Proof of Theorem 3. Define the following function:


G(θ, b) =

1
1−σ



1− σ

(b − Pl + Ā)


+

β
1−σ



(wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)1−σ −

Φ × (wθ ∗ (2 + r) + b(1 + r))1−σ

(1)

Let the function b̄cl (θ) be implictly defined by the equality G(θ, b̄cl (θ)) = 0. By the implicit
function theorem,
∂b̄cl (θ)
∂G /∂θ
=−
∂θ
∂G /∂b
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Setting ∂G /∂θ = 0 gives the result in Theorem 3.

Proof of Theorem 4

Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is similar to Proof .2.1. Define:

∗



G (θ, b) =

1
1−σ



1− σ

(b − Ph + Ā)


+

β
1−σ



(wθ(1 + zh ) − (1 + r) Ā)1−σ −

Φ(wθ ∗ (1 + zl ) + b(1 + r) − Pl (1 + r))1−σ

and setting ∂G /∂θ = 0 gives the result in Theorem 4.

Proof of Theorem 5
∂G /∂ Ā

Proof of Theorem 5. By implicit function theorem, ∂b/∂ Ā = − ∂G/∂b .

∂G
= (b − Pl + Ā)−σ + β(1 + r)(wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)−σ ≥ 0
∂ Ā

Since ∂G /∂b > 0, the first result follows.
For the second result, note that:
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(2)


∂b
1 h
= 2 σβ(1 + r)w(1 + zl )(wθ(1 + zl ) − (1 + r) Ā)−(1+σ)
∂ Ā∂θ (·)
−σ

−σ

i

· (1 + r)((b − Pl + Ā) − Φ(1 − σ)(1 + r)(wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r)) )
(3)

1 
+ 2 (b − Pl + Ā)−σ + β(1 + r)(wθ(1 + zl ) − Ā(1 + r))−σ
(·)

· σΦ(1 − σ)w(1 + r)(2 + r)(wθ(2 + r) + b(1 + r))−σ
≥0

This proves Theorem 5.

Computation of Nash Equillibrium
In this section we will describe the algorithm used to compute the Nash Equilibrium
between elite and non-elite universities. The Nash Equilibrium is composed by a tuple
(Ph∗ , θh ∗ , Pl∗ , θl ∗ ) such that:
(Pi∗ , θi ∗ ) ∈ arg

max



(Pi ,θi )∈R+ ×[0,1]

zi (Pi , θi , P−∗ i , θ−i ∗ )

α 

σb,i (Pi , θi , P−∗ i , θ−i ∗ )

 1− α

(4)

Note that the problem defined in 4 involves solving for a fixed point nested within another
fixed point problem. In particular, the universities will offer a given level of zl , zh to the
households and, conditional on such offer households will demand education services that
need to fulfill the promised levels of zl , zh . This implies that when solving for the optimal
of the universities we need to take into account that the offered level of productivities
need to be satisfied by the demand of educational services. The full procedure to find the
Equilibrium is described below:
Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
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g

g

g

g

1. Start algorithm with some initial guess h Ph , θh , Pl , θl i. Set E = 10.

α 
1− α
g
g
2. Find h PhT , θhT i ∈ arg max(Ph ,θh )∈R+ ×[0,1] zh (Ph , θh , Pl , θl g )
σb,h (Ph , θh , Pl , θl g )
g

g

(a) Set h Phr , θhr i = h Ph , θh i
g

g

(b) Given h Phr , θhr , Pl , θl i, go to 5. to compute hzh , zl i
g

g

(c) Given S1 = h Phr , θhr , Pl , θl , zh , zl i compute the objective function of the university H(S1).
(d) Update for a new guess of the optimal h Phr , θhr i = h Phnew , θhnew i according to some rule.
(e) Repeat (b) − (d) until optimal h PhT , θhT i is found

α 
1− α
g g
g g
3. Find h PlT , θlT i ∈ arg max(Pl ,θl )∈R+ ×[0,1] zl (Ph , θh , Pl , θl )
σb,l (Ph , θh , Pl , θl )
g

g

(a) Set h Plr , θhl i = h Pl , θl i
g

g

(b) Given h Ph , θh , Plr , θlr i, go to 5. to compute hzh , zl i
g

g

(c) Given S1 = h Ph , θh , Plr , θlr , zh , zl i compute the objective function of the university L(S1).
(d) Update for a new guess of the optimal h Plr , θlr i = h Plnew , θlnew i
(e) Repeat (b) − (d) until optimal h PlT , θlT i is found
g

g

g

g

4. Set E = ||h Ph , θh , Pl , θl i − h PhT , θhT , PlT , θlT i||. If E is smaller than a tolerance level, stop the algorithm,
g

g

g

g

the NE is given by the tuple h PhT , θhT , PlT , θlT i. Otherwise, set h Ph , θh , Pl , θl i = h PhT , θhT , PlT , θlT i and go
to 2.
5. Computation of hzh , zl i given h Ph , θh , Pl , θl i
g

g

(a) Start algorithm with some initial guess hzh , zl i and set ε = 10
g

g

(b) Given h Ph , θh , Pl , θl i, the guess hzh , zl i and the policy functions of the households, compute the
realized values of hzrh , zrl i
g

g

(c) set ε = (zrh − zh )2 + (zrl − zl )2 .
g

g

(d) If ε is smaller to a tolerance level, the algorithm is complete. Otherwise, set hzh , zl i = hzrh , zrl i and
go to (b).
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Analysis in the linear case
In order to get a clear idea of how credit constraints affect the market for higher education,
we illustrate the linear case where σ = 1. Furthermore, we need to distinguish scenarios
where households would like to substitute future for current consumption and the other
way around. This is given by the inequality β(1 + r) < 1. Whenever this inequality is
satisfied, households would prefer to get as much debt during the first period. The
opposite case, when β(1 + r) ≥ 1 will motivate households to save as much as possible
given that the returns to savings, in terms of utility, are more than one to one.
Case 1.β(1 + r) ≥ 1
In this case, households will prefer to save as much as they want and then the value
functions for each case (not study, study in low quality university or study in high quality
university) are given by:

V N (b, θ) = β [b(1 − τ)(1 + r) + wθ(2 + r)]

(5)

(6)

The value function for households going to the low quality university is only defined
l

)
whenever they can afford it. That is, whenever Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤ min{ Ā, wθ(1+z
1+r }. In

particular, consider the case where Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤ 0. If this holds, then households are
able to afford the price of education with their income after taxes and thus we have no
concerns about they not getting enough debt to fund their education.
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However, when students should get positive debt in order to attend the low quality
university, the amount of debt should satisfy two constraints:

Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤ Ā
Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤

wθ(1 + zl )
1+r

(7)
(8)

The constraint given in 7 states that the amount of debt students get should not exceed
the upper limit given exogenously in the economy. The inequality given in 8 guarantees
that students have enough funds to get the necessary debt to attend college. The two
aforementioned inequalities give bounds in b and θ for students to being able to pay the
tuition in the low quality college:
Ā − Pl
1−τ
Pl
wθ(1 + zl )
b ≥ L(θ) =
−
1 − τ (1 − τ)(1 + r)
b ≥ b pl =

(9)
(10)

Now, for households with state variables (b, θ) such that low quality education is
affordable, we can define the value of going to the low university as:

h
i
V L (b, θ) = β (b(1 − τ) − Pl)(1 + r) + wθ(1 + zl )
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(11)

Similarly, in order to be able to go to the high quality institutions, it should be the case
that:
Ā − Ph
1−τ
Ph
wθ(1 + zh )
b ≥ H(θ) =
−
1 − τ (1 − τ)(1 + r)
b ≥ b ph =

(12)
(13)

For those households, we can define the value of going to the high quality college as:

h
i
V H (b, θ) = β (b(1 − τ) − Ph )(1 + r) + wθ(1 + zh )

(14)

Consider the case of a person who is deciding whether to go to the low quality college
or not study. In such case, granted that he could afford to pay tuition, he will decide to
attend whenever V L (b, θ) ≥ V N (b, θ). This implies that the decision will be to go to the
low quality college whenever:
Pl (1 + r)
w[zl − r − 1]

θl ≥ θ L =

(15)

Similarly, when a person is deciding whether to go to the high quality college or to the
low quality one, and granted he could afford both, the relevant decision rule will be to
go to the high quality college whenever V H (b, θ) ≥ V L (b, θ). This inequality generates the
decision rule of going to college whenever:

θ ≥ θH =

(Ph − Pl )(1 + r)
w(zh − zl )

(16)

The decision rules can be represented in the state space according to the following
graph:
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Figure 23: Representation of the education decisions on the state space.
Note that we can express N H in terms of elements that we have found previously:

NH =

Z θ Ih Z b̄
θH

H(θ)

dF(b, θ) +

Z 1 Z b̄
θ Ih

bPh

dF(b, θ)

(17)

where b̄ is the maximum level of bequests in the state space and

θ Ih =

(1 + r) Ā
(1 + zh )w

(18)

For the sake of simplicity, we will assume a uniform distribution for (b, θ). As long as
Ph > Pl and zh > zl we can express the measure of people going to the high quality
university as:

N

H

1
=
b̄



Ph
b−
1−τ



(1 + r) Ā
(P − P )(1 + r)
− h hl l
(1 + zh )w
w(z − z )
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(19)

+

"

w(1 + zh )
(1 − τ)(1 + r)

(1 + r) Ā
w(1 + zh )

2



−

(Ph − Pl )(1 + r)
w(zh − zl )

2 ##

Similarly, the average level of skills of people attending such college is given by:

θ̃ H =

1
b̄

" 

(1 + r) Ā
(1 + zh )w

w(1 + zh )
3(1 − τ)(1 + r)

2



−

"

(Ph − Pl )(1 + r)
w(zh − zl )

(1 + r) Ā
w(1 + zh )

"
1
Ā
Ph
b̄ −
+
2
1−τ 1−τ

3

−


1−



2 ! 

Ph
b̄
−
2 2(1 − τ)

(Ph − Pl )(1 + r)
w(zh − zl )

(1 + r) Ā
1(1 + zh )


+

3 #
+

2 !##
(20)

We can express the relevant variables for low quality college, granted Ph > Pl and zh > zl ,
as:

NL =

Z θH Z 1
θL

L(θ)

dF(b, θ) +

θH

Z θ Ih Z H(θ)
θ Il

L

θ̃ =

bPl

Z θH Z 1
θL

L(θ)

θ Il

bPl

dF(b, θ) +

θdF(b, θ) +

Z θ Ih Z H(θ)

Z θ Il Z H(θ)

Z 1 Z bPh
θ Ih

bPl

dF(b, θ)+

dF(b, θ)

(21)

Z θ Il Z H(θ)
θH

θdF(b, θ) +
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L(θ)

L(θ)

θdF(b, θ)+

Z 1 Z bPh
θ Ih

bPl

θdF(b, θ)

(22)

µb L =

Z θH Z 1
L(θ)

θL

bdF(b, θ) +

Z θ Ih Z H(θ)
θ Il

bPl

Z θ Il Z H(θ)
θH

bdF(b, θ) +

L(θ)

bdF(b, θ)+

Z 1 Z bPh
θ Ih

bPl

bdF(b, θ)

(23)

It is important to note that throughout this analysis we have not implemented the fact
that both colleges are able to set a threshold rule such that people with a level of skills
below such threshold will not be admitted. In such a case, we will simply modify the
regions of integration to consider that only people with ability beyond the threshold will
be able to attend.
Existence of equilibrium
The expressions found in 19, 20, 21 and 22 can be used to express the necessary
conditions that the offered qualities need to satisfy in equilibrium. In particular, we need
to find zh , zl such that:
  

 α1
 α2
l
h
l
h
l
h
l
h
h
h
h
I(θ , θ , Ph , Pl , z , z ) 
z  κ θ̃ (θ , θ , Ph , Pl , z , z )
 =

α 
α
κ l θ̃ h (θ l , θ l , Ph , Pl , zh , zl ) 1 I(θ h , θ l , Ph , Pl , zh , zl ) 2
zl

(24)

We need to prove existence of a fixed point in the qualities offered by universities
before proving the existence of the Nash Equilibrium. Note, however, that difficulty arises
in this point given the fact that there is no natural way to bound the set of qualities offered
by the universities. Additionally, note that equations 19, 20, 21 are not continuous in
zh = zl . The inability of proving the existence of a fixed point in the qualities offered by
universities shows that it is not possible to prove existence of the Nash Equilibrium. We
rely purely on the computational analysis to find a Nash Equilibrium in this case that
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might not be unique.
Case 2.β(1 + r) < 1

This case is more involved as households value more current consumption than future
and will try to get as much debt as possible. The difficulty arises as even when students can
afford to pay college, they might be constrained given that they want to substitute future
by current consumption. Additionally, we need to establish which is the relevant constraint
that households face when getting the desired level of debt, either the exogenously given
level of credit constraint or they reach a point where they can’t fund the debt with their
resources.
We start analyzing the case of a person who is not going to university. In this case, the
person will get as much debt as possible and he will be constrained whenever

wθ
1+r

> Ā. If

this is the case, the person will get the maximum level of debt Ā. Taking into account this
case when computing the value of not going to college, we see that:

N

V (b, θ) =




b(1 − τ) + wθ 2+r if θ ≤
1+r

Ā(1+r)
w

(25)



b(1 − τ) + w(θ)(1 + β) + Ā[1 − β(1 + r)] if θ > Ā 1+r
w

Now, let’s consider a household that goes to the low-quality university. Evidently, the
value function will only be defined for the case when it is possible to pay tuition price via
endowment or debt. For people whose income is below the tuition price (b(1 − τ) < Pl )
and who are constrained either by the exogenous level Ā or by their earning capacity
wθ(1+zl )
1+r ,

the value of going to the low quality college will not be defined.

An individual who is not constrained and takes as much debt as he can, will derive
utility given by b(1 − τ) − Pl +

wθ(1+zl )
1+r .

The first term, b(1 − τ) − Pl corresponds to net

income after tuition and the remaining part

wθ(1+zl )
1+r
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is simply the amount they will make

in the second period taken to the present value of the first period.
If the net income after tuition is negative, an individual will not be credit constrained
so long as:

Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤ min{ Ā,

wθ(1 + zl )
}
1+r

(26)

However, it is possible to have individuals who are borrowing constrained even if the
net income after tuition is positive. These individuals are those who would like to borrow
against their future income, given that current consumption is more valuable than future
consumption, but they are not able to borrow as much as they want given the exogenous
limit Ā. Those are individuals such that:

wθ(1 + zl )
< Ā
(1 + r)

(27)

and they are forced to borrow no more than Ā. This implies that we can define the value of going to low-quality college
as:

L

V (b, θ) =














b(1 − τ) − Pl +





wθ(1+zl )
1+r

if






b(1 − τ) − Pl ≥ 0





or








b(1 − τ) − Pl < 0

θ≤

Ā(1+r)
w(1+zl )



Pl − b(1 − τ) ≤ min{ Ā,













b(1 − τ) − Pl + Ā[1 − β(1 + r)] + wβ(1 + zl ) if b(1 − τ) − Pl > 0 and θ >
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w(θ)(1+zl )
}
1+r

Ā(1+r)
w(1+zl )

(28)

Finally, doing the same analysis but with Ph and zh we can find the value of going to
the high quality college:

H

V (b, θ) =














b(1 − τ) − Ph +




wθ(1+zh )
1+r

if






b(1 − τ) − Ph ≥ 0






θ≤

Ā(1+r)
w(1+zh )

or








b(1 − τ) − Ph < 0

h)


Ph − b(1 − τ) ≤ min{ Ā, w(θ)(1+z
}

1+r












b(1 − τ) − Ph + Ā[1 − β(1 + r)] + wβ(1 + zh ) if b(1 − τ) − Ph > 0 and θ > Ā(1+r)h
w(1+z )

(29)

Life-cycle Model
In this section we embed a life-cycle model into a two-period model, so our calibration
of Section 2.5.2 is realistic. We solve the household’s problem in two parts: 1) during the
study periods, t = 0, . . . , S − 1, and 2) after college age, S, . . . , T, and leave the problem
expressed as a two-period maximization problem in which households decide how much
to save for post-college periods. First, we start by solving the post-college optimization
problem. We assume that after college graduation, individuals enter perfect financial
markets, so there is perfect consumption smoothing. The problem of the households is:

T

max ∑ βt−S
ct

t=S

c1t −σ
,
1−σ

s.t.

cS = b + aS+1 + w(1 + z j )θ
ct + at (1 + r) = at+1 + w(1 + z j )θ,

t ∈ {S, . . . , T }

where at+1 is the debt at period t to be repaid next period, and b are the savings that the
individual carries from the college years. In here, we assume that there are no borrowing
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constraints, since households enter perfect financial markets. Solving this problem, yields
the present value budget constraint in period S:

T

ct

∑ (1 + r)t−S

t=S

T

wθ(1 + z j )
(1 + r)t−S
t=S

= b+∑

Combining this with the Euler equation, the optimal consumption path is given by:

cS =


1
b + w(1 + z j )θΦro
ΦS

ct = ((1 + r)β)

t−S
σ

cS ,

t ∈ {S, . . . , T }

where ΦS and Φro are given by the following expressions:

ΦS =

1−



1−

β
(1+r)σ−1



 T−σS+1

β
(1+r)σ−1

Φro

 σ1

=


1 T −S+1
1+r

1
1 − 1+r

1−

The present value utility at time S of this consumption path is given by:
T

∑ βt−S u(ct ) = ΦS u(cS )

t=S

Note that cS is determined for every given savings b carried from the college period, so
without solving the problem for periods {0, . . . , S − 1}, it will not be completely pinned
down. Now, we solve for the households’ problem during periods 0, . . . , S − 1. Given
that during college, there exist exogenous borrowing constraints given by Ā, there are
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two cases: a) individuals are unconstrained, and b) individuals are constrained. The
unconstrained solution of the problem in periods {0, . . . , S − 1} yields:

y

c0 Φ0 + (Ph h + Pl l)Φr +

a
y
= wθΦr (1 − l)(1 − h) + b
S
(1 + r)
t

ct = ((1 + r)β) σ c0 ,

t ∈ {1, . . . , S − 1}
y

where b is the initial wealth of individuals, and Φ0 , Φr are given by:

Φ0 =

1−



1−



β
(1+r)σ−1
β
(1+r)σ−1

 σS
 σ1

y
Φr

=

1−
1−


1 S
1+r

1
1+r

Utility in period 0 is given by
S

∑ βt u(ct ) = Φ0 u(c0 )
t=0

Note that now, the problem can be perfectly embedded in the two-period model
described in Section 2.3. Households solve the following two-period problem:

u(c0 ) + β̃u(cS ),

max
c0 ,cS

s.t.

cs ΦS = a + wθ(1 + z j )Φro
y

c0 Φ0 + (Ph h + Pl l)Φr +

a
y
= wθΦr (1 − l)(1 − h) + b
(1 + r)S
a ≥ − Ā
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where:
β̃ =

β S ΦS
Φ0

These two budget constraints can be rewritten as a single lifetime budget constraint:

y

c0 Φ0 + (Ph h + Pl l)Φr +

wθ(1 + z j )Φro
c s Φs
y
=
wθΦ
(1
−
l)(1
−
h)
+
+b
r
(1 + r)S
(1 + r)S

The unconstrained consumptions are given by:

cn =

ch =

cl =

h  o

S Φy
r
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ) wθ Φr +(1+r)
+
ΦS
1+

b(1+r)S
ΦS

y

−

Ph Φr (1+r)S
ΦS

−

Pl Φr (1+r)S
ΦS

i

(β(1+r))(−S/σ) Φ0 (1+r)S
ΦS

h
Φro
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ) wθ(1 + zl ) Φ
+
S
1+

i

(β(1+r))(−S/σ) Φ0 (1+r)S
ΦS

h
Φro
(β(1 + r))(−S/σ) wθ(1 + zh ) Φ
+
S
1+

b(1+r)S
ΦS

b(1+r)S
ΦS

(β(1+r))(−S/σ) Φ0 (1+r)S
ΦS
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y

i

.3 A Practical Guide to Parallelization in Economics
To understand the role that optimization flags play in the performance of the C++ codes, we
plot in Figure 24 the run times for a different number of processors with no optimization
flags and with three flags (from less aggressive, -O1, to most aggressive, -O3) in the case
of C++--OpenMP.
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Total Computation Time (s)

No flags

Physical cores
20

Time (s)

15

10

−O1

−O2
5
−O3
CUDA
OpenAcc
1
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5

6

7

8

# of cores

Figure 24: Computing time(s) in C++ with different number of processors and optimization
flags.
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